Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting -- but not in new -- democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights.property rights, contract rights, autocracy, democracy

Contract Intensive Money

This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it introduces a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. Second, it uses this measure to provide additional and more direct evidence about the importance of secure property and contract rights for economic growth and investment. In the analysis below, we briefly review the arguments that link the quality of third-party contract enforcement to growth and investment. We then show how the new measure, which we call “contract-intensive money” or CIM, relates to the subjective measures employed in the literature. We test empirically the proposition that this variable, as a measure of the security of contract and property rights, is positively related to income, growth and investment.contract enforcement, property rights, governance, growth

Why the Transition from Communism Is So Difficult

After the defeat of fascism, there were economic miracles, but after the collapse of communism, economic performance has been poor. This address develops a theory of power that explains this difference and other puzzles. When those with power have an encompassing stake in society, they have an incentive to make it productive. When those with power have only a narrow interest in society, their incentive is to seek redistributions without concern for social costs. After fascism, the encompassing interests of majorities prevailed, whereas after communism narrow interests, such as large and uneconomic state enterprises, have had disproportionate political influence.Communism

A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45510/1/11127_2005_Article_BF01725793.pd

Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting -- but not in new -- democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights

Contract Intensive Money

This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it introduces a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. Second, it uses this measure to provide additional and more direct evidence about the importance of secure property and contract rights for economic growth and investment. In the analysis below, we briefly review the arguments that link the quality of third-party contract enforcement to growth and investment. We then show how the new measure, which we call “contract-intensive money” or CIM, relates to the subjective measures employed in the literature. We test empirically the proposition that this variable, as a measure of the security of contract and property rights, is positively related to income, growth and investment