Communication Matters: U.S. Monetary Policy and Commodity Price Volatility

Using a GARCH model, we analyze the influence of U.S. monetary policy action and communication on the price volatility of commodities for the period 1998–2009. We find, first, that U.S. monetary policy events have an economically significant impact on price volatility. Second, expected target rate changes and communications decrease volatility, whereas target rate surprises and unorthodox monetary policy measures increase it. Third, we find a change in reaction to central bank communication during the recent financial crisis: the “calming” effect of communication found for the whole sample is partly offset during that period.Central Bank Communication, Commodities, Federal Reserve Bank, Monetary Policy, Price Volatility

Federal Reserve Communications and Emerging Equity Markets

Work on the impact of U.S. monetary policy on emerging financial markets mostly focuses on official federal funds rate announcements; empirical evidence using data on informal communication channels, such as speeches, is scant. Employing a unique data set covering formal and informal communication channels in a GARCH model framework, we provide comprehensive evidence on the effects of U.S. monetary policy on 17 emerging equity market returns over the period 1998–2009. We find, first, that both monetary policy actions and communications have a significant impact on market returns. Second, target rate change surprises are an important driver of emerging market returns. However, informal communications—particularly when taking into account their higher frequency—have a larger (cumulative) influence on returns than do target rate surprises. Third, during the financial crisis, central bank communication plays an even more pronounced role. Finally, American emerging markets react more to U.S. central bank communications than do non-American markets. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.Central Bank Communication, Emerging Markets, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, Monetary Policy

Financial Market Reaction to Federal Reserve Communications: Does the Crisis Make a Difference?

This paper studies the effects of Federal Reserve communications on US financial market returns from 1998 to 2009 and asks whether a significant change occurred during the financial crisis of August 2007–December 2009. We find, first, that central bank communication moves financial markets in the intended direction. In particular, shorter maturities are affected in an economically meaningful way. Second, speeches by the Chairman generate relatively more public attention than communication by other governors or presidents. Finally, central bank communication is even more market relevant during the financial crisis subsample.Central Bank Communication, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, Financial Markets, Monetary Policy

The Impact of U.S. Central Bank Communication on European and Pacific Equity Markets

We examine the effects of U.S. federal funds target rate changes and all types of FOMC communication on European and Pacific equity market returns using a GARCH model. We show that both types of news have a significant impact, but that the effects are not symmetric: although several communication variables are statistically significant, target rate changes have an economically more important impact. European markets are influenced by a greater variety of FOMC communications than Pacific markets.Central Bank Communication, International Equity Markets, Federal Reserve Bank, U.S. Monetary Policy

The influence of government ideology on monetary policy:New cross-country evidence based on dynamic heterogeneous panels

Using data of 23 OECD countries over the 1980–2005 period, we examine whether government ideology affects monetary policy, conditional on central bank independence. Unlike previous studies in this line of literature, we estimate central bank behavior using forward‐looking and real‐time data in Taylor rule models and use estimators that allow for heterogeneity across countries. Our models with heterogeneous slope coefficients for the full sample do not suggest partisan effects. We also do not find evidence that central bank behavior is conditioned by the interaction of the ideology of the incumbent government and the electoral calendar