Market-Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73571/1/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00275.x.pd

A New Approach to the Design of Electronic Exchanges

Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory

Market-based allocation with indivisible bids

Abstract. We study multi-unit double auctions accepting bids with indivisibility constraints. We propose different price-quote policies and study their influence on the efficiency of market-based allocation. Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote provided, indicating interesting tradeoffs in communication and allocation efficiency.

Rule-Based Automated Price Negotiation: Overview and Experiment

The idea of automating e-commerce transactions attracted a lot of interest during the last years. Multi-agent systems are claimed to be one of promising software technologies for achieving this goal. In this paper we summarize state-of-the-art in rule-based approaches to automated negotiations and present initial experimental results with our own implementation of a rule-based price negotiation mechanism in a model e-commerce multi-agent system. The experimental scenario considers multiple buyer agents involved in multiple English auctions that are performed in parallel

(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol

. This paper presents a new protocol for M + 1st-price auction, a style of auction in which the highest M bidders win and pay a uniform price, determined by the (M + 1)st price. A set of distributed servers collaborates to resolve the (M + 1)st price without revealing any information in terms of bids including the winners' bids. A new trick to jointly and securely compute the highest value as a degree of distributed polynomials is introduced. The building block requires just one round for bidders to cast bids and one round for auctioneers to determine the winners. 1 Introduction The Internet is a prime vehicle for supporting electronic auction, a primitive pricing mechanism for setting prices. The most common auction style is the open-bid English auction, in which bidders incrementally raise the prices bid for goods until as many winners are left as the number of units of goods. Bidders are required to be watching the current prices, and it usually takes a long time to close ..