Over-the-Counter Markets

We study how intermediation and asset prices in over-the-counter markets are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly the prices at which investors trade with each other as well as marketmakers' bid and ask prices in a dynamic model with strategic agents. Bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors, or have easier access to multiple marketmakers. With a monopolistic marketmaker, bid-ask spreads are higher if investors have easier access to the marketmaker. We characterize endogenous search and welfare, and discuss empirical implications.

Dynamic Trading with Predictable Returns and Transaction Costs

This paper derives in closed form the optimal dynamic portfolio policy when trading is costly and security returns are predictable by signals with dierent mean-reversion speeds. The optimal updated portfolio is a linear combination of the existing port- folio, the optimal portfolio absent trading costs, and the optimal portfolio based on future expected returns and transaction costs. Predictors with slower mean reversion (alpha decay) get more weight since they lead to a favorable positioning both now and in the future. We implement the optimal policy for commodity futures and show that the resulting portfolio has superior returns net of trading costs relative to more naive benchmarks. Finally, we derive natural equilibrium implications, including that demand shocks with faster mean reversion command a higher return premium

Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets

We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand are larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then "recover" over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.

Margin-Based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price

In a model with multiple agents with different risk aversions facing margin constraints, we show how securities’ required returns are characterized both by their beta and their margins. Negative shocks to fundamentals make margin constraints bind, lowering risk free rates and raising Sharpe ratios of risky securities, especially for high-margin securities. Such a funding liquidity crisis gives rise to a “basis,” that is, a price gap between securities with identical cash-flows but different margins. In the time series, the basis depends on the shadow cost of capital which can be captured through the interest-rate spread between collateralized and uncollateralized loans, and, in the cross section, it depends on relative margins. We apply the model empirically to the CDS-bond basis and other deviations from the Law of One Price, and to evaluate the effects of unconventional monetary policy and lending facilities

Repeated Auctions with Endogenous Selling

This paper studies trade in repeated auction markets. We show, for conditionally independent signals, that an owner’s decision to sell, expected prices, and continuation values are the same for a large class of auction mechanisms, extending the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to a multi-period setting. Further, we derive a robust No-Trade Theorem. For conditionally affiliated signals, we give conditions under which revenue ranking implies volume and welfare ranking. In particular, we show that English auctions have larger volume and welfare than second-price auctions, which in turn have larger volume and welfare than first-price auctions

Demand-Based Option Pricing

We model the demand-pressure effect on prices when options cannot be perfectly hedged. The model shows that demand pressure in one option contract increases its price by an amount proportional to the variance of the unhedgeable part of the option. Similarly, the demand pressure increases the price of any other option by an amount proportional to the covariance of their unhedgeable parts. Empirically, we identify aggregate positions of dealers and end users using a unique dataset, and show that demand-pressure effects help explain well-known option-pricing puzzles. First, end users are net long index options, especially out-of-money puts, which helps explain their apparent expensiveness and the smirk. Second, demand patterns help explain the prices of single-stock options.

Adverse Selection and Re-Trade

An important feature of financial markets is that securities are traded repeatedly by asymmetrically informed investors. We study how current and future adverse selection affect the required return. We find that the bid-ask spread generated by adverse selection is not a cost, on average, for agents who trade, and hence the bid-ask spread does not directly in uence the required return. Adverse selection contributes to trading-decision distortions, however, implying allocation costs, which affect the required return. We explicitly derive the effect of adverse selection on required returns, and show how our result differs from models that consider the bid-ask spread to be an exogenous cost

Over-the-Counter Marketmaking

We study how intermediation and asset prices are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly marketmakers&rsqou; bid and ask prices in a dynamic model with strategic agents. Bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors or have more easy access to multiple marketmakers. This distinguishes our theory from the information-based intermediation , which implies higher spreads in connection with higher investor sophistication. With a monopolistic marketmaker, bid-ask spreads are higher if investors have easier access to the marketmaker. We discuss several empirical implications and study endogenous search and welfare

Valuation in Dynamic Bargaining Markets

We study the impact on asset prices of illiquidity associated with search and bargaining in an economy in which agents can trade only when they find each other. Marketmakers' prices are higher and bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can find each other more easily. Prices become Walrasian as investors' or marketmakers' search intensities get large. Endogenizing search intensities yields natural welfare implications. Information can fail to be revealed through trading when search is difficult

Valuation in Over-The-Counter Markets

We provide the impact on asset prices of trade by search and bargaining. Under natural conditions, prices are higher if investors can find each other more easily, if sellers have more bargaining power, or if the fraction of qualified owners is greater. If agents face risk limits, then higher volatility leads to greater difficulty locating unconstrained buyers, resulting in lower prices. Information can fail to be revealed through trading when search is difficult. We discuss a variety of financial applications and testable implications