Science and Ideology in Economic, Political, and Social Thought

This paper has two sources: One is my own research in three broad areas: business cycles, economic measurement and social choice. In all of these fields I attempted to apply the basic precepts of the scientific method as it is understood in the natural sciences. I found that my effort at using natural science methods in economics was met with little understanding and often considerable hostility. I found economics to be driven less by common sense and empirical evidence, then by various ideologies that exhibited either a political or a methodological bias, or both. This brings me to the second source: Several books have appeared recently that describe in historical terms the ideological forces that have shaped either the direct areas in which I worked, or a broader background. These books taught me that the ideological forces in the social sciences are even stronger than I imagined on the basis of my own experiences. The scientific method is the antipode to ideology. I feel that the scientific work that I have done on specific, long standing and fundamental problems in economics and political science have given me additional insights into the destructive role of ideology beyond the history of thought orientation of the works I will be discussing

Evidence and Ideology in Macroeconomics: The Case of Investment Cycles

The paper reports the principal findings of a long term research project on the description and explanation of business cycles. The research strongly confirmed the older view that business cycles have large systematic components that take the form of investment cycles. These quasi-periodic movements can be represented as low order, stochastic, dynamic processes with complex eigenvalues. Specifically, there is a fixed investment cycle of about 8 years and an inventory cycle of about 4 years. Maximum entropy spectral analysis was employed for the description of the cycles and continuous time econometrics for the explanatory models. The central explanatory mechanism is the second order accelerator, which incorporates adjustment costs both in relation to the capital stock and the rate of investment. By means of parametric resonance it was possible to show, both theoretically and empirically how cycles aggregate from the micro to the macro level. The same mathematical tool was also used to explain the international convergence of cycles. I argue that the theory of investment cycles was abandoned for ideological, not for evidential reasons. Methodological issues are also discussed

Retail Assortment Planning in the Presence of Consumer Search

Consumers often know what kind of product they wish to purchase, but do not know which specific variant best fits their needs. As a result, a consumer may find an acceptable product in one retailer but nevertheless purchase nothing, opting to search other retailers for an even better product. We study several models of retail assortment planning, some of which explicitly account for consumer search and one that does not, which we call the "no-search" model. Even though the no-search model never includes an unprofitable variant in the assortment, in the presence of consumer search, it may indeed be optimal to include an unprofitable variant. Furthermore, we find that the no-search model can lead to an assortment with an expected total profit that is significantly less than optimal. In the extreme, the no-search model may recommend closing down a category (i.e., carry no variants) even if a profitable assortment exists (a 100% profit loss). We conclude that failing to incorporate consumer search into an assortment planning process may cause a retailer to underestimate the substantial value a broad assortment has in preventing consumer search. We discuss how the insights from our stylized models may apply to actual assortment planning processes.product proliferation, multinomial logit model, assortment optimization

Designing Optimal Preannounced Markdowns in the Presence of Rational Customers with Multiunit Demands

We analyze the optimal design of a markdown pricing mechanism with preannounced prices. In the presence of limited supply, buyers who choose to purchase at a lower price may face a scarcity in supply. Our focus is on the structure of the optimal markdown mechanisms in the presence of rational or strategic buyers who demand multiple units. We first examine a complete information setting where the set of customer valuations is known but the seller does not know the valuation of each individual customer (i.e., cannot exercise perfect price discrimination). We then generalize our analysis to an incomplete valuation information setting where customer valuations are drawn from known distributions. For both settings, we compare the seller's profit resulting from the optimal markdown mechanism and the optimal single price. We provide a number of managerial insights into designing profitable markdown mechanisms.pricing, markdown, strategic bidding, price discrimination