Tensors and compositionality in neural systems

Neither neurobiological nor process models of meaning composition specify the operator through which constituent parts are bound together into compositional structures. In this paper, we argue that a neurophysiological computation system cannot achieve the compositionality exhibited in human thought and language if it were to rely on a multiplicative operator to perform binding, as the tensor product (TP)-based systems that have been widely adopted in cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence do. We show via simulation and two behavioural experiments that TPs violate variable-value independence, but human behaviour does not. Specifically, TPs fail to capture that in the statements fuzzy cactus and fuzzy penguin, both cactus and penguin are predicated by fuzzy(x) and belong to the set of fuzzy things, rendering these arguments similar to each other. Consistent with that thesis, people judged arguments that shared the same role to be similar, even when those arguments themselves (e.g., cacti and penguins) were judged to be dissimilar when in isolation. By contrast, the similarity of the TPs representing fuzzy(cactus) and fuzzy(penguin) was determined by the similarity of the arguments, which in this case approaches zero. Based on these results, we argue that neural systems that use TPs for binding cannot approximate how the human mind and brain represent compositional information during processing. We describe a contrasting binding mechanism that any physiological or artificial neural system could use to maintain independence between a role and its argument, a prerequisite for compositionality and, thus, for instantiating the expressive power of human thought and language in a neural system

Beyond word frequency: Bursts, lulls, and scaling in the temporal distributions of words

Background: Zipf's discovery that word frequency distributions obey a power law established parallels between biological and physical processes, and language, laying the groundwork for a complex systems perspective on human communication. More recent research has also identified scaling regularities in the dynamics underlying the successive occurrences of events, suggesting the possibility of similar findings for language as well. Methodology/Principal Findings: By considering frequent words in USENET discussion groups and in disparate databases where the language has different levels of formality, here we show that the distributions of distances between successive occurrences of the same word display bursty deviations from a Poisson process and are well characterized by a stretched exponential (Weibull) scaling. The extent of this deviation depends strongly on semantic type -- a measure of the logicality of each word -- and less strongly on frequency. We develop a generative model of this behavior that fully determines the dynamics of word usage. Conclusions/Significance: Recurrence patterns of words are well described by a stretched exponential distribution of recurrence times, an empirical scaling that cannot be anticipated from Zipf's law. Because the use of words provides a uniquely precise and powerful lens on human thought and activity, our findings also have implications for other overt manifestations of collective human dynamics

Analogical cognition: an insight into word meaning

Analogical cognition, extensively researched by Dedre Gentner and her colleagues over the past thirty five years, has been described as the core of human cognition, and it characterizes our use of many words. This research provides significant insight into the nature of word meaning, but it has been ignored by linguists and philosophers of language. I discuss some of the implications of the research for our account of word meaning. In particular, I argue that the research points to, and helps account for, a key explanatory role that linguistic meaning must play. The research also shows how words contribute to thought as opposed to merely being a means of conveying thought

Comments on Jason Stanley's "on the linguistic basis for contextualism"

147-15

SITUATIONS, WORLDS AND CONTEXTS

53-5

NOMINAL AND TEMPORAL ANAPHORA

243-28