A monotone model of intertemporal choice

Existing models of intertemporal choice such as discounted utility (also known as constant or exponential discounting), quasi-hyperbolic discounting and generalized hyperbolic discounting are not monotone: A decision maker with a concave utility function generally prefers receiving $1 m today plus$1 m tomorrow over receiving $2 m today. This paper proposes a new model of intertemporal choice. In this model, a decision maker cannot increase his/her satisfaction when a larger payoff is split into two smaller payoffs, one of which is slightly delayed in time. The model can rationalize several behavioral regularities such as a greater impatience for immediate outcomes. An application of the model to intertemporal consumption/saving reveals that consumers may exhibit dynamic inconsistency. Initially, they commit to saving for future consumption, but, as time passes, they prefer to renegotiate such a contract for an advance payment. Behavioral characterization (axiomatization) of the model is presented. The model allows for intertemporal wealth, complementarity and substitution effects (utility is not separable across time periods)

Probabilistic subjective expected utility

This paper develops the first model of probabilistic choice under subjective uncertainty (when probabilities of events are not objectively known). The model is characterized by seven standard axioms (probabilistic completeness, weak stochastic transitivity, nontriviality, event-wise dominance, probabilistic continuity, existence of an essential event, and probabilistic independence) as well as one new axiom. The model has an intuitive econometric interpretation as a Fechner model of (relative) random errors. The baseline model is extended from binary choice to decisions among m> 2 alternatives using a new method, which is also applicable to other models of binary choice

Stronger utility

Empirical research often requires a method how to convert a deterministic economic theory into an econometric model. A popular method is to add a random error term on the utility scale. This method, however, ignores stochastic dominance. A modification of this method is proposed to account for stochastic dominance. The modified model compares favorably to other existing models in terms of goodness of fit to experimental data. The modified model can rationalize the preference reversal phenomenon. An intuitive axiomatic characterization of the modified model is provided. Important microeconomic concept of risk aversion is well defined in the modified model

Utility of a quarter-million

This paper presents a new method how to elicit the Bernoulli utility function over a wide range of monetary outcomes using approximation through Taylor expansion. The new method is applied to the natural experiment provided by the Swiss version of the television show Deal or No Deal

The Troika paradox

In three binary choice problems, people reveal a choice pattern which falsifies expected utility theory and many generalized non-expected utility theories. This new paradox challenges popular non-expected utility models analogously to how the Allais paradox challenged neoclassical expected utility theory

Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization

In imperfectly discriminating contests the contestants contribute effort to win a prize but the highest contributed effort does not necessarily secure a win. The contest success function (CSF) is the technology that translates an individual's effort into his or her probability of winning. This paper provides an axiomatization of CSF when there is the possibility of a draw (the sum of winning probabilities across all contestants does not add up to one)

Probabilistic risk aversion with an arbitrary outcome set

This paper analyzes risk aversion when outcomes/consequences may not be measurable in monetary terms and people have fuzzy preferences over lotteries, i.e. they choose in a probabilistic manner. The paper shows that comparative risk aversion is well defined in a constant error/tremble model but not in a strong utility model

Loss aversion

Loss aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper extends the notion of loss aversion to a more general setup where outcomes (consequences) may not be measurable in monetary terms and people may have fuzzy preferences over lotteries, i. e., they may choose in a probabilistic manner. The implications of loss aversion are discussed for expected utility theory and rank-dependent utility theory as well as for popular models of probabilistic choice such as the constant error/tremble model and a strong utility model (that includes the Fechner model of random errors and Luce choice model as special cases)

Two examples of ambiguity aversion

We consider two plausible and even natural examples of ambiguity aversion: the classical Ellsberg (1961) two-color paradox and a variant of the Machina (2009) reflection example. We extend the results of Baillon etal. (2011) and demonstrate that these two examples challenge the descriptive validity of Siniscalchi (2009) vector expected utility and the model of Nau (2006)