Requisitos uniformes para originais submetidos a Revistas Biomédicas

Um pequeno grupo de editores de revistas da área médica reuniu-se informalmente em Vancouver, Colúmbia Britânica, em 1978, para estabelecer diretrizes para o formato dos originais submetidos a suas revistas. Esse grupo ficou conhecido como o Grupo de Vancouver. Seus requisitos para apresentação de originais, que incluíam os formatos de referências bibliográficas desenvolvidos pela Biblioteca Nacional de Medicina (National Library of Medicine - NLM), foram publicados pela primeira vez em 1979. O Grupo de Vancouver se expandiu e evoluiu para o Comitê Internacional de Editores de Revistas Médicas (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors - ICMJE), que se reúne anualmente. Gradualmente, este comitê vem ampliando seus alvos de atenção. O comitê produziu quatro edições prévias dos requisitos uniformes. Ao longo dos anos, surgiram questões que vão além da preparação dos originais. Algumas delas são tratadas agora nos requisitos uniformes; outras são contempladas em pareceres separados. Cada parecer foi publicado em uma revista científica; todos estão reproduzidos no final deste artigo

Strategies Under the Surface: the determinants of redistricting in Belgium

Most of the time, electoral reforms are seen as decisions taken by political players aiming at increasing their seat share.1 According to Benoit’s model, parties rank reform plans according to whether they maximize their share of seats (Benoit,2004). In that respect, the decision of the Belgian government to change district boundaries for the 2003 federal elections is rather strange, as the reform adopted has no mechanical impact on the allocation of seats among parties. This does not, however, mean that this redistricting is one of the few reforms not driven by strategic considerations. Belgian parties are driven by other forms of strategy lying under the surface. As a matter of fact, four power-related elements have played a part in the decision to change district boundaries. Firstly, the change to province constituencies was made to reduce the uncertainty of parliamentary careers caused by the two-tier system in use up to 2003. Secondly, promoters of redistricting tried to introduce a new campaign structure, which they hoped would be more appropriate for their party. Thirdly, large parties required to introduce a 5% threshold jointly to the redistricting. The threshold was meant to block smaller parties and consequently to favour larger ones. And finally redistricting was also pushed by centralized parties expecting this reform to increase their control over decentralized party structures. All these strategies show that in the study of electoral reform, political science will have to go beyond merely considering its impact on each party’s share of seats.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe