A Game-Theoretic Model of Interactions between Hibiscus Latent Singapore Virus and Tobacco Mosaic Virus

Mixed virus infections in plants are common in nature and their interactions affecting host plants would depend mainly on plant species, virus strains, the order of infection and initial amount of inoculum. Hence, the prediction of outcome of virus competition in plants is not easy. In this study, we applied evolutionary game theory to model the interactions between Hibiscus latent Singapore virus (HLSV) and Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) in Nicotiana benthamiana under co-infection in a plant host. The accumulation of viral RNA was quantified using qPCR at 1, 2 and 8 days post infection (dpi), and two different methods were employed to predict the dominating virus. TMV was predicted to dominate the game in the long run and this prediction was confirmed by both qRT-PCR at 8 dpi and the death of co-infected plants after 15 dpi. In addition, we validated our model by using data reported in the literature. Ten out of fourteen reported co-infection outcomes agreed with our predictions. Explanations were given for the four interactions that did not agree with our model. Hence, it serves as a valuable tool in making long term predictions using short term data obtained in virus co-infections

Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention

In this account of the history of voting-power measurement, we confine ourselves to the concept of a priori voting power. We show how the concept was re-invented several times and how the circumstances in which it was reinvented led to conceptual confusion as to the true meaning of what is being measured. In particular, power-as-influence was conflated with value in the sense of transferable utility cooperative game theory (power as share in constant total payoff). Influence was treated, improperly, as though it were transferable utility, and hence an additive and distributive quantity. We provide examples of the resulting misunderstanding and mis-directed criticism

Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council

We analyze democratic equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a voting body containing all members delegates decision-making to a (time-varying) subset of its members, as describes, e.g., the relationship between the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We develop a theoretical framework for analyzing democratic equitability in CVGs at both the country and region levels, and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation. We apply the framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it. We find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between 21.3 times (United Kingdom) and 3.8 times (China) from a country-level perspective, while from a region perspective Eastern Europe is the most heavily overrepresented region with more than twice its equitable representation, and Africa the most heavily underrepresented. Our equity measures do not preclude some UNSC members from exercising veto rights, however

The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game

Cooperative TU-game, Solution concept, Modiclus, SM-nucleolus, Weighted voting games, 91A12,