Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

We use mutual fund flows as a measure for individual investor sentiment for different stocks, and find that high sentiment predicts low future returns at long horizons. Fund flows are dumb money %uF818 by reallocating across different mutual funds, retail investors reduce their wealth in the long run. This dumb money effect is strongly related to the value effect. High sentiment also is associated high corporate issuance, interpretable as companies increasing the supply of shares in response to investor demand.

Investor Sentiment and Corporate Finance: Micro and Macro

We document that net equity issuance is considerably more sensitive to aggregate stock returns and Q's than to firm-level stock returns and Q's. Very similar patterns also emerge when we look at merger activity. In light of earlier work (Campbell 1991, Vuolteenaho 2002) which finds that aggregate stock returns are less informative about future cashflows than are firm-level stock returns--and thus, potentially more strongly influenced by investor sentiment--these results suggest that both equity issuance and mergers are to a significant extent driven by market-timing considerations, as opposed to by purely fundamental factors.

Aggregate Short Interest and Market Valuations

We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history. Total short interest moves in a countercyclical fashion. For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak. Moreover, this decline does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put options, as the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency. The evidence suggests that: i) arbitrageurs are reluctant to bet against aggregate mispricings; and ii) short-selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market.

Short Sale Constraints and Stock Returns

Stocks can be overpriced when short sale constraints bind. We study the costs of short selling equities, 1926-1933, using the publicly observable market for borrowing stock. Some stocks are sometimes expensive to short, and it appears that stocks enter the borrowing market when shorting demand is high. We find that stocks that are expensive to short or which enter the borrowing market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis. Size-adjusted returns are one to two percent lower per month for new entrants, and despite high costs it is profitable to short them.

Aggregate Short Interest and Market Valuations

We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history. Total short interest moves in a countercyclical fashion. For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak. Moreover, this decline does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put options, as the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency. The evidence suggests that: i) arbitrageurs are reluctant to bet against aggregate mispricings; and ii) short-selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market.

Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-Outs

Recent equity carve-outs in US technology stocks appear to violate a basic premise of financial theory: identical assets have identical prices. In our 1998-2000 sample, holders of a share of company A are expected to receive x shares of company B, but the price of A is less than x times the price of B. A prominent example involves 3Com and Palm. Arbitrage does not eliminate these blatant mispricing due to short sale constraints, so that B is overpriced but expensive or impossible to sell short. Evidence from options prices shows that shorting costs are extremely high, eliminating exploitable arbitrage opportunities.

Investor Reaction to Salient News in Closed-End Country Funds

We provide a model of closed-end fund pricing which includes investors who do not form expectations correctly and allows for salient country-specific news to affect this expectation formation process. We use panel data on prices and net asset values of closed- end country funds to examine investor reaction to news that affects fundamentals, and measure the response of the idiosyncratic change in fund prices to the idiosyncratic change in fund asset values. In a typical week, US prices underreact to changes in foreign fundamentals; the (short-run) elasticity of price with respect to asset value is significantly less than one. In weeks with major news (relevant to the specific country) appearing on the front page of The New York Times, prices react much more to fundamentals; the elasticity of price with respect to asset value is closer to one. These results are roughly consistent with the hypothesis that major news events lead some investors who normally lag behind in updating their expectations to temporarily react more quickly.

Credit Conditions and the Cyclical Behavior of Inventories: A Case Studyof the 1981-82 Recession

This paper examines micro data on U.S. firms' inventories during different macroeconomic episodes. Much of the analysis focuses on the 1981-82 recession, a recession that was apparently precipitated by tight monetary policy. We find important cross-sectional effects in this period: firms that were "bank-dependent" were much more prone to shed inventories than their non-bank-dependent counterparts. In contrast, such cross-sectional differences are largely absent during a period of "loose" monetary policy later in the 1980s. Our findings are consistent with the view that 1) there is a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission; 2) the lending channel is likely to be particularly important in explaining inventory fluctuations during downturns.