Can Managers Use Discretionary Accruals to Ease Financial Constraints? Evidence from Discretionary Accruals Prior to Investment

ABSTRACT: Despite a large literature on discretionary accruals, how the use of discretionary accruals impacts corporate financial decisions is not well understood. We hypothesize that a financially constrained firm with valuable projects can use discretionary accruals to credibly signal positive prospects, enabling it to raise capital to make the investments. We examine a large panel of firms during 1987 to 2009 and find that financially constrained firms with good investment opportunities have significantly higher discretionary accruals prior to investment compared to their unconstrained counterparts. Constrained high-accrual firms have higher earnings-announcement returns than constrained low-accrual firms, obtain more equity and debt financing, and invest in projects that appear to improve performance. These results provide supporting evidence that the use of discretionary accruals can help constrained firms with valuable projects ease those constraints and increase firm value. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.</jats:p

The Determinants of Board Structure

Using a comprehensive sample of nearly 7,000 firms from 1990 to 2004, this paper examines corporate board structure, its trends, and its determinants. We study how board structure has evolved over time and, more importantly, we compare board structure across small and large firms in ways suggested by recent theoretical work. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms structure their boards in response to the costs and benefits of the board\u27s monitoring and advising roles. Our models explain as much as 45% of the observed variation in board structure. Further, small and large firms have dramatically different board structures. For example, board size was falling in the 1990s for large firms, a trend that reversed at the time of mandated reforms, while board size was relatively flat over the 1990s for small and medium-sized firms.

The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors

Using 8,000 public companies we study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and other contemporary reforms on directors and boards, guided by their impact on the supply and demand for directors. SOX increased director workload and risk (reducing the supply), and increased demand by mandating that firms have more outside directors. We find both broad-based changes and cross-sectional changes (by firm size). Board committees meet more often post SOX and Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums doubled. Directors post SOX are more likely to be lawyers/consultants, financial experts and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives. Post-SOX boards are larger and more independent. Finally, we find significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, particularly among smaller firms.

Can Managers Use Discretionary Accruals to Ease Financial Constraints? Evidence from Discretionary Accruals Prior to Investment

Despite a large literature on discretionary accruals, how the use of discretionary accruals impacts corporate financial decisions is not well understood. We hypothesize that a financially constrained firm with valuable projects can use discretionary accruals to credibly signal positive prospects, enabling it to raise capital to make the investments. We examine a large panel of firms during 1987 to 2009 and find that financially constrained firms with good investment opportunities have significantly higher discretionary accruals prior to investment compared to their unconstrained counterparts. Constrained high-accrual firms have higher earnings-announcement returns than constrained low-accrual firms, obtain more equity and debt financing, and invest in projects that appear to improve performance. These results provide supporting evidence that the use of discretionary accruals can help constrained firms with valuable projects ease those constraints and increase firm value

Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Internal Corporate Governance

We use a well-developed dynamic panel GMM estimator to alleviate endogeneity concerns in two aspects of corporate governance research: the effect of board structure on firm performance and the determinants of board structure. The estimator incorporates the dynamic nature of internal governance choices to provide valid and powerful instruments that address unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. We re-examine the relation between board structure and performance using the GMM estimator in a panel of 6,000 firms over a period from 1991-2003, and find no causal relation between board structure and current firm performance. We illustrate why other commonly used estimators that ignore the dynamic relationship between current governance and past firm performance may be biased. We discuss where it may be appropriate to consider the dynamic panel GMM estimator in corporate governance research, as well as caveats to its use

The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors

Using eight thousand public companies, we study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and other contemporary reforms on directors and boards, guided by their impact on the supply and demand for directors. SOX increased directors\u27 workload and risk (reducing the supply), and increased demand by mandating that firms have more outside directors. We find both broad-based changes and cross-sectional changes (by firm size). Board committees meet more often post-SOX and Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums have doubled. Directors post-SOX are more likely to be lawyers/consultants, financial experts, and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives. Post-SOX boards are larger and more independent. Finally, we find significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, particularly among smaller firms