23 research outputs found

    FIN 423

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    Insiders' timing ability and disclosure on corporate share buyback trading

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    Purpose – Due to insufficient disclosure on open market share repurchases in the USA, at any given point in time, outside shareholders have no knowledge of whether their firm is executing open market share repurchase trades. It is hypothesized that such information disparity between outside shareholders and insiders of a repurchasing firm creates asymmetric opportunities for insiders to time their sell trades in a period when the firm is engaged in buyback trading of its own shares. Insiders have an incentive to sell when the firm is in the market supporting the price by repurchasing its shares. The purpose of this study is to examine this hypothesis (insider timing hypothesis) by investigating insiders' trading activities during the periods of corporate share buyback trading. Design/methodology/approach – Multiple regression analyses are used to explore relations among trades by insiders, corporate share buyback trades, and a number of other control variables. Findings – This study finds evidence that insiders do increase the net number of shares sold in a fiscal quarter when the firm is in the market engaged in share buyback trading. Originality/value – This study suggests the possibility of insiders' opportunistic trading behavior during the periods of corporate open market share buyback trading.Disclosure, Insider trading, Shares, United States of America

    The Winner's Curse and Bidder Competition in Acquisitions: Evidence from Failed Bank Auctions.

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    Auction theory predictions are used to test if winning bidders overpay (the "winner's curse") in FDIC sealed-bid auctions of failed banks. The authors find that winning bids tend to increase as the number of competitors increases, as predicted by theory. Further, bid levels of all bidders increase with increased competition, which is consistent with bidders' failing to adjust for the winner's curse in a common value auction setting. However, additional tests, using only winning bids, only are consistent with both a common value and a private values model, so this result should be interpreted with caution. Copyright 1989 by American Finance Association.
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