An auction-based approach for composite web service selection

Web service composition (WSC) offers a range of solutions for rapid creation of complex applications by facilitating the composition of already existing concrete web services. One critical challenge in WSC is the dynamic selection of concrete services to be bound to the abstract composite service. In our research, we identify and elaborate on the challenges involved on developing a market-based mechanism for composite service selection. We propose a combinatorial procurement auction model as a useful approach to research service selection, in order to overcome the limitations of the current optimization-based and negotiation-based solutions. The proposed auction model supports dynamic pricing for the offered web services, enables the providers to express their preferences more fully, and creates the incentive for the providers to be truthful about the offered prices

Search, Bargaining and Optimal Asking Prices

This paper analyzes a search-and-bargaining model in which the asking price influences the rate at which potential customers arrive to inspect the seller's house, and the buyer's valuation of the asset is not learned until after the seller makes his initial offer (the asking price). The optimal asking and reservation prices are characterized, and the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium asking-price-reservation-price strategy is established. Comparative-statics analysis illustrates how seller and buyer discount rates and the buyer's outside opportunity affect the optimal reservation and asking prices. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

Implementation of social optimum in oligopoly

D71, L5, Nash implementation, Oligopoly regulation,

Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market

Collusion, Communication, Price cycle, War of attrition, Pricing coordination,