Political Quotas and Governance

Reserving political office for members of a particular, usually disadvantaged, group is a common form of political quota in many parts of the world. This has been shown to improve distributional access in favour of reserved groups, but often conjectured (and shown) to come at the cost of governance quality. We develop the first theoretical model to demonstrate the opposite possibility; a reduction in political competition - due to office being restricted to members of a pre-designated group - can improve governance. The model establishes a tight set of predictions regarding when improvements should be expected to occur, and when not. Such predictions are not yielded by alternative theories of political competition, are a priori unlikely to occur by chance, and have never been investigated in the large empirical literature on the effects of political reservations. We first show, in a Maharashtrian sample of rural villages, that governance outcomes dramatically increase under reservations. This is the first such effect documented in the literature. We then demonstrate a non-uniform pattern of improvement that lines up precisely with the predictions of the theory developed here

Fast Fourier Transform computations and build-up of plastic deformation in 2D, elastic-perfectly plastic, pixelwise disordered porous media

Stress and strain fields in a two-dimensional pixelwise disordered system are computed by a Fast Fourier Transform method. The system, a model for a ductile damaged medium, consists of an elastic-perfectly matrix containing void pixels. Its behavior is investigated under equibiaxial or shear loading. We monitor the evolution with loading of plastically deformed zones, and we exhibit a nucleation / growth / coalescence scenario of the latter. Identification of plastic ``clusters'' is eased by using a discrete Green function implementing equilibrium and continuity at the level of one pixel. Observed morphological regimes are put into correspondence with some features of the macroscopic stress / strain curves.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures. Presented at the "11th International Symposium On Continuum Models and Discrete Systems (CMDS 11)" (Ecole des Mines, Paris, July 30- August 3 2007

Primary Spaces, Mackey's Obstruction, and the Generalized Barycentric Decomposition

We call a hamiltonian N-space \emph{primary} if its moment map is onto a single coadjoint orbit. The question has long been open whether such spaces always split as (homogeneous) x (trivial), as an analogy with representation theory might suggest. For instance, Souriau's \emph{barycentric decomposition theorem} asserts just this when N is a Heisenberg group. For general N, we give explicit examples which do not split, and show instead that primary spaces are always flat bundles over the coadjoint orbit. This provides the missing piece for a full "Mackey theory" of hamiltonian G-spaces, where G is an overgroup in which N is normal.Comment: 23 pages, 1 figure. Final preprint version, to appear in Journal of Symplectic Geometr

Managerial Skill Acquisition and the Theory of Economic Development

Micro level studies in developing countries suggest managerial skills play a key role in the adoption of modern technologies. The human resources literature suggests that managerial skills are difficult to codify and learn formally, but instead tend to be learned on the job. In this paper we present a model of the interactive process between on-the-job managerial skill acquisition and the adoption of modern technology. The environment considered is one where all learning possibilities are internalized in the market, and where managers are complementary inputs to non-managerial workers. The paper illustrates why some countries may adopt modern technologies while others stay backwards. The paper also explains why managers may not want to migrate from rich countries to poor countries as would be needed to generate income convergence.

Contracting Productivity Growth

In this paper, we analyze the interactions between growth and the contracting environment in the production sector. Allowing incompleteness in contracting implies that viable production relationships for firms and workers, and therefore the profitability of industries, depend on the rates of innovation and growth. The speed at which new innovations arrive in turn depends on the profitability of production, for the usual reasons examined in the endogenous growth literature. We show that these interactions can have important implications which are consistent with observed phenomena in both the micro and macro environment. In particular, we demonstrate how this interaction can lead to a productivity slowdown and a shift in labour market contracts toward more short term arrangements. We show the consistency of an increase in the proportion of the labour force under short term employment, unchanged turnover, increased relative returns of workers in high productivity sectors, and increased income inequality, with a productivity slowdown of finite duration.Endogenous Growth, Incomplete Contracting

Why Doesn´t Development Always Succeed? The Role of a Work Ethic

This paper presents a theory of underdevelopment. It explains why developing countries may not be able to successfully implement the productive technologies or modes of organization used in developed ones. It also suggests ways around this problem of implementation, and provides an explanation for why already developed countries did not face the same problems. The paper examines the interaction between the population’s work ethic and the actions of firms, where a person’s work ethic comes to matter. It is shown that an economy can be in either a high work ethic steady state, or a welfare dominated low work ethic one. Development makes the high work ethic steady state more e¢cient, but, if too rapid, will not allow it to be reached. Instead, the unique trajectory is to the low one, and welfare is reduced.

Garside families and Garside germs

Garside families have recently emerged as a relevant context for extending results involving Garside monoids and groups, which themselves extend the classical theory of (generalized) braid groups. Here we establish various characterizations of Garside families, that is, equivalently, various criteria for establishing the existence of normal decompositions of a certain type

Growth, Cycles and Welfare: A Schumpeterian Perspective

We use a Schumpeterian model in which both the economy's growth rate and its volatility are endogenously determined to assess some welfare and policy implications associated with business cycle fluctuations. Because it features a higher average growth rate than its acyclical counterpart, steady-state welfare is higher along the cyclical equilibrium growth path of the model. We assess the impact of alternative stabilization policies designed to smooth cyclical fluctuations. Although, it is possible to significantly reduce the variance of output growth via simple policy measures, the welfare benefits are at best negligible and at worst completely offset by the resulting reduction long-term productivity growth.Endogenous cycles, Endogenous growth, Welfare, Stabilization policy

I - Q Cycles

We develop a model of 'intrinsic' business cycles, driven by the decentralized behaviour of entrepreneurs and firms making continuous, divisible improvements in their productivity. We show how equilibrium cycles, associated with strategic delays in implementation and endogenous innovation, arise even in the presence of reversible investment. We derive the implications for the cyclical evolution of both tangible (physical) and intangible (knowledge) capital. In particular, our framework is consistent with key aspects of the somewhat puzzling relationship between fixed capital formation and the stockmarket at business cycle frequencies.Tobin's Q, fixed capital formation, intangible investment, cycles and growth

Commons as Insurance and the Welfare Impact of Privatization

It is shown here that despite the efficiency gains from privatization, when markets are incomplete, all individuals may be made worse off by privatization, even when the resource is equitably privatized. Such market incompleteness is common in the developing world and can explain the often encountered resistance to efficiency enhancing privatizing reforms, especially in the case of village level landholdings and forests. The advantage of commonly held property arises because of its superior insurance properties (which tend to provide income maintenance in low states). Sufficient conditions are established under which any feasible insurance scheme under private property cannot ex ante Pareto dominate allocations under the commons.common property, privatisation, insurance