Are the planned increases in aid too much of a good thing?

Donor countries have committed themselves to increase aid to developing countries by 60 percent over the next five years; and larger increases would be needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). But there are concerns that there may be a limit on the amount of aid that developing countries can absorb and use effectively—and that large aid flows might even be harmful. Could a large increase in aid be “too much of a good thing?” This essay disentangles the seven possible reasons why additional aid might not be effective. These include microeconomic effects (e.g., transactions costs), macroeconomic effects (e.g., ‘Dutch Disease’) and the impact on political economy (e.g., the ‘Resource Curse’). The paper looks at each possible constraint in turn. The paper finds that there are indeed serious obstacles to effective use of increased aid, but that none is immutable. All of the constraints which limit the effective use of additional aid can be addressed by a relatively small set of practical improvements in the way that aid is provided and used. Donors have already committed themselves to a significant program of aid reform. If the measures to which donors are committed were consistently implemented, the seven constraints to effective aid absorption could be relaxed. The paper concludes that, provided increased aid is accompanied by reforms to the way aid is delivered, the capacity of developing countries to absorb and use aid should not be presented as a barrier to the increases in aid which would be needed to meet the MDGs.Foreign aid, dutch disease, absorption, millenium development goals, transaction costs, resource curse, aid reform

What is Poverty Reduction?

There is a healthy debate about how to achieve poverty reduction in developing countries, but not enough discussion of what we mean by “poverty reduction.” “Poverty reduction” is often used as a short-hand for promoting economic growth that will permanently lift as many people as possible over a poverty line. But there are many different objectives that are consistent with “poverty reduction,” and we have to make choices between them. There are trade-offs between tackling current and future poverty, between helping as many poor people as possible and focusing on those in chronic poverty, and between measures that tackle the causes of poverty and those which deal with the symptoms. Because donors focus on just one dimension of poverty reduction (growth) they marginalise other legitimate objectives such as reducing chronic poverty or providing social services in countries that cannot otherwise afford them. Because donor agencies do not recognize these different objectives explicitly, there are important negative consequences for the choice and management of individual aid programmes, and for donors’ ability to make transparent and evidence-based decisions about the composition of their portfolio. Aid could be more effective if there were greater recognition of the different dimensions of poverty reduction and if this was recognized in the objectives for and incentives in aid agencies. There is an ethical case for a global system of social justice that provides long-term, redistributional transfers of resources to the world’s poor, to enable them to lead better lives while their country is developing, even if there is no expectation that these transfers will accelerate economic development. Reasonable people can disagree about whether this is desirable but the existing hegemonic definition of poverty reduction does not sufficiently acknowledge this as a legitimate goal or permit a meaningful discourse about how it might be achieved.poverty reduction, growth, donors

A Policymakers' Guide to Dutch Disease

It is sometimes claimed that an increase in aid might cause Dutch Disease—that is, an appreciation of the real exchange rate which can slow the growth of a country’s exports— and that aid increases might thereby harm a country’s long-term growth prospects. This essay argues that it is unlikely that a long-term, sustained and predictable increase in aid would, through the impact on the real exchange rate, do more harm than good, for three reasons. First, there is not necessarily an adverse impact on exports from Dutch Disease, and any impact on economic growth may be small. Second, aid spent in part on improving the supply side—investments in infrastructure, education, government institutions and health—result in productivity benefits for the whole economy, which can offset any loss of competitiveness from the Dutch Disease effect. Third, the welfare of a nation’s citizens depends on their consumption and investment, not just output. Even on pessimistic assumptions, the additional consumption and investment which the aid finances is larger than any likely adverse impact on output. However, the macroeconomic effects of aid can cause substantial harm if the aid is not sustained until its benefits are realized. The costs of a temporary loss of competitiveness might well exceed the benefits of the short-term increase in aid. To avoid doing harm, aid should be sustained and predictable, and used in part to promote economic growth. This maximizes the chances that the long-term productivity and growth benefits will offset the adverse effects—which may be small if they exist at all—that big aid surges may pose as a result of Dutch Disease.Foreign aid, dutch disease, exchange rate,economic growth, consumption

Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from the UK Experience

The establishment of the UK Department for International Development in 1997, and the evolution of the UK’s foreign aid policies, has provoked international interest as a possible model for other countries to follow. The UK now combines in a single government department not only the delivery of all overseas aid, but also responsibility for analyzing the impact on developing countries of other government policies, such as trade, environment and prevention of conflict. The department is led by a Cabinet-level minister. It has a remit to articulate the UK’s long-term security, economic and political interests in helping to build a more stable and prosperous world, and to ensure that this long-term goal is considered alongside the more immediately pressing concerns of political, security and commercial interests. It has benefited from a sharp focus on its long-term mission to reduce poverty overseas. Within a few years, the new Department has established a reputation for itself, and for the UK Government, as a leader in development thinking and practice. This paper describes the institutional changes in more detail, and considers how they came about. It also considers the steps that will be needed to consolidate its early success.development, foreign aid, UK, poverty reduction, Department for International Development

Commitment to Development Index 2014

In this report, The Commitment to Development Index ranks 27 of the world's richest countries on their policies that affect more than five billion people living in poorer nations. Moving beyond comparing how much foreign aid each country gives, the CDI quantifies a range of rich country policies that affect poor people: Quantity and quality of foreign aidOpenness to tradePolicies that encourage investment and financial transparencyOpenness to migrationEnvironmental policiesPromoting international securitySupport for technology creation and transferThe Index gives credit for generous and highquality aid, incentives for foreign direct investment and financial transparency, open immigration policies, robust support for technological research and development, and contributions to global security and the environment. Scores are reduced for barriers to imports from developing countries, selling arms to poor and undemocratic nations, barriers to sharing technology, and policies that harm shared environmental resources

Payments for Progress: A Hands-Off Approach to Foreign Aid

There are significant differences of opinion about the merits of additional aid in meeting the MDGs, including whether and how aid should be given in ‘fragile states’, whether additional aid on the scale envisioned can be effectively used even in well-managed economies, and whether the aid system, particularly in highly aid-dependent countries, undermines instead of strengthens local institutions. We discuss an approach to scaling up foreign aid that would explicitly be aimed at strengthening local capacity and institutions, including in fragile states. “Payments for progress” would link additional aid to clear evidence of progress already achieved on the ground. This approach would give flexibility and autonomy to local institutions, providing an opening for local institutional experimentation, while at the same time ensuring that aid pays only for real, measurable achievements. Donors would bind themselves as a group to pay a specific amount for clear evidence of progress against one or more agreed goals in low-income developing countries. Developing country governments would present an independently audited statement reporting their progress on the measures, and donors would pay the agreed amount. Payments would be determined as a function of the outcomes, and not linked to the implementation of any particular policies, any other intermediate outputs, or “tied” to purchases from particular suppliers or companies. Governments that found ways to provide services efficiently and so reduce the costs of providing them would benefit from a larger surplus. We discuss the issues such an approach raises—in setting the benchmarks against which progress is measured, in avoiding cheating, and in managing unintended negative consequences of an incentives-based approach. We conclude with a summary of the advantages for donors and recipients.foreign aid, MDGs, aid-dependent countries, local capacity, fragile states, tied aid

The Costs and Benefits of Front-loading and Predictability of Immunization

How can the international community save more children’s lives faster and more effectively in the 21st century? This Working Paper analyzes the extent to which “frontloading” and predictable vaccine funding, as proposed by the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm), is more effective in impacting vaccine coverage than spending vaccine funds equally throughout the lives of projects. The IFFIm is an initiative of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), and supported by the governments of the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Italy, Spain and Norway. An initial IFFIm investment of $4 billion is expected to prevent 5 million child deaths by 2015, and more than 5 million future adult deaths. Using a stylized model, the authors quantify the positive and negative effects of predictable vaccine funds and frontloading, and finds IFFIm’s approach can increase the impact of vaccine coverage by 22%. This is because stable and long-term financing allows vaccine manufacturers and countries to plan for long periods of time, knowing that resources will be available. Front-loading helps to reduce the spread of disease and to immunize large groups of people faster.frontloading, vaccine, immunization