Exploring a New Determinant of Task Technology Fit: Content Characteristics

Although task technology fit has received academic attention as a measure of information systems success, compared to other popular information systems success models it has received less empirical testing in the information systems field. One reason might be a relatively low explanatory power for the main construct, i.e., task technology fit, in the model. In this study, we suggest content characteristics as a new determinant of fit, and empirically test it along with the two existing determinants, task and technology characteristics with 105 users of a web-based learning management system. In order to verify the contribution of content characteristics to the explanatory power, both task technology fit models with and without content characteristics are tested and compared. The results support that the addition of content characteristics dramatically increases the explanatory power for the task technology fit

Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. By studying a model with one principal and two agents where one agent can gather information that is valuable for the principal's project choice and the other agent provides effort to the chosen project, we study when the principal can benefit from such delegation relative to centralization. We show that beneficial delegation is possible when complete contracts cannot be written, and delegation of authority should necessarily be to the information gatherer. The benets of delegation stem from either efficiency gains or reduction in rent to the information gatherer.Corporate hierarchies; information gathering; delegation; centralization.

Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make decisions that set directions for the organization, employ subordinates and contract with external suppliers. This paper explains when such delegation of authority can be optimal, using a model of a firm with three parties: the principal, the manager and the worker. In centralization with two two-tier hierarchies, the principal designs contracts for both agents. In delegation with a three-tier hierarchy, the principal directly contracts with a delegated agent who, in turn, contracts with the other agent. We identify an environment where the principal can benefit from delegating authority to the manager, but not to the worker. Beneficial delegation arises endogenously when delegation motivates the manager to acquire valuable information, which is used for better decision-making and more effcient incentive provision to the worker. We also show how total surplus is distributed in delegation vis-a-vis centralization, document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and the distribution of total surplus, and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralizationCorporate hierarchies, centralization, delegation, optimal contract.

INFORMATION GATHERING, DELEGATED CONTRACTING AND CORPORATE HIERARCHIES

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. We study when such delegation can be optimal. In centralization, the owner retains the authority, which fails to motivate the manager to acquire valuable information, leading to suboptimal decisions and inefficient incentive provision to the worker. Beneficial delegation should necessarily motivate the manager to acquire information, which is possible only when the authority is delegated to the manager. We also document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization.Corporate hierarchies, information gathering, delegation, centralization.

Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make decisions that set directions for the organization, employ subordinates and contract with external suppliers. This paper explains when such delegation of authority can be optimal, using a model of a firm with three parties: the principal, the manager and the worker. In centralization with two two-tier hierarchies, the principal designs contracts for both agents. In delegation with a three-tier hierarchy, the principal directly contracts with a delegated agent who, in turn, contracts with the other agent. We identify an environment where the principal can benefit from delegating authority to the manager, but not to the worker. Beneficial delegation arises endogenously when delegation motivates the manager to acquire valuable information, which is used for better decision-making and more efficient incentive provision to the worker. We also show how total surplus is distributed in delegation vis-à-vis centralization, document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and the distribution of total surplus, and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization.Corporate hierarchies, centralization, delegation, optimal contract

Bad News Reporting on Troubled IT Projects: The Role of Personal, Situational, and Organizational Factors

An individual’s bad news reporting behavior has been studied from a number of perspectives and has resulted in a variety of research streams including the MUM effect (or reluctance to transmit bad news), whistle-blowing, and organizational silence. While many scholars in different areas have studied reporting behavior, it has not been widely discussed in the information systems literature. This dissertation research addresses an individual’s bad news reporting behavior (and its antecedents) in the troubled IT project context. Many social phenomena are multi-causal (Hollander 1971). The silence phenomenon involved in an individual’s bad news reporting behavior is multi-causal too. While prior research has identified many antecedents to the bad news reporting behavior, it has not provided any systematic approach for categorizing them. In this dissertation, the antecedents are categorized into three different levels: personal factors (i.e., individual-level factors), situational factors (i.e., project-level factors), and organizational factors. This research empirically investigates how the antecedents at different levels affect (i.e., encourage or discourage) an individual’s decision to report or not report bad news in the IT project context. The dissertation follows a multi-paper model, and includes three independent, empirical studies, each with its own research model focusing on personal, situational, and organizational factors

Overcoming the Mum Effect in IT Project Reporting: Impacts of Fault Responsibility and Time Urgency

The mum effect ?a project member\u27s reluctance to report bad news about a troubled project ?has been recognized as an important contributor to project failure. While there are many potential factors that can influence the mum effect, in this study we focus on two factors that are particularly important in today\u27s software development environment: (1) the issue of fault responsibility that arises in the context of outsourced IT projects that involve an external vendor, and (2) the issue of time urgency, which has become more important as firms seek to compete on Internet time, developing and delivering applications with greater speed than ever before. We draw upon the basic whistle-blowing model adapted from Dozier and Miceli (1985) to examine how fault responsibility and time urgency ultimately affect a project member\u27s IT project reporting decision. Based on the results of a controlled laboratory experiment, we confirmed that the basic whistle-blowing model holds in an IT project context and found that both fault responsibility and time urgency can have significant effects on an individual\u27s willingness to report bad news. Fault responsibility exerts both direct and indirect influence on willingness to report bad news, while time urgency was found only to exert an indirect influence on willingness to report bad news. One implication of our study is that when fault responsibility rests with an outside vendor, this can actually increase the probability that a client employee will report the bad news to his or her management, provided that the vendor is not able to hide the problem entirely from the client organization. With respect to time urgency, our results suggest that managers may be able to increase individuals\u27 willingness to report by emphasizing that there is a narrow window of time to correct defects before a project is delivered and the impacts of defects start to be felt. Contributions and directions for future research are discussed

Digital Video Presentation and Student Performance: A Task Technology Fit Perspective

The article presents findings of a study regarding the adaptation of the Task Technology Fit (TTF) model in the teaching and learning process in the U.S. It emphasizes the three dimensions of fit, which include the Ease of Learning, Task Match and Ease of Use, which were applied in the context of digital video for oral presentations in the classroom environment. It stresses the importance of the digital technology in education, wherein the results of the study showed significant improvements in the oral presentation skills with the application of digital tools