Public and Private Sector Discount Rates in Public-Private Partnerships

Whether public sector projects should be discounted at a lower rate than private sector projects is a highly contentious issue and one that has spawned an enormous literature. The purpose of this paper is to assess the appropriate private and public sector discount rates in the context of public private partnerships. It is shown that there are powerful arguments for using a higher rate to discount private projects than public sector projects and that failure to recognise this may lead to excessive reliance on public provision. It is important to emphasise, however, that the reason for the divergence is not related to the conventional arguments of incomplete markets or taxation. Finally, we suggest that the results may have far broader implications for private sector involvement in public services.discount rates, public-private partnerships

Competition Law in Telecommunications and its Implications for Common Carriage of Water

As with most water companies in the world UK water companies face very little competition for the delivery of water within their area. However, recently both the government and the regulator, Ofwat, have indicated that they wish to see a major change in the industry through a significant growth of competition. The pricing of common carriage of water will be central to whether this objective can be achieved. The aim of this paper is assess UK and European competition policy in telecommunications and the lessons that can be learnt from this for the regulation of common carriage in the water industry.anti-trust, competition policy, regulation, utilities

Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment

How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bureaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.donated labor, intrinsic motivation, non-profit organizations, power within organizations

Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment

How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bu- reaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.donated labor, intrinsic motivation, non-profit organizations, power within organizations

Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment

How does the environment of an organization infuence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bu- reaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.

Financing and Managing Public Services: An Assessment

Public services can be, and are, delivered according to a variety of different arrangements. The public sector can finance and provide a service itself, or contract with the private sector to participate in provision, or its role may be limited to regulating a private provider. In this paper we examine the features determining the effectiveness of public-service delivery, including incentives for employees and teams within organizations providing public services, the structure of the organization and the competitive framework that it faces, and the role of the private sector. We assess the reform programme in the UK, which has involved substantial reorganization of public services and increasing involvement of the private sector. Reforms focus on the improvement of incentives; but while incentives are critical, the special characteristics of public services (and the people who provide them) must be recognized in the implementation of new structures and incentive schemes.public services, public management

Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment

How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bureaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.donated labor, intrinsic motivation, non-profit organizations, power within organizations

The Role of Donated Labour and Not for Profit at the Public/Private Interface

The aim of this paper is to assess the role of donated labour and not-for-profit (NFP) entities at the public private interface. After discussing what a NFP enterprise is and providing general background, we look at the underlying theory of NFP institutions. The fact that NFP companies are able to precommit themselves not to expropriate donated labour is identified as a primary justification of the NFP model and we emphasise the role that purchasers play in the expropriation problem and suggest that this is a particular concern for institutions at the public private interface. After summarising the empirical literature we provide a brief case study of Glas Cymru and show that it is likely to fall foul of the purchaser problems in that the structure makes it hard to avoid expropriation of donated labour. Although there is limited empirical evidence investigation of what is available suggests that the shift from FP to NFP has had no significant effect on the company. Finally, we address the issue of Foundation Hospitals and suggest that there is more, albeit limited, reason to suggest that the NFP status will prove beneficial for donating labour.not-for-profit, public private interface

Value-for-money measurements in public-private partnerships

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are long-term partnerships between the public and private sectors that usually involve the private sector undertaking investment projects that traditionally have been executed (or at least financed) and owned by the public sector. This paper considers alternative approaches to value-for-money tests and discusses some of the main conceptual problems associated with these tests. It explains why comparisons between private bids and a public sector comparator are difficult and prone to significant error. It is argued that tests centered on comparisons between private sector alternatives are well focussed, less prone to measurement error than other tests, and more likely to deliver the best candidate from the group it considers. The paper also considers the PPP evidence from the United Kingdom and summarises the experience of outsourcing in the private sector

The Costs and Benefits of "Strangers": Why Mixed Communities Are Better

Much of the literature on diversity assumes that individuals have an exogenous "taste for discrimination". In contrast with this approach, we build a model where preferences over the nature of one's community are derived indirectly, and arise because the composition of the community determines the behavior of its members. This allows us to gain a far deeper understanding of the forces that underpin the desirability of diversity or homogeneity within communities. Our main contribution is to show that there are always counteracting forces (heterogeneity involves both costs and benefits), and that, although people prefer to live in communities where their type is majoritarian, they always benefit from having some heterogeneity in the composition of their community.heterogeneity, social interactions, value of information, complementarities.