International Prudential Regulation, Regulatory Risk and the Cost of Bank Capital

We define regulatory risk as any regulatory action that leads to an increase in the cost of capital for the regulated firm. In a general equilibrium setting the paper considers the impact of globally harmonising capital adequacy requirements on the cost of bank equity capital. The results show that uniform increases in capital requirements lead to an increase in the cost of capital. However when regulatory standards differ across countries, financial integration leads to positive spillovers which reduces the cost of capital mark up for a given increase in bank capital. Accordingly, regulatory risk may be greater under a regulatory agreement such as the Basel Accord which imposes international uniformity in capital ratios.

Endogenous Capital and Profitability in Banking

This paper investigates the relation between bank capital and profitability. To my knowledge, no previous paper has analysed this problem in a two-equation structural model. Contrary to what is reported with surprising frequency in this field of research, the results show no statistically significant relationship between capital and profitability. Given non-binding capital requirements this finding is consistent with the view that, while raising capital is costly for banks, it is associated with compensating benefits that offset these additional costs. Consequently, when capital structure is endogenously determined in a profit maximising equilibrium, no systematic relation between capital and profit is expected.

A Theory of Precautionary Regulatory Capital in Banking

The orthodox assumption in the banking literature is that capital requirements are a binding constraint on banking behaviour. This is in conflict with the empirical observation that banks hold a bu¤er of capital well in excess of the minimum requirements. This paper develops a model where capital is endogenously determined within a profit maximising equilibrium. Optimality involves balancing the reduction in expected costs associated with regulatory breach with the excess cost of financing from increasing capital. We demonstrate that when the equilibrium probability of regulatory breach is less than one half, banks are expected to hold precautionary capital.