Prizes for Basic Research -- Human Capital, Economic Might and the Shadow of History

This paper studies the impact of global factors on patterns of basic research across countries and time. We rely on the records of major scientific awards, and on data dealing with global economic and historical trends. Specifically, we investigate the degree to which scale or threshold effects account for countries share of major prizes [Nobel, Fields, Kyoto and Wolf]. We construct a stylized model, predicting that lagged relative GDP of a country relative to the GDP of all countries engaging in basic research is an important explanatory variable of country's share of prizes. Scale effects imply that the association between the GDP share of a country and its prize share tends to be logistic -- above a threshold, there is a "take off" range, where the prize share increases at an accelerating rate with the relative GDP share of the country, until it reaches "maturity" stage. Our empirical analysis confirms the importance of lagged relative GDP in accounting for countries' prize shares, and the presence of "winner takes all" scale effect benefiting the leader. Using measures of casualties during the wars, we find that the only significant effect can be found for a lag of 3 decades – i.e., deaths in the war negatively impact the viability of basic research about 30 years after the fact. With more recent data, we document the growing importance of countries that used to be at the periphery of global research, possibly advancing towards the take off stage.Global economic trends, basic research, World War I and II, human capital, winner takes all

FDI and Trade -- Two Way Linkages?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the intertemporal linkages between FDI and disaggregated measures of international trade. We outline a model exemplifying some of these linkages, describe several methods for investigating two-way feedbacks between various categories of trade, and apply them to the recent experience of developing countries. After controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional effects, we find that the strongest feedback between the sub-accounts is between FDI and manufacturing trade. More precisely, applying Geweke (1982)%u2019s decomposition method, we find that most of the linear feedback between trade and FDI (81%) can be accounted for by Granger-causality from FDI gross flows to trade openness (50%) and from trade to FDI (31%). The rest of the total linear feedback is attributable to simultaneous correlation between the two annual series.

Prizes for Basic Research -- Human Capital, Economic Might and the Shadow of History

This paper studies the impact of several factors on the geographical distribution of basic scientific research across countries and time, and explains the dynamics of the process that has resulted in the United States becoming the undisputed leader in basic research. Our study is based on the records of major scientific awards, and on data dealing with global economic and historical trends. We investigate the degree to which scale or threshold effects account for the number of major prizes (Nobel, Fields, Kyoto, Wolf) won by different countries. We constructed a stylized model, predicting that lagged relative GDP of a country relative to the GDP of all countries engaging in basic research is an important explanatory variable of a country?s share of prizes. Scale effects imply that the association between the GDP share of a country and its prize share can be logistic -- above a certain threshold, there is a take-off range, where the prize share increases at an accelerating rate relative to the GDP share of the country, until it reaches "maturity" stage. Our empirical research findings confirm the importance of lagged relative GDP in accounting for a country's prize shares, and the presence of a "winner-takes-all" scale effect benefiting the leader. We found that U.S. basic research take-off started during the 1920s, with this research being done in the United States by U.S. scholars, prior to the immigration of scientists after Hitler's rise to power in Germany (1932-33). This is consistent with the notion that World War II set in motion forces that did not start, but hastened, the U.S. take-off, triggering immigration that contributed to the speed and intensity of U.S. research dominance. Using more recent data, we also documented the growing importance of countries that used to be at the periphery of global research, but are now possibly advancing towards the take-off stage.

Endogenous Financial and Trade Openness: Political Economy Considerations

This paper studies the endogenous determination of financial and trade openness. First, we outline channels leading to two-way feedbacks between the different modes of openness; next, we identify these feedbacks empirically. We find that one standard deviation increase in commercial openness is associated with a 9.5 percent increase in de-facto financial openness (% of GDP), controlling for political economy and macroeconomic factors. Similarly, increase in de-facto financial openness has powerful effects on future trade openness. While de-jure restrictions on capital mobility do not impact de-facto financial openness, de-jure restrictions on the current account have large adverse effect on commercial openness, suggesting that it is much easier to overcome restrictions on capital account convertibility than restrictions on commercial trade. Having established (Granger) causality, we investigate the relative magnitudes of these directions of causality using the decomposition test developed in Geweke (1982). We find that almost all of the linear feedback between trade and financial openness can be accounted for by G-causality from financial openness to trade openness (53%) and from trade to financial openness (34%). The residual is due to simultaneous correlation between the two measures.

Endogenous Financial and Trade Openness

This paper studies the endogenous determination of financial and trade openness. First, we outline a theoretical framework leading to two-way feedbacks between the different modes of openness; next, we identify these feedbacks empirically. We find that one standard deviation increase in commercial openness is associated with a 9.5 percent increase in de-facto financial openness (% of GDP), controlling for political economy and macroeconomic factors. Similarly, increase in de-facto financial openness has powerful effects on future trade openness. De-jure restrictions on capital mobility have only a weak impact on de-facto financial openness, while de-jure restrictions on the current account have large adverse effect on commercial openness. Having established (Granger) causality, we investigate the relative magnitudes of these directions of causality using Geweke's (1982) decomposition methodology. We find that almost all of the linear feedback between trade and financial openness can be accounted for by G-causality from financial openness to trade openness (53%) and from trade to financial openness (34%). We conclude that in an era of rapidly growing trade integration countries cannot choose financial openness independently of their degree of openness to trade. Dealing with greater exposure to financial turbulence by imposing restrictions on financial flows will likely be ineffectual.

FDI and Trade – Two Way Linkages?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the intertemporal linkages between FDI and disaggregated measures of international trade. We outline a model exemplifying some of these linkages, describe several methods for investigating two-way feedbacks between various categories of trade, and apply them to the recent experience of developing countries. After controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional effects, we find that the strongest feedback between the sub-accounts is between FDI and manufacturing trade. More precisely, applying Geweke (1982)’s decomposition method, we find that most of the linear feedback between trade and FDI (81%) can be accounted for by Granger-causality from FDI gross flows to trade openness (50%) and from trade to FDI (31%). The rest of the total linear feedback is attributable to simultaneous correlation between the two annual series.financial openness, commercial openness, trade, foreign direct investment

Public and private saving and the long shadow of macroeconomic shocks

The global crisis of 2008-9 and the ongoing Euro crisis raise many questions regarding the long-term response to crises. We know that households that lost access to credit, for example, were forced to adjust and increase saving. But, will households remain bigger savers than they would have been had the global financial crisis not occurred? And for how long will this increased saving persist? We also ask similar questions about the public sector’s saving decisions. We study the degree to which past income crises increase the saving rates of affected households and the public sector. We find evidence consistent with history-dependent dynamics: more experience of past crises tends to increase savings among households, but lead to decreased public sector saving. This decrease in public saving, however, is about 1/3 in magnitude than the corresponding increase in private/household saving. We follow up on these findings with an investigation of the importance of historical exposure for current account dynamics, but find no strong indication that our measure of past exposure is important to the current account’s determination. We conclude by examining the likely impact of the 2008-9 GFC on future saving

Macroeconomic adjustment and the history of crises in open economies

This paper investigates the impact of the history of crises on macroeconomic performance. We first study the impact of past banking crises on the probability of a future banking crisis. Applying data for 1980-2010 for all countries for which the required information is available, controlling for conventional macro variables and the history of banking crises occurring after 1970, we do not detect a learning process from past banking crises. Countries that have already experienced one banking crisis generally have a higher likelihood of experiencing another crisis; and the depth of the present crisis does not appear to be affected by the previous historical experience with crisis events. Evidence also suggests that, in middle-income countries, higher de jure capital account openness is associated with lower likelihood of a banking crisis, a lower ratio of non-performing loans during the crisis, and higher levels of forgone output in the crisis’ aftermath. In contrast, we find that past crisis experience has a significant impact on savings. When facing considerable political risk, the past does seem to matter -- countries with more people who were exposed, over their lifetime, to larger disasters will tend to save more. This association, however, does not hold for countries with more stable political systems. We interpret these results as consistent with a differential sectoral adjustment to a crises hypothesis. The private sector, by virtue of its harder budget constraints, adjusts faster, whereas the government adjusts at a slower pace following a crisis. The financial sector may find itself in between the two. The “too big to fail” doctrine associated with large banks provides them with a softer budget constraint, delaying the day of adjustment; for some, delaying bankruptcy. Occasionally, the separation between banks and the public sector is murky, further delaying necessary adjustments of the financial sector

Precautionary strategies and household savings

Why do people save? A strand of the literature has emphasized the role of ‘precautionary’ motives; i.e., private agents save in order to mitigate unexpected future income shocks. An implication is that in countries faced with more macroeconomic volatility and risk, private saving should be higher. From the observable data, however, we find a negative correlation between risk and private saving in cross-country comparisons, particularly in developing countries. We provide a plausible explanation for the disconnect between precautionary-saving theory and the empirical evidence that is based on a model with a richer account for the various modes of ‘precautionary’ behavior by private agents, in cases where institutions are weaker and labor informality is prevalent. In such environments, household saving decisions are intertwined with firms’ investment decisions. As a result, the interaction between saving behavior, broadly construed, and aggregate risk and uncertainty, may be more complex than is frequently assumed