Modelling delta-notch perturbations during zebrafish somitogenesis

The discovery over the last 15 years of molecular clocks and gradients in the pre-somitic mesoderm of numerous vertebrate species has added significant weight to Cooke and Zeeman's ‘clock and wavefront’ model of somitogenesis, in which a travelling wavefront determines the spatial position of somite formation and the somitogenesis clock controls periodicity (Cooke and Zeeman, 1976). However, recent high-throughput measurements of spatiotemporal patterns of gene expression in different zebrafish mutant backgrounds allow further quantitative evaluation of the clock and wavefront hypothesis. In this study we describe how our recently proposed model, in which oscillator coupling drives the propagation of an emergent wavefront, can be used to provide mechanistic and testable explanations for the following observed phenomena in zebrafish embryos: (a) the variation in somite measurements across a number of zebrafish mutants; (b) the delayed formation of somites and the formation of ‘salt and pepper’ patterns of gene expression upon disruption of oscillator coupling; and (c) spatial correlations in the ‘salt and pepper’ patterns in Delta-Notch mutants. In light of our results, we propose a number of plausible experiments that could be used to further test the model

Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor

A customary gender division of labor is one in which women and men are directed towards certain tasks and/or explicitly prohibited from performing others. We offer an explanation as to why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom, and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition. Our model builds on the literature on the marital hold-up problem, and considers both problems in choice of specialty and human capital acquisition in a framework in which agents learn a variety of skills and must search for a marriage partner on the marriage market. We show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in career choice and human capital acquisition, and that both problems may be mitigated through the customary gender division of labor. We find, however, that a gender division of labor is not Pareto-improving; one gender is made worse off. Both the distributional effects and welfare gains to a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities to exchange in markets increase.