Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coxeistence?

My thesis for this paper is based upon developments which appear, as of 1955, to bring into clearer focus the process by which the earned differential advantages of patent rights are being adjusted to the prohibitory dixits of antitrust law. This is part of the never-ending governmental function of balancing stability of legal rights against the desired flexibility resulting from evolutionary growth. We can only chart the directions of the current trends. Generalizations from this panorama should not be overdrawn or artificially simplified. Both the patent and antitrust spectra are arranged in degrees. The edges of certainty are blurred in areas where the law continues to adjust itself to technological economic growth. Despite these caveats, however, I do not mean to underrate the increased clarification of the appointed provinces of patent and antitrust policies. This clarification is emerging from what has occurred since the 1930\u27s when patent laws and the Patent System began to be subjected to accusations of organic deficiencies in their underlying theory and operations-criticisms that went beyond instances of misuse of patent rights. Let us begin this synthesis with some generalizations and searching questions. At the same time let us bear in mind that the patent-antitrust picture is seen through contracted vision because opinion necessarily· mixes with demonstrable facts in the value judgments any observer may make

UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND STATE POWERS

The genesis and development of the so-called doctrine of unconstitutional conditions represent a phase of the general problem of the division of state and federal powers. Its importance was first recognized in the series of cases dealing with the power of the state over foreign corporations seeking to do business within its borders, for it was in those decisions that the Supreme Court moderated the absolutism of the principle announced in Paul v. Virginia, by the indefinite qualification that the conditions of admission must not be repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States

FEDERAL ANTITRUST LEGISLATION: GUIDEPOSTS TO A REVISED NATIONAL ANTITRUST POLICY

The year 1952 finds various currents of controversy in the antitrust field converging toward the necessity for a survey and reappraisal of the body of congressional legislation generally known as the federal antitrust laws. The foundation stone in the trio of principal antitrust statutes is the Sherman Act of 1890. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act of 1914, as amended, are the other two members of this major group of antimonopoly laws. While differing in particulars in its impact upon the American economy, each of these basic statutes is avowedly designed to maintain competition in American interstate and foreign commerce

Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts

This topic is a constellation of antitrust highlights. Within the past five years the Federal Trade Commission has ventured into borderlands of its claim of jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in testing the scope of section 5 itself and its relation to the Commission\u27s jurisdiction under the Sherman and Clayton Acts

Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coxeistence?

My thesis for this paper is based upon developments which appear, as of 1955, to bring into clearer focus the process by which the earned differential advantages of patent rights are being adjusted to the prohibitory dixits of antitrust law. This is part of the never-ending governmental function of balancing stability of legal rights against the desired flexibility resulting from evolutionary growth. We can only chart the directions of the current trends. Generalizations from this panorama should not be overdrawn or artificially simplified. Both the patent and antitrust spectra are arranged in degrees. The edges of certainty are blurred in areas where the law continues to adjust itself to technological economic growth. Despite these caveats, however, I do not mean to underrate the increased clarification of the appointed provinces of patent and antitrust policies. This clarification is emerging from what has occurred since the 1930\u27s when patent laws and the Patent System began to be subjected to accusations of organic deficiencies in their underlying theory and operations-criticisms that went beyond instances of misuse of patent rights. Let us begin this synthesis with some generalizations and searching questions. At the same time let us bear in mind that the patent-antitrust picture is seen through contracted vision because opinion necessarily· mixes with demonstrable facts in the value judgments any observer may make

Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts

This topic is a constellation of antitrust highlights. Within the past five years the Federal Trade Commission has ventured into borderlands of its claim of jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in testing the scope of section 5 itself and its relation to the Commission\u27s jurisdiction under the Sherman and Clayton Acts

WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES

Waiver of jury trial in criminal cases generally is a highly practical issue at the present time both from the standpoint of the public and of the accused. The belief is common that the element of delay is one of the primary causes of the general disrespect attaching to the courts of criminal juridiction. It is said that an overzealousness in shielding the citizen against oppression and injustice has resulted in shifting to the background expedients designed to simplify and give momentum to the disposition of criminal cases

FEDERAL ANTITRUST LEGISLATION: GUIDEPOSTS TO A REVISED NATIONAL ANTITRUST POLICY

The year 1952 finds various currents of controversy in the antitrust field converging toward the necessity for a survey and reappraisal of the body of congressional legislation generally known as the federal antitrust laws. The foundation stone in the trio of principal antitrust statutes is the Sherman Act of 1890. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act of 1914, as amended, are the other two members of this major group of antimonopoly laws. While differing in particulars in its impact upon the American economy, each of these basic statutes is avowedly designed to maintain competition in American interstate and foreign commerce