547 research outputs found
Deterrence vs. Efficiency To Regulate Nonpoint Source Pollution
In the context of nonpoint source pollution the regulator can not attribute individually the responsibility of pollution because of informational asymmetry which makes the costs of monitoring of individual emission very high. This grounds a moral hazard problem. We analyse group performance based instruments to regulate this kind of informational problem. In particular, we assess randomand collective fining schemes with respect to their deterrence and efficiency. We show that a collective fine scheme is more deterrent than a random fine scheme. However, the analysis of efficiency is less categorical between these two schemes. The efficiency depends on the number of non-compliant agents. If the number of non-compliant agents is high it is better to implement a collective fine scheme. If the number of non-compliant agents is small it is better to implement a random fine scheme.
Tradable Permits Under Threat to Manage Nonpoint Source Pollution
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in group. To solve this kind of problem we consider a group performance based tax coupled to tradable permits market. The tax is activated if the group fails to meet the ambient standard. So the role of the tax is to provide an incitation to ensure that the agents provide the abatement level necessary to achieve the standard. The role of the tradable permits market is to distribute effectively this abatement level through the price of the permits which rises with the exchange of the permits.nonpoint source pollution, ambient tax, tradable permits market, Environmental Economics and Policy,
RĂ©duire les pollutions diffuses
Les enjeux des pollutions diffuses sur la qualité de la ressource en eau et la santé humaine sont tels qu'une démarche intensive de recherche sur le contrÎle de ces pollutions a été engagée, dont témoigne le rapport "Pesticides, agriculture et environnement" de l'INRA et du CEMAGREF. Les économistes y apportent leur compréhension propre des mécanismes publics de gestion mais cette démarche implique la mobilisation d'un grand nombre de disciplines.
From Experience to Experiments in South African Water Management: Defining the Framework
A role-playing game (RPG), KatAware, was developed in the Kat River catchment of South Africa to support the negotiation process among water users on the allocation rules of the resource. Playing the RPG with local stakeholders exhibited some regularity in the behaviour of players, particularly on their attitude of defining binding agreements. These regularities were first formalized through a model of cooperative game theory (CGT), and then, to confirm the results of the model, tested by an experimental protocol. Both the model and the protocol were based and calibrated on the results of the RPG. The progressive simplification (decontextualization) required to bring the RPG into the laboratory suggested to explore the role of context (in our case water related issues) on playersâ behaviour. The objective of this paper is to illustrate the process that conducted the research team from the experience in the Kat River to the first experiments to test the hypotheses exhibited in the experience and then to analyze the influence of context on playersâ behaviour. Terms and concepts are clarified in order to provide a clear research framework in this new field at the border between experiences and experiments in social sciences for commons management.
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