Philosophy and economics. Some recent books on Hume’s political economy

the essay proposes a survey of the works on Hume's economics ideas authored by economits and historians of political economy. La rivista raccoglie i saggi presentati nel corso del convegno internazionali cui hanno partecipato studiosi italiani e stranier

Hume e Trenchard

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Il terzo Conte di Shaftesbury: dalla melanconia all'entusiasmo

Shaftesbury fu uno dei più importanti pensatori inglesi che si adoperò per superare nella religione e nella cultura britannica atteggiamenti superstiziosi e fanatici utilizzando l'ironia e la critic

Shaftesbury e Des Maizeaux la storia di una traduzione mancata

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Hume e la censura cattolica: un nuovo documento

l'articolo restituisce per la prima volta il documento di condanna da parte della Congregazione della Chiesa cattolica delle opere di Hum

The internationalization process of firms : From exports to FDI ?

We describe a simple model in which domestic firms decide whether to serve a foreign market through exports or horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI). This choice involves a trade-off between the higher variable trade costs associated with exports and the higher fixed set-up costs associated with establishing foreign subsidiaries. Crucially, firms are uncertain about their profitability in foreign markets and can only learn it by operating there. To obtain market-specific knowledge, firms may follow an “internationalization process”, serving the foreign market via exports first and eventually, in some cases, switching to local subsidiary sales. To assess the validity of the predictions of our model, we use firm-level data on export and FDI decisions in individual destination markets for all companies registered in Belgium over the period 1997-2008. We show that firms’ strategies to serve foreign markets depend not only on the variable and fixed costs associated with exports and FDI, but also on the export experience they have acquired in that market.Exports, FDI, Uncertainty, Experimentation

Policymakers’ Horizon and Trade Reforms

Does policymakers\' horizon affect their willingness to support economic reforms? Voting in the U.S. Congress provides an ideal setting to address this question. Differences between the House and Senate, in which members serve two-year and six-year mandates respectively, allow to examine the role of term length; the staggered structure of the Senate allows to compare the behavior of different \"generations\" of senators and study the impact of election proximity. Considering all major trade liberalization reforms undertaken by the U.S. since the early 1970\'s, we find that Senate members are more likely to support them than House members. However, inter-cameral differences disappear for third-generation senators, who face re-election at the same time as House members. Considering Senate votes alone, we find that the last generation is more protectionist than the previous two and this result holds both when comparing different senators voting on the same bill, as well as individual senators voting on different bills. Inter-generational differences disappear instead for senators who hold safe seats or have announced their retirement, indicating that the protectionist effect of election proximity is driven by legislators\' fear of losing office.Term Length, Election Proximity, Trade Reforms

Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across constituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.Fast Track Authority, Trade Negotiations, Strategic Delegation