Remittances, consumption and investment in Ghana

This paper uses a new, nationally-representative household survey from Ghana to analyze within a rigorous econometric framework how the receipt of internal remittances (from within Ghana) and international remittances (from African or other countries) affects the marginal spending behavior of households on a broad range of consumption and investment goods, including food, education and housing. Contrary to other studies, which find that remittances are spent disproportionately on consumption (food and consumer goods/durables) or investment goods (education and housing), the findings show that households receiving remittances in Ghana do not spend more at the margin on food, education and housing than households with similar income levels and characteristics that do not receive remittances. When the analysis controls for endogeneity and selection bias, the findings show that any differences in the marginal spending behavior between remittance-receiving and non-receiving households are explained completely by the observed and unobserved characteristics of households. Households in Ghana treat remittances just like any other source of income, and there are no changes in marginal spending patterns for households with the receipt of remittance income.Population Policies,Access to Finance,Debt Markets,Remittances,

The impact of remittances on poverty and inequality in Ghana

This paper uses a new, 2005/06 nationally-representative household survey to analyze the impact of internal remittances (from Ghana) and international remittances (from African and other countries) on poverty and inequality in Ghana. To control for selection and endogeneity, it uses a two-stage multinomial logit model with instrumental variables focusing on variations in migration networks and remittances among various ethno-religious groups in Ghana. The paper finds that both internal and international remittances reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in Ghana. However, the size of the poverty reduction depends on the type of remittances received. In general, poverty in Ghana is reduced more by international than internal remittances. For households receiving international remittances, the level of poverty falls by 88.1 percent with the inclusion of remittances; for households receiving internal remittances, poverty falls by 69.4 percent with the inclusion of remittances. The paper also finds that both types of remittances increase income inequality in Ghana. For households with internal remittances, the inclusion of remittances causes the Gini coefficient to rise by 4 percent, and for households with international remittances, the inclusion of remittances causes the Gini to increase by 17.4 percent.Population Policies,Access to Finance,Remittances,Debt Markets,Rural Poverty Reduction

Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling

The goal of telecommunications policy has shifted from the control of natural monopoly to the promotion of competition. But the question remains how extensive and persistent the government\u27s regulatory role should be in the operation of communications markets. One might think that regulators could find the answer to this question in antitrust law. But antitrust has itself been torn between interventionist and laissez-faire tendencies. Over the past two decades, the dominant Chicago School approach to antitrust has focused on economic efficiency, a standard that has led to the abandonment or contraction of some categories of liability. More recently, however, post-Chicago theorists have suggested that the particular characteristics of the new economy, particularly the economics of networks, justify a more interventionist approach. As it happens, telecommunications lies at the heart of the new economy. Couching the inquiry in antitrust terms, therefore, does not resolve the critical policy issues. These issues have come to the fore in the dispute over regulation of broadband Internet access. The Internet is sometimes viewed as a world of laissez-faire, largely distinct from the established regime of telecommunications and mass media regulation. For historical and political reasons, the same standards of content and economic regulation that apply to other media have not been extended to Internet communications. But the contradictions that this dichotomy raises have been unavoidable in the broadband context. The question we address specifically is whether government should require open access. But this question is only one aspect of a larger issue: when should the government regulate competitive conduct in the new economy, which is characterized by extraordinary rates of innovation, modest capital requirements, economies of scale in production and consumption, and frequent entry and exit? This question has no simple answer

Devising a \u3ci\u3eMicrosoft\u3c/i\u3e Remedy That Serves Consumers

According to Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, Microsoft was a “predacious” monopolizer that did extensive “violence . . . to the competitive process.” Through a “single, well-coordinated course” of anticompetitive action, it suppressed competition from Netscape\u27s Navigator, an Internet browser, and from Sun\u27s Java programming language and related technologies. Microsoft “mounted a deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts, . . . placed an oppressive thumb on the scale of competitive fortune, . . . and trammeled the competitive process.” Having colorfully concluded that Microsoft\u27s offenses were extreme, Judge Jackson deferred to the government\u27s demand for a drastic remedy. He ordered that Microsoft be broken into two firms: one confined to the operating systems business, and the other to the applications business. He also imposed a set of conduct restrictions, some applying to both firms, which remain in effect for the ten-year duration of the judgment, and some applying primarily to the operating systems business, which remain in effect until the two businesses establish their independent viability. The Supreme Court refused expedited review of the district court\u27s decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where it is now pending. This Article attempts to identify an appropriate legal response to the offenses Microsoft was found to have committed. The ultimate criterion of the appropriateness of a remedy is straightforward: a remedy should serve consumers. Such a remedy will result in markets that closely resemble those that would have emerged but for Microsoft\u27s unlawful behavior. The optimal remedy will minimize the sum of the expected costs of future misconduct, anticompetitive effects of past misconduct, lost efficiencies in product composition, firm structure, and multi-firm collaboration, impaired incentives to innovate, and administration, including enforcement of the remedy and the antitrust laws. Judged by this standard, the court\u27s decree falls short. Part I begins by setting forth in some detail the conduct the court held illegal. Although we disagree with many of the court\u27s factual and legal characterizations of Microsoft\u27s conduct, we generally accept them for purposes of analyzing the remedy. Part I then sets out briefly the terms of the court\u27s remedial order. Part II, after a description of the conditions that might justify structural relief, presents the argument that structural relief is inappropriate in Microsoft. This Part concludes that any severe restructuring of Microsoft, including the separation of its applications and operating systems activities ordered by the court, will almost certainly raise prices to consumers and will likely fail to produce long-term competitive benefits. Part III sketches the content of a conduct remedy tailored to promote consumer interests and identifies a number of ways in which the decree\u27s conduct provisions subvert that objective

Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling

The goal of telecommunications policy has shifted from the control of natural monopoly to the promotion of competition. But the question remains how extensive and persistent the government\u27s regulatory role should be in the operation of communications markets. One might think that regulators could find the answer to this question in antitrust law. But antitrust has itself been torn between interventionist and laissez-faire tendencies. Over the past two decades, the dominant Chicago School approach to antitrust has focused on economic efficiency, a standard that has led to the abandonment or contraction of some categories of liability. More recently, however, post-Chicago theorists have suggested that the particular characteristics of the new economy, particularly the economics of networks, justify a more interventionist approach. As it happens, telecommunications lies at the heart of the new economy. Couching the inquiry in antitrust terms, therefore, does not resolve the critical policy issues. These issues have come to the fore in the dispute over regulation of broadband Internet access. The Internet is sometimes viewed as a world of laissez-faire, largely distinct from the established regime of telecommunications and mass media regulation. For historical and political reasons, the same standards of content and economic regulation that apply to other media have not been extended to Internet communications. But the contradictions that this dichotomy raises have been unavoidable in the broadband context. The question we address specifically is whether government should require open access. But this question is only one aspect of a larger issue: when should the government regulate competitive conduct in the new economy, which is characterized by extraordinary rates of innovation, modest capital requirements, economies of scale in production and consumption, and frequent entry and exit? This question has no simple answer