On Algorithmic Statistics for space-bounded algorithms

Algorithmic statistics studies explanations of observed data that are good in the algorithmic sense: an explanation should be simple i.e. should have small Kolmogorov complexity and capture all the algorithmically discoverable regularities in the data. However this idea can not be used in practice because Kolmogorov complexity is not computable. In this paper we develop algorithmic statistics using space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity. We prove an analogue of one of the main result of `classic' algorithmic statistics (about the connection between optimality and randomness deficiences). The main tool of our proof is the Nisan-Wigderson generator.Comment: accepted to CSR 2017 conferenc

Weak Parity

We study the query complexity of Weak Parity: the problem of computing the parity of an n-bit input string, where one only has to succeed on a 1/2+eps fraction of input strings, but must do so with high probability on those inputs where one does succeed. It is well-known that n randomized queries and n/2 quantum queries are needed to compute parity on all inputs. But surprisingly, we give a randomized algorithm for Weak Parity that makes only O(n/log^0.246(1/eps)) queries, as well as a quantum algorithm that makes only O(n/sqrt(log(1/eps))) queries. We also prove a lower bound of Omega(n/log(1/eps)) in both cases; and using extremal combinatorics, prove lower bounds of Omega(log n) in the randomized case and Omega(sqrt(log n)) in the quantum case for any eps>0. We show that improving our lower bounds is intimately related to two longstanding open problems about Boolean functions: the Sensitivity Conjecture, and the relationships between query complexity and polynomial degree.Comment: 18 page

Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor

Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations

We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be expressed as $v_if(S)$, where $v_i$ is a private single parameter of the agent, and the function $f$ is publicly known. Our motivation behind studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions arise naturally in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. For an ad shown in a set $S$ of ad-slots, $f(S)$ is, say, the number of {\em unique} viewers reached by the ad, and $v_i$ is the valuation per-unique-viewer. (b) From a theoretical point of view, this factorization of the valuation function simplifies the bidding language, and renders the combinatorial auction more amenable to better approximation factors. We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts any $\alpha$-approximation non-truthful algorithm ($\alpha \leq 1$) for this problem into $\Omega(\frac{\alpha}{\log{n}})$ and $\Omega(\alpha)$-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time, respectively

When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-Correcting Procedures

Computational mechanism design (CMD) seeks to understand how to design game forms that induce desirable outcomes in multi-agent systems despite private information, self-interest and limited computational resources. CMD finds application in many settings, in the public sector for wireless spectrum and airport landing rights, to Internet advertising, to expressive sourcing in the supply chain, to allocating computational resources. In meeting the demands for CMD in these rich domains, we often need to bridge from the theory of economic mechanism design to the practice of deployable, computational mechanisms. A compelling example of this need arises in dynamic combinatorial environments, where classic analytic approaches fail and heuristic, computational approaches are required. In this talk I outline the direction of self-correcting mechanisms, which dynamically modify decisions via “output ironing" to ensure truthfulness and provide a fully computational approach to mechanism design. For an application, I suggest heuristic mechanisms for dynamic auctions in which bids arrive over time and supply may also be uncertain.Engineering and Applied Science

Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets

We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently, and has a budget for his total payment. For a special class of procurement games, the {\em bounded knapsack} problem, we show that no universally truthful budget-feasible mechanism can approximate the optimal value of the buyer within $\ln n$, where $n$ is the total number of units of all items available. We then construct a polynomial-time mechanism that gives a $4(1+\ln n)$-approximation for procurement games with {\em concave additive valuations}, which include bounded knapsack as a special case. Our mechanism is thus optimal up to a constant factor. Moreover, for the bounded knapsack problem, given the well-known FPTAS, our results imply there is a provable gap between the optimization domain and the mechanism design domain. Finally, for procurement games with {\em sub-additive valuations}, we construct a universally truthful budget-feasible mechanism that gives an $O(\frac{\log^2 n}{\log \log n})$-approximation in polynomial time with a demand oracle.Comment: To appear at WINE 201