How Revenue and Information Shape Citizen Political Behavior

Many developing countries exhibit deficits in governance, including corruption, rent-seeking, the suboptimal provision of public goods, and weak accountability. This dissertation uncovers the micro-foundations of political failure by evaluating how government revenue windfalls and information asymmetries affect the will or ability of citizens to curb rent-seeking and hold politicians accountable. The first chapter provides one of the first causal, micro-level tests of the prominent claim that windfalls lower demand for good governance in comparison to taxation. It also sheds light on the relationship between revenue and information by examining whether windfalls and taxes produce differences in how citizens become politically informed. The second chapter turns attention to the role of information and examines how new information on government spending affects citizen political participation and incumbent support. The final chapter analyzes whether windfalls induce citizen groups to engage in rent-seeking behavior to appropriate wealth in more divided societies. To identify causal effects at the individual level, I employ experimental and quasi-experimental research designs and original survey and behavioral data from two separate, large-scale field projects conducted in Indonesia. Overall, the dissertation deepens understanding of the causes of political failure by examining not only whether windfalls and information asymmetries have adverse effects on citizen political behavior but also when and why

Replication Data for: Laura Paler. 2013. "Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government." American Political Science Review 107(4): 706-725.

These files contain all the material necessary to replicate the results in: Laura Paler. 2013. "Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government," American Political Science Review 107(4): 706-725. Abstract: It is widely believed that rents from windfall revenue undermine accountability. An enduring explanation is that windfalls free leaders from the need to tax, producing a quiescent population. Yet, there is little direct evidence of how windfalls and taxes affect citizen political action. I use novel revenue and information experiments to examine whether and why windfalls (compared to taxes) affect how citizens participate in politics. The experiments were embedded in a public awareness campaign conducted with 1,863 citizens in Indonesia. The results—from an original survey and postcard campaign—indicate that the tax treatment increased monitoring and anti-incumbent political action. Yet, when given spending information, citizens in the windfall treatment cared just as much about misused revenue as those in the tax treatment. The findings have important implications for understanding not only how revenue affects citizen political behavior but also how people acquire and process information on government spending. The paper and online appendices and other supporting documents are available at www.laurapaler.com. If you have any comments or queries, email me at [email protected]

Replication Data for: The Social Costs of Public Political Participation: Evidence from a Petition Experiment in Lebanon

Data and code to reproduce the results in "The Social Costs of Public Political Participation: Evidence from a Petition Experiment in Lebanon" and the Supplementary Online Appendices. Data and code are in STATA format (.dta .do); Codebook in Microsoft Excel (.xlsx); Original survey instrument (.pdf)