Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America

Latin America is more democratic today than in the recent past, yet in places also far more violent. Parts of the region suffer the world’s highest crime rates, and a widespread sense of insecurity fuels calls for tougher policing. Understanding the origins of this problem, and suggesting ways out of it, is Mark Ungar’s aim in this ambitious and insightful book

Lan American Coups: Have They Vanished or Taken New Shapes?

In the following pages, three well-known Latinoamericanists share their views on the current prospects for coups in Latin America. They are: Rut Diamint of the University Torcuatto de Tella in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Pablo Policzer of the University of Calgary in Canada; and Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC. Each looks at the potential for coups from different perspectives but, all three come to similar conclusions. That is, that despite substantial gains in democracy, the threat of coups in Latin America remains latent. The authors agree that democracy is growing in the region. Opinion surveys such as the Americas Barometer consistently show that citizens in Latin America have gradually incorporated democracy as part of their core value system. Yet, the authors argue convincingly that Latin America faces new types of interruptions to its democratic process that should be considered coups, even if not following the traditional style of military coup that predominated in the past. Situations that have taken place in Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras and other countries serve to illustrate the new trends. More specifically, Professor Diamint argues that in Latin America a culture of intolerance, demonization of the opposition, and the utilization of any method to achieve power prevails. In a region with a very high threshold of violence, governments fail to set an example of establishing a culture of debate, consensus, and transparency. This culture is inclined to uncontrollable political expressions, preferring confrontational means to resolve conflict. Within this scenario, “messianic” solutions are promoted and coups cannot be discarded as an option that would never transpire. Professor Policzer looks more closely to the constitutional loopholes that allow for a transformation of limited into absolute power. He argues that coups can be constitutional or unconstitutional, and that a constitutional coup can occur when violations to democracy actually stem from the constitutions themselves. In Honduras, for example specific provisions in the Constitution itself created conditions for a constitutional crisis; similar provisions have also led to constitutional authoritarianism in Venezuela and other countries. Dr. Policzer stresses that when a head of state or the military take absolute power, even temporarily, based on provisions in their constitutions; they are in essence staging a constitutional coup. These blind spots in constitutions, he argues, may be more serious threat to democracy than that of traditional coups. Lastly, Dr. Shifter argues that some kind of coup should be expected in Latin America in coming years, not only because fundamental institutions remain weak in some countries, but because the regional political environment is less prepared to respond effectively to transgressions than it was a few years ago. The good news, however, is that only a handful of countries, show no interest in governing. The bad news is that in those few countries where situations are indeed shaky, they are also in some cases aggravated by rising food and fuel prices, and spreading criminality, which pose serious risks to the rule of law and democratic governance

Organizing coercion in authoritarian Chile

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001."June 2001."Includes bibliographical references (leaves 163-178).Coercion is at the center of politics, yet how it is organized has remained poorly understood. This dissertation analyzes how the Chilean military regime (1973-90) organized coercion, focusing especially on two major shifts during the period of most institutional flux, from 1973-78. Available explanations for the shifts fail to account for the magnitude of organizational changes. As an alternative, this dissertation provides a typology of coercion, based on measurements of how well principals monitor agents' operations and performance. Principals can monitor from within their own organization (internal monitoring), or from information sources outside their direct control (external monitoring). Measuring levels of internal and external monitoring, using various criteria for the breadth and depth of information, yields a matrix with types that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. The four basic types are blind, bureaucratic, transparent, and hide and seek coercion. There are tradeoffs to each type of coercion, which can prompt principals to shift from one to another. In Chile, measurements of internal and external monitoring before and after each of the two major shifts, alongside counterfactual analysis and tests of the competing available explanations, reveal that the regime in each case grappled with organizing coercion as a discrete problem of governance. In 1974 the regime created a powerful secret police to better coordinate coercion through higher internal monitoring. The police resolved many organizational problems but failed to increase internal monitoring substantially.(cont.) Moreover, it created a series of new problems as it began to run amok. In 1977-78 it was replaced by another institution, which increased internal monitoring, a shift that also coincided with an increase in external monitoring. In each case, the regime's choices were influenced by, but not reducible to, broader political dynamics such as power struggles and efforts to institutionalize the regime. Secondary literature is used to analyze three other cases (Argentina, East Germany, and South Africa), that organized coercion differently than Chile. In all cases, the framework provided accounts for the variation in the organization of coercion.by Pablo Policzer.Ph.D

No Going Back: The Impact of ILO Convention 169 on Latin America in Comparative Perspective

In this article we assess the impact of  the International Labour Organization’s 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO C-169) since it entered into effect in 1991. We examine the Convention’s impact on selected key Latin American states which have ratified the Convention: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. We analyze  each country’s constitutional order, legislative and jurisprudential developments, as well as  different policy developments concerning indigenous peoples and their rights. We also trace the development of indigenous peoples’ rights in the same period in two non-ratifying states—Australia and Canada—along the same  dimensions. We compare the impacts that these laws and policies have had on indigenous peoples’ rights, both in the six Latin American signatories as well as in Australia and Canada. In particular, we examine the indigenous right to political participation and self-government, as well as on the right to land, territories and natural resources. In doing so we assess the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation and free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), and to participate in the benefits provided by resource extraction on their lands and territories. We then analyze and discuss the impact  that  ILO C-169 has had on non-ratifying states, in the case of  in Australia and Canada. We argue that ILO C-169 has had an indirect but nevertheless decisive impact on these tow states expressed in legal developments, jurisprudence and policies that concern indigenous peoples. We conclude that ILO C-169 represents a key step in the recognition and protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. Whether directly or indirectly, and notwithstanding the many gaps still left to address, it demonstrates that there is no going back on indigenous peoples’ rights