Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of moral hazard, adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild--Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. We impose a condition on the expected delivery rates for untraded assets that is similar to the trembling hand refinements used in game theory. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always exists, even with exclusivity constraints on asset sales, and transactions-liquidity costs or information-evaluation costs for asset trade. We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be Pareto improving because it allows for better risk spreading. We also show that default opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets.

A Strategic Market Game with a Mutual Bank with Fractional Reserves and Redemption in Gold (A Continuum of Traders)

We utilize the strategic market game approach to analyze the role and function of a mutual bank with variable fractional reserves, redemption in gold and endogenous interest rate formation. We specify the conditions of enough money and its distribution. Using the continuum of traders model, we show existence and optimality for the case of no bankruptcy as well as for the case in which there exists the potentiality of bankruptcy. Finally, we analyze the relationship of the gearing ratio and the bankruptcy penalty with respect to the resulting equilibrium allocations