Moral Vices as Artistic Virtues: Eugene Onegin and Alice

Moralists hold that art criticism can and should take stock of moral considerations. Though moralists disagree over the proper scope of ethical art criticism, they are unified in their acceptance of the consistency of valence thesis: when an artwork fares poorly from the moral point of view, and this fact is art critically relevant, then it is thereby worse qua artwork. In this paper, I argue that a commitment to moralism, however strong, is unattractive because it requires that we radically revise our art critical practices in contexts where revision seems ill advised. I will consider two such cases, Pushkin\u27s Eugene Onegin and Balthus\u27 Alice. When we further reflect on our actual art critical practices in cases like these, we find that we do not have an unfailing commitment to the consistency of valence thesis. That is, some artworks are (artistically) good because they are (morally) bad

The Incorrigible Social Meaning of Video Game Imagery

In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video play, viz., \u27come on, it\u27s only a game!\u27 The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue that the amoralist is mistaken and that there are non-consequentialist resources for morally evaluating our single-player game play. On my view, some video games contain details that anyone who has a proper understanding of and is properly sensitive to features of a shared moral reality will see as having an incorrigible social meaning that targets groups of individuals, e.g., women and minorities. I offer arguments to support the claim that there are such incorrigible social meanings and that they constrain the imaginative world so that challenges like \u27it\u27s only a game\u27 lose their credibility. I also argue that our responses to such meanings bear on evaluations of our character, and in light of this fact video game designers have a duty to understand and work against the meanings of such imagery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR

Fitting Attitude Theory and the Normativity of Jokes

We defend a fitting-attitude (FA) theory of the funny against a set of potential objections. Ultimately, we endorse a version of FA theory that treats reasons for amusement as non-compelling, metaphysically non-conditional, and alterable by social features of the joke telling context. We find that this version of FA theory is well-suited to accommodate our ordinary practices of telling and being amused by jokes, and helpfully bears on the related faultless disagreement dispute

Monstrous Thoughts and the Moral Identity Thesis

The responses are not simply imagined: we are prescribed by Justine actually to find erotically attractive the fictional events, to be amused by them, to enjoy them, to admire this kind of activity. So the novel does not just present imagined events, it also presents a point of view on them, a perspective constituted in part by actual feelings, emotions, and desires that the reader is prescribed to have toward the merely imagined events. Given that the notion of response covers such things as enjoyment and amusement, it is evident that some kinds of responses are actual, and not just imagined. I can criticize someone for taking pleasure in others\u27 pain, for being amused by sadistic cruelty, for being angry at someone when she has done no wrong, for desiring the bad. The same is true when responses are directed at fictional events, for these responses are actual, not just imagined ones

Pornography, Ethics, and Video Games

In a recent and provocative essay, Christopher Bartel attempts to resolve the gamer\u27s dilemma. The dilemma, formulated by Morgan Luck, goes as follows: there is no principled distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. So, we\u27ll have to give up either our intuition that virtual murder is morally permissible-seemingly leaving us over-moralizing our gameplay-or our intuition that acts of virtual pedophilia are morally troubling-seemingly leaving us under-moralizing our game play. Bartel\u27s attempted resolution relies on establishing the following three theses: (1) virtual pedophilia is child pornography, (2) the consumption of child pornography is morally wrong, and (3) virtual murder is not murder. Relying on Michael Rea\u27s definition of pornography, I argue that we should reject thesis one, but since Bartel\u27s moral argument in thesis two does not actually rely thesis one that his resolution is not thereby undermined. Still, even if we grant that there are adequate resources internal to Bartel\u27s account to technically resolve the gamer\u27s dilemma his reasoning is still unsatisfying. This is so because Bartel follows Neil Levy in arguing that virtual pedophilia is wrong because it harms women. While I grant Levy\u27s account, I argue that this is the wrong kind of reason to resolve the gamer\u27s dilemma because it is indirect. What we want is to know what is wrong with virtual child pornography itself. Finally, I suggest alternate moral resources for resolving the gamer\u27s dilemma that are direct in a way that Bartel\u27s resources are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR

Population Characteristics of Largemouth Bass Associated with Changes in Abundance of Submersed Aquatic Vegetation in Lake Seminole, Georgia

Population characteristics of largemouth bass ( Micropterus salmoides L.) including growth, body condition (relative weight), survival, and egg production were examined in relation to abundance of submersed aquatic vegetation (SAV) coverage (primarily hydrilla [ Hydrilla verticillata L.f. Royle]) in three embayments of Lake Seminole, GA, and compared to a previous study conducted in 1998. (PDF has 8 pages.