Measuring Ethno-Linguistic Affinity between Nations

Research on ethno-linguistic ties has so far mostly focused on domestic measures of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. Little attention has been given to the possibility that ethno-linguistic relations between countries may affect out- comes, particularly in a spatial econometric context. In this paper, I propose a way of measuring Ethno-Linguistic Affinity between nations. This new index measures the degree of similarity two randomly drawn individuals from two different populations can be expected to display. I show that this measure has a number of attractive theoretical characteristics, which make it particularly useful and continue to actually construct such a measure for all countries in Africa. Finally, using this measure of Ethno-Linguistic Affinity, I show that civil conflict in Africa is likely to spill over between contiguous ethno-linguistically similar countries.Ethno-Linguistic heterogeneity, spatial econometrics, conflict, Africa

What Can Be Done to Reduce the Occurrence of Piracy in the Short and Long Run?

The problem of piracy and other forms of maritime security is actually less severe than many people perceive. Nevertheless, it is a problem that needs to be addressed. To solve the problems around Somalia, the naval involvement should continue, and effective punishment for piracy must be increased. Finally, in order to fight the long-term occurrence of piracy, a land-based solution must be found. Such a solution can only work when the focus is on building institutions and particularly the fight against corruption. There are other regions in the world that may succumb to piracy and where such land-based reforms can prevent piracy from being established in the first place.

Gov-arrrgh-nance: Jolly Rogers and Dodgy Rulers

In this paper, we argue that the effect of governance on the emergence of crimes of different levels of sophistication is highly non-linear. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive to establishing any business, including illicit enterprises. At the bottom of the spectrum, therefore, both legal business and criminal gangs benefit from improved governance. With further improvements in governance criminal activities decline. We find strong and consistent support for this hypothesis using the International Maritime Bureau's dataset on piracy. Piracy is reported by ship-owners, giving a unique insight into crime in badly governed countries which were systematically excluded from previous analyses. We show that profitable forms of piracy flourish where on the one hand there is stability and infrastructure, but on the other hand the state does not have the capacity to intervene and/or bureaucrats can be bribed to turn a blind eye. For minor acts of theft from ships the pattern is quadratic: piracy first rises and then falls as governance improves.Piracy, illegal behaviour, law enforcement, legal institutions

Migrants in Germany: Separate and Unequal

Migrants of non-Western origin often live among themselves. This residential segregation is, however, not necessarily caused by a lacking will to integrate. It rather seems to a large part explainable with the socio-economic differences between population groups. The key to successful integration of migrants into the German society thus lies in the alleviation of inequalities in respect to education, income and German language skills.Segregation, Migration, Poverty

Who Bears Responsibility for the Provision of Security: The State or You?

When defining the absence of a threat as an economic good, it is necessary to define this good using the standard economic typology: is security a private, public, club or common good? We argue in this Policy Briefing that security provision can display characteristics belonging to any of these types of goods. In recent years, we can observe a change from more publicly oriented security provision to privately provided security. That does not, however, take away the responsibility of the state to provide a basic level of security. In addition to that, it is the responsibility of the state to coordinate internationally to deliver international security.

The Influence of Conflict on the Demand for Education in the Basque Region

It has previously been shown that civil conflict influences many economic factors, including education, which play an important role in development and economic growth. Previous authors working on the influence of conflict on education have, however, always focused strongly on the supply-side effects, whereas this paper examines the influence of conflict on the demand for education. It is theoretically shown that, under relatively general conditions, individuals living in a conflict area have an incentive to increase their level of education and that this effect depends on the individual's skill level. This hypothesis is then tested using the conflict in the Basque Region as a case study, which is an example of a conflict in which one would not expect strong supply-side effects. Using the other Spanish regions, an artificial region is created in which the population has a similar educational distribution as in the Basque Region. When comparing the true and artificial regions, it can clearly be seen that for individuals with a medium level of education, there is a strong incentive to increase their education level, which is in concordance with the theoretical model.Conflict, Education, Matching, Spain

How is the EUSECON Project Shaping the European Security Research Agenda?

The New Agenda for European Security Economics (EUSECON) is a project that, since 2008, explores the challenges and opportunities in research on human-induced security risks. After defining security as a good that has both public and private characteristics, the research focuses on different elements within the wider issue. The research addresses the factors that influence agents of insecurity and the responses triggered by insecurity threats and security policies. Underpinned by research, the project presents its policy-relevant findings with the goal of improving policy-making in the European Union, disseminating this knowledge to stakeholders, and of promoting information exchange.

How Many Bucks in a Bang: On the Estimation of the Economic Costs of Conflict

The estimation of the costs of conflict is currently receiving a lot of attention in the literature. This paper aims to give a thorough overview of the existing literature, first by addressing the history of case studies that address conflict costs and second by looking at the existing body of cross-country analyses for conflict costs. In addition to the existing cross-country literature, a number of studies that only concern themselves with particular elements of conflict costs are included as well. In the end, this paper combines the insights from these previous analyses to explore how much room there is to further improve the existing studies. Specific recommendations are given how to proceed with the development of the field of conflict cost measurement.Conflict, costs of conflict, case studies

Does Security Play a Role in European Development Aid Policy?

In this Policy Briefing we address the question of whether there is a coherent and consistent policy when it comes to giving development aid. While one would theoretically argue that aid provision should be based on objective criteria set out to optimize governments' behavior or people's welfare, we find that this is not the case. While specific countries may be optimizing their objectives in international aidgiving, the cumulative effect, particularly when it comes to European policy is incoherent and inconsistent. Coordinating development policy at the European level could alleviate this problem.

How Rational Is the Response of Individuals to the Threat of Terrorism in Europe?

In this Policy Briefing, we address two important questions. We look at the drivers of concern about terrorism and find that beyond individual characteristics, it is also affected by the occurrence of terrorism. When distinguishing between permanent and transitory terrorism, the first has a much stronger impact than the first. The second question concerns how terrorism affects the policy preferences of voters. We find that while a higher level of terrorist concern does increase people's willingness to trade off civil liberties for more security, a singular attack has only a temporary effect. After only a few months, people's preferences return towards their pre-attack levels.