Use of Force against Non-state Actors and the Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness of Self-Defence

AbstractThe right of self-defence against non-state actors is increasingly invoked and accepted in the practice of states. However, the recognition of this right must overcome a fundamental obstacle: that of explaining why the rights of the host state, in particular its right of territorial sovereignty, is not infringed by the self-defensive force used within its territory. In practice, states invoking self-defence against non-state actors rely on the involvement of the host state with those actors to justify the use of force in that state's territory. It is not clear, from a legal standpoint, how to rationalize the fact of involvement as a form of legal justification. For some, involvement amounts to attribution. For others, involvement is a form of complicity. For others still, involvement may entail a breach of the host state's due diligence obligation to protect the rights of other states in its territory. All of these solutions are deficient in some way, and have failed to receive general endorsement. This article considers whether there may be a different, as yet neglected, solution: self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. The article shows that this is not a perfect solution either, since positive law remains uncertain on this point. Nevertheless, it is a solution that may provide a better normative framework for the development of the law of self-defence against non-state actors.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Cambridge University Press via https://doi.org/10.1017/S092215651600058

Military assistance on request and general reasons against force: consent as a defence to the prohibition of force

Is consent a defence or part of the definition of the prohibition of force? The mainstream answer has been to read (non)consent into the definition of the prohibition. The rule would thus prohibit only non-consensual force. In this article, I challenge this approach. This approach implies that there is no general reason against force in international society, that consensual force is not harmful and does not call for justification. And yet, the use of force, whether internal or international, always harms or threatens harm to international peace - the paramount purpose of the United Nations, so that maintaining international peace must count as a general reason against force. Moreover, international actors offer and expect justifications whenever force is used, including with consent. To reflect the general reason against force, the prohibition must exclude consent from its definition. Consent must be recast as a defence

Humanitarian intervention and the law of state responsibility

Abstract The primary rules of international law do not permit states to resort to force for humanitarian purposes. Some scholars have thus attempted to rely on the secondary rules of state responsibility to find a legal basis for forcible humanitarian intervention. In particular, three claims can be identified: that humanitarian intervention is justified; that the state intervening for humanitarian purposes is excused; and that the consequences arising from the intervention for the state acting for humanitarian purposes ought to be mitigated. All three arguments rely either on the defence of necessity, cast as a justification or as an excuse, or on necessity-like reasoning, as the basis for mitigation. This article takes these three claims and draws out the implications of each both within and beyond the law of responsibility. In so doing, this article shows how each of the three arguments is more problematic and less straightforward than it appears at first and that, ultimately, none can provide an adequate legal basis for humanitarian intervention. The legality of humanitarian intervention must be found in the primary rules regulating the use of force in international relations and not in the secondary rules of state responsibility.</jats:p

Shared Non-responsibility in International Law? Defences and the Responsibility of Co-perpetrators and Accessories in the Guiding Principles

Abstract This comment assesses the approach to the reach of defences beyond the international legal person(s) who is (or are) the author(s) of the internationally wrongful act articulated in Guiding Principle 5 of the Guiding Principles on Shared Responsibility in International Law. It will focus on three main points: (1) whether the choice in respect of the reach of defences in Principle 5 is justifiable for the international legal order; (2) the reach of defences in cases of coercion, where the coerced party may benefit from a defence due to the coercion (in the form of a force majeure defence); and (3) the ‘blindspot’ in the Guiding Principles in relation to defences of accessories, in particular where the conditions for accessorial liability are defined broadly as in the case of Principle 6 on aid and assistance.</jats:p