The Relationship between Knowledge Intensity and Market Concentration in European Industries: An inverted U-Shape

This paper is motivated by the European Union strategy to secure competitiveness for Europe in the globalising world by focussing on technological supremacy (the Lisbon - agenda). Parallel to that, the EU Commission is trying to take a more economic approach to competition policy in general and anti-trust policy in particular. Our analysis tries to establish the relationship between increasing knowledge intensity and the resulting market concentration: if the European Union economy is gradually shifting to a pattern of sectoral specialisation that features a bias on knowledge intensive sectors, then this may well have some influence on market concentration and competition policy would have to adjust not to counterfeit the Lisbon-agenda. Following a review of the available theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between knowledge intensity and market structure, we use a larger Eurostat database to test the shape of this relationship. Assuming a causality that runs from knowledge to concentration, we show that the relationship between knowledge intensity and market structures is in fact different for knowledge intensive industries and we establish a non-linear, inverted U-curve shape.market structure, knowledge intensity, competition policy

Netzinvestitionen und Regulierungsandrohung: Vermeidung der Monopolbildung oder des Infrastrukturausbaus?

In summer 2005, Deutsche Telekom announced its plans for the buildup of a new fiber glass network. At the same time, it formulated the condition that this network was not to be regulated concerning pricing or use by other providers (network access). In order to make this investment possible, in its coalition treaty the big coalition agreed to exclude the new network from the ex-ante regulation and to include this freedom from regulation in the telecommunication law. The question is now how investments can be facilitated and, at the same time, welfare losses through monopoly gains can be avoided. Applying game theory, it can be shown that a regulation authority like the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’, which is responsible for German telecommunication sector, should signal an increasing tolerance for deviations from its calculated and determined regulatory price in the face of increasing uncertainty concerning expected cost and returns. Thus, the threat of regulation alone leads to tolerable prices, without the actual regulation taking place. In the future, the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’ should reduce information asymmetries and the optimal level of tolerance in order to achieve a more precise intervention price and a more effective threat of regulation. The effectiveness of such a threat decreases if the legislation prevents the regulation authority from using this instrument by law. Against this background, the recent Federal Government resolution from March 17th 2006 noveling the telecommunication law heads for the economically right direction but it has to prove its incentive compatibility in the daily legal practice.

Sind Theater reine Subventionsgüter? Eine ökonomische Betrachtung der fiskalischen Unterstützung von Theaterbetrieben

Until 2003, public savings in the art sector have been immense. But lately there has been a tendency of increasing public expenditures in this field. Nevertheless one has to ask if these allowances are required to sustain artistic and cultural life. If, however, art cannot be financed by the contributions of their consumers, the question arises whether and to which extend the government should pay for it. In spring 2007, we realized a survey in cooperation with the “neue theater“ in Halle and the “Anhaltisches Theater Dessau“. Among other subjects, we asked the audience to evaluate the current ticket prices. As a result, we analyzed how these theatres could adjust their ticket prices in order to reduce the need of public subsidies. The conclusion of this survey is that the visitors are reacting rather weakly to moderate price increases. So it can be stated that the theatres could in fact boost their revenues by appropriately raising their ticket prices. Unfortunately, the resulting extra revenue is not sufficient to finance the performing arts without the help of public subsidies. Finally, an additional argument for subsidizing art is that not only the customers benefit from it, but also the society as a whole because of so-called positive external effects.

Network Investment and the Threat of Regulation – Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?

In summer 2005, the German telecommunication incumbent Deutsche Telekom announced its plans to build a new broadband fibre optics network. Deutsche Telekom decided as precondition for this new network not to be regulated with respect to pricing and third party access. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments and prevents monopolistic prices at the same time, we model an incumbent's decision problem under a threat of regulation in a game-theoretical context. The decision whether to invest or not depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on investment returns. Depending on the incumbent's expectation on these parameters, he will decide if the investment is favourable, and which price to best set. This price is below a non-regulated profit maximising price, since the incumbent tries to circumvent regulation. Thus, we show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention might prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both investment decision and the incumbent's price via his signals on regulation probability and price. These signals an be considered optimal, if they simultaneously allow investment and minimize the incumbent's price.regulation, investment, telecommunication, network industries

Broadband Investment and the Threat of Regulation: Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?

Recently, investments in new generation networks in Germany have been curtailed, since potential investors required this new network be unregulated. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments to occur but prevents monopolistic prices, we model an investor's decision problem under a threat of regulation. We show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention may prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both the investment decision and the investor's price via her signals on regulation probability and price.