Systemically Important Banks and Capital Regulation Challenges

Bank regulation might have contributed to or even reinforced adverse systemic shocks that materialised during the financial crisis. Capital regulation based on risk-weighted assets encourages innovation designed to circumvent regulatory requirements and shifts banks’ focus away from their core economic functions. Tighter capital requirements based on risk-weighted assets may further contribute to these skewed incentives. The estimated macroeconomic costs of redirecting banks’ attention away from such unconventional business practices are low. During a medium-term adjustment period, for each percentage point of bank equity, regulation that is not based on risk-weighted assets would affect annual GDP growth by -0.02 percentage point more than under the risk-weighted assets framework. Refocusing banks’ attention toward their main economic functions is a core requirement for durable financial stability and sustainable economic growth. Banques d'importance systémique: défis pour la réglementation du capital La réglementation bancaire pourrait avoir contribué, voire renforcé, des chocs systémiques qui se sont matérialisés lors de la crise financière. La réglementation des fonds propres fondée sur des actifs pondérés par les risques encourage l'innovation conçue pour contourner les exigences réglementaires et éloigne les préoccupations des banques de leurs principales fonctions économiques. Le resserrement des exigences en capital fondées sur les actifs pondérés du risque peut exacerber ce biais d’incitation. Des estimations suggèrent que rediriger l’activité des banques hors de telles pratiques commerciales nonconventionnelles ne serait guère coûteux. Pendant une période d'ajustement de moyen terme, pour chaque point de pourcentage du ratio de capitaux propres bancaires, une réglementation qui ne s’appuie pas sur les actifs pondérés du risque réduirait la croissance annuelle du PIB de seulement 0,02 point de pourcentage de plus qu’une réglementation fondée sur les actifs pondérés par les risques. Un recentrage de l’attention des banques vers leurs principales fonctions économiques est une exigence fondamentale pour garantir la stabilité financière et une croissance économique durables.systemically important financial institutions, financial stability, Basel accord, Basel III, financial regulation, Too-big-to-fail, Bank Leverage, capital requirements, crise financière, réglementation financière, institutions financières d'importance systémique, levier bancaire, stabilité financière, Accord de Bâle, Bâle III

A Market Perspective on the European Sovereign Debt and Banking Crisis

Europe has been beset by an interrelated banking crisis and sovereign debt crisis. Bond spreads faced by Greece and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Portugal followed by Spain, have increased. This paper explores these issues from the perspective of financial markets, focusing mainly on the four countries in the frontline of these pressures: Greece and Portugal, on the one hand, where the problems are primarily fiscal in nature; and Ireland and Spain, on the other, where banking problems related to the property boom and bust have been the key moving part. The paper first examines the probabilities of default implicit in observable market spreads and considers these calculations against sovereign debt dynamics. It then explores the implications of the interaction between bank losses and fiscal deficits on the one hand, and the feedback that any debt haircuts anticipated by markets could have on bank solvency. The study finds that market-implied sovereign default probabilities do in fact discriminate quite clearly between countries based on five criteria that affect the probability of debt restructuring. The discussion highlights some implications for banking system balance sheets of expected losses and shows the potential impact on them of sovereign restructuring implicit in market analysis. While the paper does not make any recommendations for policy action, it does explore a range of policy options and the implications each might have for the financial markets. JEL Classification: G01, G12, G15, G18, G21, H06, H60, H62, H63, H68 Keywords: financial crisis, sovereign risks, public deficits and debt, bond markets, banks.

Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III

The estimated medium-term impact of Basel III implementation on GDP growth is in the range of -0.05 to -0.15 percentage point per annum. Economic output is mainly affected by an increase in bank lending spreads as banks pass a rise in bank funding costs, due to higher capital requirements, to their customers. To meet the capital requirements effective in 2015 (4.5% for the common equity ratio, 6% for the Tier 1 capital ratio), banks are estimated to increase their lending spreads on average by about 15 basis points. The capital requirements effective as of 2019 (7% for the common equity ratio, 8.5% for the Tier 1 capital ratio) could increase bank lending spreads by about 50 basis points. The estimated effects on GDP growth assume no active response from monetary policy. To the extent that monetary policy will no longer be constrained by the zero lower bound, the Basel III impact on economic output could be offset by a reduction (or delayed increase) in monetary policy rates by about 30 to 80 basis points. Impact macro-économique de Bâle III L'impact estimé à moyen terme de la mise en conformité avec les règles de Bâle III sur la croissance du PIB est de l'ordre de -0,05 à -0,15 point de pourcentage par an. L’effet sur l’activité économique provient principalement de ce que les banques augmentent leurs marges de crédit afin de compenser la hausse de leurs coûts de financement provoquée par le durcissement des exigences de capital. Pour répondre aux exigences de fonds propres en 2015 (4,5% pour le ratio d'actions ordinaires, 6% pour le ratio de fonds propres de base), les banques devraient augmenter leurs marges de crédit d'environ 15 points de base en moyenne. Les exigences de capital en vigueur à compter de 2019 (7% pour le ratio d'actions ordinaires, 8,5% pour le ratio de fonds propres de base) pourraient augmenter les marges de crédit d’environ 50 points de base. Les effets estimés sur la croissance du PIB n’incorporent aucune réponse de la politique monétaire. Pour autant que la politique monétaire ne se heurte plus au plancher zéro des taux nominaux, l'impact de Bâle III sur la production économique pourrait être compensé par une réduction (ou un retard avant l’augmentation) des taux de la politique monétaire d'environ 30 à 80 points de base.monetary policy, bank, financial intermediaries, bank regulation, bank lending, interest rates, Basel accord, Basel III, bank capital requirements, politique monétaire, banque, taux d'intérêt, Réglementation des fonds propres bancaires, Accord de Bâle, Bâle III, crédit bancaire, réglementation bancaire, intermédiaires financiers

The EU Stress Test and Sovereign Debt Exposures

This working paper’s quantifications show that most sovereign debt is held on the banking books of banks, whereas the EU stress test considered only their small trading book exposures. It discusses why sovereign debt held in the banking book cannot be ignored by investors and creditors, because of: (a) recovery values in the event of individual bank failures; and (b) fiscal sustainability and structural competitiveness issues which mean the market cannot give a zero probability to debt restructurings beyond the period of the stress test and/or the period after which the role of the European Financial Stability Facility Special Purpose Vehicle (EFSF SPV) comes to an end. How the SPV could operate to shift sovereign risk from banks to the public sector is also an important part of the discussion.financial stability

The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do

Contagion risk and counterparty failure have been the main hallmarks of the current crisis. While some large diversified banks that focused mainly on commercial banking survived very well, others suffered crippling losses. Sound corporate governance and strong riskmanagement culture should enable banks to avoid excessive leverage and risk taking. The question is whether there is a better way, via leverage rules or rules on the structures of large conglomerates, to ensure volatile investment banking functions do not dominate the future stability of the commercial banking and financial intermediation environment that is so critical for economic activity. While there is a main consensus on the need for reform of capital rules, dynamic provisioning, better co-operation for future crises, centralised trading of derivatives etc., the question is whether such reforms will be sufficient if they do not address contagion and counterparty risk directly. The world outside of policy making is waiting for a fundamental reassessment of banks’ business models: what banks are supposed to do and how they compete with each other. It is the “elephant in the room” on which some policy makers have not yet had the time or inclination to focus. This article emphasises not only the need for transparent and comparable accounting rules and for improvements in corporate governance, but also supports the imposition of a group leverage ratio to provide a binding capital constraint (that Basel riskweighted rules have been unable to achieve) and proposes a Non- Operating Holding Company Structure (NOHC) – reforms that are essential to deal with contagion and counterparty risk that are so integral to the ‘too big to fail’ issue.