Unequal Exchange: Developing Countries in the International Trade Negotiations

The results of the Uruguay Round, show that the concessions given by developing countries were generally more valuable than those they received from industrial countries. I suggest that this outcome is explained by aggressive demands from industrial countries, and by the lack of resources at the disposal of developing countries. These and other “structural factors”, weaken the negotiating capacity of developing countries and the outcome of their bargaining, is likely to be an “unequal exchange of concessions”. The paper discussess the costs of these exchanges, and the structural factors that help to understand the processes leading to these outcomes.Uruguay Round, Multilateral Negotiations, Developing countries, Unbalanced reciprocity

Unequal Exchange: Developing Countries in the International Trade Negotiations

The outcome of the Uruguay Round show that the concessions given by developing countries were more valuable than those they received from industrial countries. I suggest that this outcome is explained by the aggresive demands from industrial countries and the lack of resources (human and financial) at the disposal of developing countries. The paper discussess the costs of these unequal exchanges, and the structural factors that help to understand the processess leading to these outcomes.Uruguay Round, Developing countries, Reciprocity,

Argentina

After decades of being a marginal player in the GATT trade negotiations, Argentina decided to participate actively in the Uruguay Round. This chapter measures the imbalance between the concessions given and received and concludes that the value of the first are far more important than the second. I discusss the economic consequence of this imbalance, and the prospects that the outcome of the Doha Round can be more balanced outcome for Argentina.Argentina, GATT, Uruguay Round, Reciprocity, Intellectual Property

US contingent protection against honey imports : development aspects and the Doha Round

On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6 percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9 percent. A previous antidumping investigation in 1995 ended with a suspension"agreement"that curtailed U.S. imports from China by around 30 percent. Millions of beekeepers around the world, most of them poor, make a living from honey production, and a free and competitive world market would help raise their standards of living. Nevertheless, the sequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionism followed by the United States, the world's top importer, to include successful exporters under the effects of its contingent protection measures sends a clear message that other countries should think twice before investing in expanding honey exports to the United States. In addition to looking into the trade effects of these contingent protection measures, the author concludes that under the regulatory arrangements of the DOC, Argentina's beekeepers never had a chance of defending themselves. For example, responding to the DOC's lengthy and sophisticated questionnaires that sought to determine cost of production went beyond the capacities of poor beekeepers. In the absence of information, the DOC resorted to evidence presented by the petitioners which was riddled with errors. The available evidence suggests that had beekeepers been capable of responding to the questionnaires, the margin of dumping would had been lower, if at all existent. This and other evidence discussed by the author suggest the urgent need to introduce reforms into the World Trade Organization antidumping and subsidy agreements. At the minimum what is required is a consensus that all respondents be given the same opportunity by the international trade rules. The author argues that at present this is not the case and offers suggestions for reforms.Trade Policy,Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Public Health Promotion,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade Policy,Rules of Origin

Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization

The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in maintaining centralized control over the management of pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's procedural requirements (for example, to follow published criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on objective criteria. However, when Latin American governments attempted to introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long-run international price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not.Economic Theory&Research,Free Trade,Trade Law,Emerging Markets,Trade Policy

The unbalanced Ururguay Round outcome : the new areas in future WTO negotiations

The Uruguay Round involved a grand North-South bargain: The North reduced import barriers, particularly in textiles and agriculture. The South adopted new domestic regulations in such areas as services and intellectual property-changes that would lead to increased purchases from the North. In mercantilist economics, apples for apples-imports for imports. In real economics, apples for oranges. The authors argue that while the North's reduction of import barriers benefits both the North and the South, the new domestic regulations adopted by countries of the South could prove costly to those countries. To begin with, the regulations will be expensive to implement. And while the cost side of their impact is secured by a legal obligation (in the case of intellectual property rights, for example, the cost is higher prices for patented goods), the benefits side is not so secured.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Decentralization,Rules of Origin,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade and Regional Integration,World Trade Organization

WTO safeguards and trade liberalization: lessons from the Argentine footwear case

The footwear case provides an example of the complexities of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on the use of safeguards, and of the interaction of multilateral and regional processes of liberalization. As a result both of Argentina's unilateral liberalization and the removal of barriers within Mercosur, imports of footwear increased rapidly. As Mercosur provides no intra-regional safeguard mechanism, the government of Argentina responded by applying import relief and WTO safeguards against third countries. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body addressed these measures and as a consequence, Argentina dismantled most of them, leading to four main conclusions: The jurisprudence of the WTO's Appellate Body has created serious uncertainty as to when a country can use safeguards. This does not contribute to the political balance that has to be maintained when developing countries implement trade liberalization programs. In fact, it detracts from this crucial goal. It is an error to negotiate ambiguous multilateral agreements on the expectation that the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism will clarify them. An overvalued currency heightened the industry's problems. In the case of footwear, the decline in imports following the recent devaluation was more important than that following the implementation of earlier relief measures. The political economy of liberalization also indicates the need for regional agreements to include adequate transition mechanisms that will facilitate adjustment to free trade and to maintain support for it.Trade Policy,Rules of Origin,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research

Political economy of antidumping and safeguards in Argentina

Beginning in the late 1980s, Argentina implemented a series of reforms that were revolutionary in speed and scope, including trade liberalization. After the implementation of these policies, a record number of antidumping petitions came forward. Under a situation of high inflation, the government reinforced its fiscal and monetary policies by announcing that it would minimize the use of such measures. The flexible disciplines of the existing domestic antidumping regulations facilitated this objective. Later, when the GATT/WTO-sanctioned trade remedies were implemented, the government made a serious attempt to establish discipline by including liberal regulations and creating special institutional arrangements. A presumption built into the construction of the new mechanisms was that adhering to WTO requirements would strengthen the resistance against protection. This presumption turned out to be false. Changing circumstances, including severe peso overvaluation, had significant effects on the number and outcome of antidumping investigations. Regarding safeguards, the government followed the letter and the spirit of the WTO agreement. In relation to the number of petitions, few measures have been implemented. Rejections were based on a concern for consumer costs and on failure of the industry seeking protection to provide a convincing modernization plan. This, plus the fact that some cases were brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, have made safeguards a less attractive instrument for protection-seekers than antidumping. An important positive side of the story is that unlike previous balance of payments adjustments, in spite of the major crisis that followed the recent devaluation, the hard-won liberalization has been maintained.Environmental Economics&Policies,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Economic Theory&Research,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Trade Policy

Reciprocity in the FTAA: The Roles of Market Access, Institutions and Negotiating Capacity

Latin America will support the FTAA if it sees this project as a way of creating the conditions for improved growth performance and declining poverty. In searching for these objectives with effectiveness, this paper calls attention to some of the conditions that are necessary in order for individual countries to internalize benefits from the FTAA. I focus attention on the negotiations between Latin America and the United States because according to existing knowledge on the determinants of growth and convergence, it is the outcome of this exchange of concessions that holds the promise of the most significant gains for Latin America. This paper argues that such a convergence is more likely to take place if: (1) the outcome of these negotiations is characterized by a reciprocal and a significant exchange of market access concessions and, (2) Latin American countries strengthen some of their fundamental economic policies and institutions.FTAA, Reciprocity, Intellectual Property