Essays on delegated portfolio management

This thesis contains three essays on delegated portfolio management and deals with issues such as impact of regulations on mutual fund performance, impact of competition on transparency in financial markets and strategic trading behaviour of agents in illiquid markets. Chapter 1 analyses the impact of more frequent portfolio disclosure on mutual funds performance. Since 2004, SEC requires all U.S. mutual funds to disclose their portfolio holdings on a quarterly basis from semi-annual previously. This change in regulation provides a natural setting to study the impact of disclosure frequency on the performance of mutual funds. Prior to the policy change, it finds that the semi-annual funds with high abnormal returns in the past year outperform the corresponding quarterly funds by 17-20 basis points a month. This difference in performance disappears after 2004. The reduction in performance is higher for semi-annual funds holding illiquid assets than those holding liquid assets. These results support the hypothesis that performance of funds with more disclosure suffers more from activities such as front running. Chapter 2 analyses the impact of competition in financial markets on incentives to re- veal information. It finds that discretionary portfolio disclosure and advertising expenses of mutual funds decrease with competition. This supports the theory that mutual funds use portfolio disclosure and advertising as marketing tools to attract new investments in a financial market, where superior relative performance and greater visibility are rewarded with convex payoffs. With higher competition, the likelihood of landing new investments goes down for each fund while the cost of disclosure goes up. Funds respond by cutting down on costly disclosures and advertising activities. Thus competition seems to have adverse impact on market transparency and search cost. 3Chapter 3 develops a model of strategic trading to study forced liquidation. Traders who hold an illiquid risky security have to satisfy minimum capital requirements, or liquidate their position. Therefore, traders with price impact can induce the fire sale of others to benefit from future low prices. It shows that if traders have similar proportions of wealth invested in the risky security, or the market is sufficiently liquid, they behave cooperatively and smooth their orders over several trading periods. However, if the proportions are significantly different across agents, and market liquidity is low, the strong agent, who is less exposed to the risky asset, predates on the weak agent, and forces her to exit the market

Impact of reporting delays on profitability of front-running strategies against mutual funds

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is any impact of reporting delays on profitability of front-running strategies against the mutual funds. Design/methodology/approach: The author studies if freshness of mutual fund holding information from public disclosures affects precision of flow-based front-running strategies against the funds and if the allowed 60-day reporting delay is able to protect the funds from these front-running activities against them. Findings: Assuming no reporting delay, the author finds that returns from hypothetical front-running strategies are significant, when these are based on the most recent holding information and are not significant, when based on relatively old holding information. Interestingly, these front-running returns appear to be mostly driven by anticipated forced buys by the mutual funds (rather than anticipated forced sales). The return from a front-running strategy long on anticipated forced buys is higher when it is based on relatively illiquid assets. The author also finds that return from a front-running strategy short on anticipated forced sales is significant, when it is based on illiquid assets from relatively old holding information. Practical implications: Hence, it appears that the allowed 60-day reporting delay is able to protect most of the funds from front-running activities against them, except for the funds holding illiquid assets from anticipated forced sales motivated front-running activities against them. Originality/value: The paper addresses an interesting question, which has not been studied before – if freshness of fund holding information helps the front-running strategies against the funds and if the allowed reporting delay is effective in protecting the funds from these activities

Impact of reporting delays on profitability of front-running strategies against mutual funds

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is any impact of reporting delays on profitability of front-running strategies against the mutual funds. Design/methodology/approach: The author studies if freshness of mutual fund holding information from public disclosures affects precision of flow-based front-running strategies against the funds and if the allowed 60-day reporting delay is able to protect the funds from these front-running activities against them. Findings: Assuming no reporting delay, the author finds that returns from hypothetical front-running strategies are significant, when these are based on the most recent holding information and are not significant, when based on relatively old holding information. Interestingly, these front-running returns appear to be mostly driven by anticipated forced buys by the mutual funds (rather than anticipated forced sales). The return from a front-running strategy long on anticipated forced buys is higher when it is based on relatively illiquid assets. The author also finds that return from a front-running strategy short on anticipated forced sales is significant, when it is based on illiquid assets from relatively old holding information. Practical implications: Hence, it appears that the allowed 60-day reporting delay is able to protect most of the funds from front-running activities against them, except for the funds holding illiquid assets from anticipated forced sales motivated front-running activities against them. Originality/value: The paper addresses an interesting question, which has not been studied before – if freshness of fund holding information helps the front-running strategies against the funds and if the allowed reporting delay is effective in protecting the funds from these activities

Impact of competition on fund disclosures and consumer search costs

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of competition in financial markets on the frequency of portfolio disclosures by mutual funds and its implications for consumer search costs. Design/methodology/approach: The empirical analysis merges the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) survivorship bias-free mutual fund database, the Thompson Financial CDA/ Spectrum holdings database and the CRSP stock price data. The sample covers the time period between 1993 and 2010 and OLS and logistic regressions are used to investigate the impact of competition on fund disclosures. Findings: This paper finds that mutual fund disclosures decrease with market competition and this effect is amplified for funds holding illiquid assets. These results provide empirical support for the findings of Carlin et al. (2102). Mutual funds use portfolio disclosures as a marketing tool to attract investments in a tournament-like market, where superior relative performance and greater visibility are rewarded with convex payoffs. With competition, the likelihood of receiving new investments decreases for each fund and funds respond by reducing costly voluntary disclosures. The disclosure costs are higher for funds holding illiquid assets, and hence, the effect is stronger for them. Originality/value: This paper has important policy implications for disclosures in a market where relative performance matters. The traditional view is that competition induces voluntary disclosure because entities would like to differentiate themselves from competitors, and hence, competition should increase market transparency. However, this paper sheds light on the negative consequence of competition in a tournament-like mutual fund market

The impact of salient fees: Evidence from the mutual fund market

In 2004 the SEC began requiring mutual funds to include the dollar amount of fund fees in shareholders reports. Before that, funds reported returns net of fees and didn\u27t disclose fees separately. This natural experiment allows me to study the impact of separate reporting of fees on the level of fund fees. I find that average reported retail fund fees decreased by 27 basis points during the five-year period after the change in this rule, compared to the five-year period before the change. This reduction in fees was much higher for funds with higher fees and more volatile returns. I also find that fund investment became more sensitive to fund fees after 2004. These findings support the narrative that reporting of mutual fund fees separately in dollars made fund fees more salient and helped increase fee awareness among the investors, which, in turn, forced mutual funds to decrease fees. © 202

Impact of Competition on Mutual Fund Marketing Expenses

In this paper, I study the impact of market competition on mutual fund marketing expenses. In a sample of US domestic equity mutual funds, I find that marketing expenses decrease with the competition. This effect is stronger for top-performing funds. These results are counterintuitive, as one would ordinarily expect funds to incur more marketing expenses in response to pressure from competing funds. However, these results support the narrative that mutual funds employ marketing to draw attention to their performance in a tournament-like market, where the top-performing funds (the winners) are rewarded with disproportionately high new investments. Higher competition decreases the chances of each fund to outperform the others and adversely affect their ability to attract new investments, and the funds respond by decreasing marketing expenses. Thus, competition appears to have implications for investor search cost

Financial Crisis and Corporate Social Responsible Mutual Fund Flows

In this paper, we investigate investment flows into mutual funds that hold more high corporate social responsible stocks (top CSR funds) vs. mutual funds that hold more low corporate social responsible stocks (bottom CSR funds). Using a large sample of equity mutual funds spanning 2003–2012, we find that top CSR funds on average receive about 5% less investment per annum compared to the other funds; whereas bottom CSR funds receive about 5.6% more investments. These relative negative and positive flows into the top and bottom CSR funds respectively were larger during the pre-financial crisis period (2003–2007). This trend, however, reversed during the financial crisis (2008–2009). Top CSR funds attracted about 8.7% more investments during the financial crisis compared to the pre-crisis period; whereas bottom CSR funds received about 9.8% less investment. This higher investment into the top CSR funds during the crisis seems to have disappeared during the post-crisis period (2009–2012). Additional analysis shows that the corporate social ratings of top CSR funds improved through the crisis, whereas it deteriorated for the bottom CSR funds. Our findings are consistent with the “flight to quality” phenomenon observed in financial markets during market crises, indicating that investors perceive top CSR fund investments as relatively safe or of higher quality and hence, invest more in them during financial crises

Sustainable mutual fund performance and flow in the recent years through the COVID-19 pandemic

Sustainable investing has gained significant momentum over the past few years. In this paper, we study the performance and flows of sustainable equity mutual funds in recent years through the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that the high-sustainable funds perform better than the low-sustainable ones by between 1.32% and 6.96% annually. This outperformance significantly increases during the COVID-19 pandemic-induced market crash and the post-crash pandemic. Similarly, we find that high-sustainable funds attract significantly more investments (or suffer less outflow) than the low-sustainable funds by between 5.28% and 5.76% per annum. These flow differences increase considerably during the market crash, consistent with the ‘flight-to-quality’ effect. We also find that the high-sustainable funds attract significantly more investment during the post-crash pandemic than before the crash. This suggests that investors consider sustainable investing a necessity (not a luxury good), and their taste/attitude towards sustainable investing has changed – now they prioritize ‘investing with a conscience.

Financial Crisis and Corporate Social Responsible Mutual Fund Flows

In this paper, we investigate investment flows into mutual funds that hold more high corporate social responsible stocks (top CSR funds) vs. mutual funds that hold more low corporate social responsible stocks (bottom CSR funds). Using a large sample of equity mutual funds spanning 2003–2012, we find that top CSR funds on average receive about 5% less investment per annum compared to the other funds; whereas bottom CSR funds receive about 5.6% more investments. These relative negative and positive flows into the top and bottom CSR funds respectively were larger during the pre-financial crisis period (2003–2007). This trend, however, reversed during the financial crisis (2008–2009). Top CSR funds attracted about 8.7% more investments during the financial crisis compared to the pre-crisis period; whereas bottom CSR funds received about 9.8% less investment. This higher investment into the top CSR funds during the crisis seems to have disappeared during the post-crisis period (2009–2012). Additional analysis shows that the corporate social ratings of top CSR funds improved through the crisis, whereas it deteriorated for the bottom CSR funds. Our findings are consistent with the “flight to quality” phenomenon observed in financial markets during market crises, indicating that investors perceive top CSR fund investments as relatively safe or of higher quality and hence, invest more in them during financial crises

Price competition in the mutual fund industry

We find a puzzling fact about mutual fund industry that funds operating in more competitive segments charge higher fees. We argue that this surprising positive relation between competition and fund fees is consistent with strategic fee setting by funds. Fund performance is better and more persistent in less competitive segments, which attracts relatively more performance-sensitive investors. This leaves relatively less performance-sensitive investors in more competitive markets. Hence, funds operating in more competitive markets face a relatively inelastic demand curve and take advantage of it by increasing their fees (which reduces investors’ net returns). Our findings have important policy implications that market competition on its own may not be sufficient to decrease fund fees and regulatory interventions are required to increase investor awareness of mutual fund fees and their adverse impacts on net fund performance