Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts

In this paper we examine how target ranges work in the context of a Barro-Gordon (1983) type model, in which the time-inconsistency problem stems from political pressures from the government. We show that target ranges turn out to be an excellent way to cope with the time-inconsistency problem, and achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts. Our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy.

The timing and magnitude of exchange rate overshooting

Empirical evidence suggests that a monetary shock induces the exchange rate to overshoot its long-run level. The estimated magnitude and timing of the overshooting, however, varies across studies. This paper generates delayed overshooting in a new Keynesian model of a small open economy by incorporating incomplete information about the true nature of the monetary shock. The framework allows for a sensitivity analysis of the overshooting result to underlying structural parameters. It is shown that policy objectives and measures of the economy's sensitivity to exchange rate dynamic affect the timing and magnitude of the overshooting in a predictable manner, suggesting a possible rationale for the cross-study variation of the delayed overshooting Phenomenon. --Exchange rate overshooting,Partial information,Learning

Inflation Range Targets with Hard Edges

A number of inflation targeting central banks operate under provisions that allow for increased flexibility when faced with large supply shocks. These so-called escape clauses, however, are usually hard to interpret and discretionary in nature. This paper argues that a practical and more viable option is to specify a hard edged target range. Within the range, the central bank enjoys complete independence. Should, however, a large supply shock force inflation outside the range, the government may overrule the bank unless it adjusts its policy to address the government's concerns. Such an arrangement has the advantage of being easily understood and non-discretionary. Furthermore, it is shown that the bandwidth of the target range is inversely related to the degree of flexibility of the inflation targeting regime and thus, provides an easy way for the central bank to communicate its preferences to the public. The paper also discusses various determinants of the optimal design of the target range.

Imperfect transparency and shifts in the central bank's output gap target

In the New Keynesian framework, the public's expectation about the future path of monetary policy is an important determinant of current economic conditions. This paper examines the impact of unobservable shifts in the central bank's output gap target on inflation and output dynamics. I show that when the degree of persistence of a shock is private information of the central bank, and policy is discretionary in nature, it is optimal for the central bank not to reveal the future expected path of the output gap target. Perfect transparency unambiguously increases inflation and output volatility and thus lowers welfare.Discretionary monetary policy New Keynesian Phillips curve Transparency Kalman filter Learning

Imperfect Transparency and Shifts in the Central Bank's Output Gap Target

In the New Keynesian framework, the public's expectation about the future path of monetary policy is an important determinant of current economic conditions. This paper examines the impact of unobservable shifts in the central bank's output gap target on inflation and output dynamics. I show that when the degree of persistence of a shock is private information of the central bank, and policy is discretionary in nature, it is optimal for the central bank not to reveal the future expected path of the output gap target. Perfect transparency unambiguously increases inflation and output volatility and thus lowers welfare.Transparency, Monetary Policy, Discretion, Commitment

Inflation Range Targets with Hard Edges

A number of inflation targeting central banks operate under provisions that allow for increased flexibility when faced with large supply shocks. These so-called escape clauses, however, are usually hard to interpret and discretionary in nature. This paper argues that a practical and more viable option is to specify a hard edged target range. Within the range, the central bank enjoys complete independence. Should, however, a large supply shock force inflation outside the range, the government may overrule the bank unless it adjusts its policy to address the government's concerns. Such an arrangement has the advantage of being easily understood and non-discretionary. Furthermore, it is shown that the bandwidth of the target range is inversely related to the degree of flexibility of the inflation targeting regime and thus, provides an easy way for the central bank to communicate its preferences to the public. The paper also discusses various determinants of the optimal design of the target range.Inflation Range Targeting, Discretion, Escape Clauses

Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts

In this paper we examine how target ranges work in the context of a Barro-Gordon (1983) type model, in which the time-inconsistency problem stems from political pressures from the government. We show that target ranges turn out to be an excellent way to cope with the time-inconsistency problem, and achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts. Our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economyInflation Band Targeting, Inflation Contract, Time-inconsistent policy

Crime, Expectations and The Deterrence Hypothesis

Empirical tests of the deterrence hypothesis - the idea that crime can be deterred through changes in the costs or benefits derived from committing crime - typically focus on estimation of the relationship between current crime rates and contemporaneous measures of economic conditions, demographics, and enforcement levels. We argue this approach is misguided because both past behavior and future conditions should impact decisions to commit a crime in the present. Accordingly, we develop an econometric model of aggregate crime rates that includes past behavior and expectations of future conditions. Model estimates suggest that expectations of future conditions are important in determining current crime rates. One implication of this finding is that the long run elasticity of crime rates with respect to policy variables may be orders of magnitude larger than short run elasticities, and depend upon whether the change is permanent or transitory. A second implication of this finding is that credibility and the ability of policy makers to commit are important in thinking about policies designed to deter crime.