Inductive Reasoning Games as Influenza Vaccination Models: Mean Field Analysis

We define and analyze an inductive reasoning game of voluntary yearly vaccination in order to establish whether or not a population of individuals acting in their own self-interest would be able to prevent influenza epidemics. We find that epidemics are rarely prevented. We also find that severe epidemics may occur without the introduction of pandemic strains. We further address the situation where market incentives are introduced to help ameliorating epidemics. Surprisingly, we find that vaccinating families exacerbates epidemics. However, a public health program requesting prepayment of vaccinations may significantly ameliorate influenza epidemics.Comment: 20 pages, 7 figure

Sustainable agriculture and plant diseases: an epidemiological perspective

The potential for modern biology to identify new sources for genetical, chemical and biological control of plant disease is remarkably high. Successful implementation of these methods within globally and locally changing agricultural environments demands new approaches to durable control. This, in turn, requires fusion of population genetics and epidemiology at a range of scales from the field to the landscape and even to continental deployment of control measures. It also requires an understanding of economic and social constraints that influence the deployment of control. Here I propose an epidemiological framework to model invasion, persistence and variability of epidemics that encompasses a wide range of scales and topologies through which disease spreads. By considering how to map control methods onto epidemiological parameters and variables, some new approaches towards optimizing the efficiency of control at the landscape scale are introduced. Epidemiological strategies to minimize the risks of failure of chemical and genetical control are presented and some consequences of heterogeneous selection pressures in time and space on the persistence and evolutionary changes of the pathogen population are discussed. Finally, some approaches towards embedding epidemiological models for the deployment of control in an economically plausible framework are presented

Government Funding Policy Towards Communicable Diseases

Communicable diseases, Prevalence, Monopolist, Price for treatment, Government funding, I18, L12,

Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal Production Systems

Trade in feeder animals creates externalities when animal diseases can spread beyond the purchasing farm. If growers choose between open and closed production systems, then Nash equilibrium likely involves excessive trading. While first-best equilibrium involves market-wide adoption of either an open-trade or closed-farm system, equilibrium may entail heterogeneous systems. If so, then the feeder trade should be restricted. Supply response to an increase in marginal costs may be positive. Within a farm, infectious disease risk can create decreasing returns to scale when the technology is otherwise increasing returns. Contractual procurement and damage control technologies will likely increase scale in finishing. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals

The article develops a dynamic capital valuation model in which farms can act with farm-varying cost to increase the probability of avoiding an infectious endemic animal disease. Multiple endemic disease equilibria can exist, and the one with the largest set of action takers is socially optimal. Costly capital markets are shown to be a factor in determining the extent of disease. Frictions, such as dealing with a veterinary public health bureaucracy, can enhance social welfare by encouraging precautionary biosecurity actions. Technical innovations can reduce social welfare, and a disease indemnification scheme is also studied. Suggestions for empirical implementation are provided. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.