Our Virgin Birth or the Reinventions of Europe

Introduction: In this chapter, we start with the assumption that while the discussion as to whether or to what extent the EU ought to be characterised as ‘empire’ is a fruitful and productive one, we can take some of the axioms developed in this book as given (see also inter alia Zielonka, 2006). We argue first that Europe as embodied in today’s EU is best characterised by its post-imperial condition, that is, the tension between its aspiration to transcend or overcome its imperial legacies on one hand, and its propensity to reproduce and project these legacies on the other; and second that in doing so, scholars need to make more explicit the relationship between internal and external imperial patterns. On both these counts, our ambition is to propose a way of framing the question that occupies the editors and contributors to this volume rather than offer a satisfactory treatment thereof. We ask how the EU has dealt with its post-imperial condition over time, and what normative guidelines could help it do so better. Revisiting our recent argument on the analogy between the 19th-century standard of civilization and the EU’s relations with the rest of the world, we suggest that the EU’s narratives and modes of actions today have only partially succeeded in dealing with its hegemonic hangover (Nicolaidis 2014).4 We do not know whether internal or external imperial patterns reinforce or mitigate each other. Thus, the definitive reconfiguration of international order away from Europe paradoxically may lead to the reassertion of imperial tendencies internally, as the great powers within Europe retrench and regroup. By the same 4 token, its ability in a number of arenas to transcend imperial habits internally can have ramifications for the EU’s engagement of its neighbours and the broader world. We first defend the idea that the EU has long embarked on a post-imperial project that is indeed grounded on a commitment to non-domination internally as well as externally. Second, we show that this project has in part failed both within and without, because old habits die hard, and because of evolving internal and external conjectural factors. Finally, we ask how the EU may best deal with its post-imperial condition – namely pursue a “decentering agenda” – by focusing on the cases of Turkey and Ukraine

Democracy with foresight: the key to a socially sustainable transition in Europe (and beyond)

How can the European Union steer a course towards long-term social and ecological well-being in a context of incessant emergencies? Two decades of perpetual crisis management have greatly eroded Europe’s capacity to pursue a sustainable future, as considerations of short-term expediency continue to hamper the four transitions that are necessary – green, digital, geopolitical and socio-economic. At the same time, however, few polities in the world are better suited to the design and promotion of long-term policies. This editorial draws on its authors’ respective research into progressive social transformation and sustainable European integration to identify a path for the socially sustainable transition which we now need and which the rest of this issue of Benchmarking Working Europe further explores

Solidarity: For Sale? The Social Dimension of the New European Economic Governances. Europe in Dialogue 2012/01

The Europeans can be proud as they look back on fifty years of peaceful integration. Nowadays many people in the world see the European Union as a model of how states and their citizens can work together in peace and in freedom. However, this achievement does not automatically mean that the EU has the ability to deal with the problems of the future in a rapidly changing world. For this reason the European Union needs to keep developing its unity in diversity in a dynamic way, be it with regard to energy issues, the euro, climate change or new types of conflict. Self-assertion and solidarity are the fundamental concepts which will shape the forthcoming discourse. "Europe in Dialogue" wishes to make a contribution to this open debate. The analyses in this series subject political concepts, processes and institutions to critical scrutiny and suggest ways of reforming internal and external European policymaking so that it is fit for the future. However, "Europe in Dialogue" is not merely trying to encourage an intra- European debate, and makes a point of including authors from non-EU states. Looking at an issue from a different angle or from a distance often helps to facilitate the crucial change of perspective which in turn makes it possible to continue to develop Europe in a meaningful way and to engage in a critical and yet courteous discourse with other civilizations and continents

Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity

In order to be simultaneously effective and liberal, governments must normally be able to count on voluntary compliance – which, in turn, depends on the support of socially shared legitimacy beliefs. In Western constitutional democracies, such beliefs are derived from the distinct but coexistent traditions of “republican” and “liberal” political philosophy. When judged by these criteria, the European Union – if considered by itself – appears as a thoroughly liberal polity which, however, lacks all republican credentials. But this view (which seems to structure the debates about the “European democratic deficit”) ignores the multilevel nature of the European polity, where the compliance of citizens is requested, and needs to be legitimated by member states – whereas the Union appears as a “government of governments” which is entirely dependent on the voluntary compliance of its member states. What matters primarily, therefore, is the compliance-legitimacy relationship between the Union and its member states – which, however, is normatively constrained by the basic compliance-legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituents. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, member governments could and should be able to assume political responsibility for European policies in which they had a voice, and to justify them in “communicative discourses” in the national public space. This is not necessarily true of “non-political” policy choices imposed by the European Court of Justice. By enforcing its “liberal” program of liberalization and deregulation, the ECJ may presently be undermining the “republican” bases of member-state legitimacy. Where this is the case, open non-compliance is a present danger, and political controls of judicial legislation may be called for.Um gleichzeitig effektiv und liberal sein zu können, ist staatliche Herrschaft auf freiwillige Folgebereitschaft angewiesen – die ihrerseits der Unterstützung durch sozial geteilte Legitimitätsüberzeugungen bedarf. In den demokratischen Verfassungsstaaten des Westens werden solche Überzeugungen aus den unterschiedlichen, aber komplementär zusammenwirkenden Traditionen der „republikanischen“ und der „liberalen“ politischen Philosophie hergeleitet. An diesen Kriterien gemessen erscheint die Europäische Union – wenn man sie für sich betrachtet – als eine „liberale“ politische Ordnung, der jedoch alle „republikanischen“ Legitimitätsmerkmale fehlen. Aber eine solche Sichtweise, die auch die derzeitige Diskussion über ein „europäisches Demokratiedefizit“ bestimmt, verkennt den Mehrebenencharakter des europäischen Gemeinwesens. In ihm sind es die Mitgliedstaaten, die Entscheidungen der Union gegenüber den eigenen Bürgern durchsetzen und auch legitimieren müssen, während es für die Union ihrerseits auf die freiwillige Folgebereitschaft ihrer Mitgliedstaaten ankommt. Dabei werden diese jedoch durch die normativen Grundlagen ihrer eigenen Legitimität begrenzt. Politische Entscheidungen auf europäischer Ebene setzen breiten Konsens voraus, und die Regierungen sollten sie deshalb auch gegenüber den eigenen Bürgern in „kommunikativen Diskursen“ vertreten und dafür die politische Verantwortung übernehmen können. Dies gilt jedoch nicht notwendigerweise auch für Entscheidungen der europäischen Politik, die im nichtpolitischen Modus ohne Beteiligung des Rates und des Parlaments vom Europäischen Gerichtshof bestimmt werden. Mit der gegenwärtigen Radikalisierung seines „liberalen“ Programms der Liberalisierung und Deregulierung des nationalen Rechts könnte der Gerichtshof in der Tat die „republikanischen“ Grundlagen der mitgliedstaatlichen Legitimität unterminieren. In diesem Falle könnte die Union sich nicht länger auf die Folgebereitschaft ihrer Mitgliedstaaten verlassen. Um diese Gefahr für die europäische Integration zu vermeiden, sollte eine stärkere politische Kontrolle der richterlichen Rechtsetzung erwogen werden.1 Legitimacy Republican and liberal legitimating discourses Constitutional democracies – and the EU? 2 Legitimacy in multilevel polities 3 Legitimating member state compliance Political modes of policy making Non-political policy making 4 The need for justification 5 The Court is pushing against the limits of justifiability 6 The liberal undermining of republican legitimacy 7 Needed: A political balance of community and autonomy Reference

"The European Union as a Trade Power"

[Summary]. The EU is a formidable trade power. While trade liberalization internally and externally have always been the essence of European integration, successive enlargements and the creation of the European Single Market have turned the EU into the world’s largest trade power. The EU is responsible for making trade policy through a complex decisionmaking process that has often been contested politically but allows it to speak on behalf of its members in international trade negotiations. This chapter argues that not only does the EU derive some inherent power from trade, but that it is also increasingly prone to use trade as the backbone of its normative power. As a result the EU is now becoming a world power through trade, as one of the major actors shaping the multilateral trade agenda, and using access to its market strategically in order to obtain political concessions from its commercial partners. This chapter explores the determinants of the EU’s trade power (both inherent and normative) and examines the contribution of trade policy to the power of Europe in the international system, both in the context of the World Trade Organization and in the broader framework of international relations

Three meanings of Brexit

Lecture delivered at the European University Institute in Florence on 26 October 2016A video interview with the presenter was recorded on 26 October 2016I will discuss three meanings of Brexit – starting with a definition of “meaning” as narrative, as opposed to explanation, rationalisation or implication. Meanings matter, I argue, for which narrative dominates the next two years and will determine not only the nature of the Brexit deal but also the nature of the EU itself. The three meanings are labelled exceptionalism (“Brexit means that the UK should leave”) a narrative shared by hard-Brexiters and Euro-federalists; scepticism (“Brexit mean that you all should leave”), a narrative shared by Euro-sceptics around Europe and left-wing Brexiters in the UK; and pluralism (“Brexit means that you can leave”). The lecture will explore the ways in which this last narrative can both draw on the other two and help transcend them. It will draw on the four disciplines of the EUI and the Max Weber programme, namely history, politics, law and economics