Evidence accumulation under uncertainty - a neural marker of emerging choice and urgency

To interact meaningfully with its environment, an agent must integrate external information with its own internal states. However, information about the environment is often noisy. In this study, we identify a neural correlate that tracks how asymmetries between competing alternatives evolve over the course of a decision. In our task participants had to monitor a stream of discrete visual stimuli over time and decide whether or not to act, on the basis of either strong or ambiguous evidence. We found that the classic P3 event-related potential evoked by sequential evidence items tracked decision-making processes and predicted participants' categorical choices on a single trial level, both when evidence was strong and when it was ambiguous. The P3 amplitudes in response to evidence supporting the eventually selected option increased over trial time as decisions evolved, being maximally different from the P3 amplitudes evoked by competing evidence at the time of decision. Computational modelling showed that both the neural dynamics and behavioural primacy and recency effects can be explained by a combination of (a) competition between mutually inhibiting accumulators for the two categorical choice outcomes, and (b) a context-dependant urgency signal. In conditions where evidence was presented at a low rate, urgency increased faster than in conditions when evidence was very frequent. We also found that the readiness potential, a classic marker of endogenously initiated actions, was observed preceding movements in all conditions - even when those were strongly driven by external evidence

Latent awareness: Early conscious access to motor preparation processes is linked to the readiness potential

An experience of intention to move accompanies execution of some voluntary actions. The Readiness Potential (RP) is an increasing negativity over motor brain areas prior to voluntary movement. Classical studies suggested that the RP starts before intention is consciously accessed as measured by offline recall-based reports, yet the interpretation of the RP and its temporal relation to awareness of intention remain controversial. We designed a task in which self-paced actions could be interrupted at random times by a visual cue that probed online awareness of intention. Participants were instructed to respond by pressing a key if they felt they were actively preparing a self-paced movement at the time of the cue (awareness report), but to ignore the cue otherwise. We show that an RP-like activity was more strongly present before the cue for probes eliciting awareness reports than otherwise. We further show that recall-based reports of the time of conscious intention are linked to visual attention processes, whereas online reports elicited by a probe are not. Our results suggest that awareness of intention is accessible at relatively early stages of motor preparation and that the RP is specifically associated with this conscious experience

Preparation and execution of voluntary action both contribute to awareness of intention

How and when motor intentions form has long been controversial. In particular, the extent to which motor preparation and action-related processes produce a conscious experience of intention remains unknown. Here, we used a brain–computer interface (BCI) while participants performed a self-paced movement task to trigger cues upon the detection of a readiness potential (a well-characterized brain signal that precedes movement) or in its absence. The BCI-triggered cues instructed participants either to move or not to move. Following this instruction, participants reported whether they felt they were about to move at the time the cue was presented. Participants were more likely to report an intention (i) when the cue was triggered by the presence of a readiness potential than when the same cue was triggered by its absence, and (ii) when they had just made an action than when they had not. We further describe a time-dependent integration of these two factors: the probability of reporting an intention was maximal when cues were triggered in the presence of a readiness potential, and when participants also executed an action shortly afterwards. Our results provide a first systematic investigation of how prospective and retrospective components are integrated in forming a conscious intention to move