31 research outputs found
Avoiding the ask: a field experiment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving’, mimeo
Abstract What triggers giving? We explore this in a randomized natural field experiment during the Salvation Army's annual campaign. Solicitors were at one or both of two main entrances to a supermarket, making the solicitation either easy or difficult to avoid. Additionally, solicitors were either silent, or asked "please give" to passersby. We observed over 17,000 passings over four days, and found dramatic avoidance of the solicitors, but only during a direct ask. Furthermore, asking increased donations 75%. Across all conditions, seeking the solicitor was exceedingly rare. The results do not support static views of altruism, such as inequity aversion, and instead highlight the importance of social cues and psychological features of the giver-receiver interaction. We argue that avoidance could evidence a lack of altruism or self-control strategy to deal with empathic reflexes to give. * A version of this paper constituted Trachtman's senior thesis at Harvard College, for which it was awarded the best thesis prize and summa cum laude honors. We would like to note that Trachtman took the lead responsibility in coordinating and executing the experiment. Erzo Luttmer provided exceptionally helpful advice along the way. We would also like to than
Be Patient When Measuring Hyperbolic Discounting: Stationarity, Time Consistency and Time Invariance in a Field Experiment
Competition and cooperation in a public goods game: A field experiment
The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12105We explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on contributions in a field experiment. A total of 10,000 potential political donors received solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the competing party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment), or no past contribution information (control). We first theoretically analyze the effect of these treatments on the contribution behavior of agents with different social preferences in a modified intergroup public good (IPG) game. Then, we report the empirical results: Contribution rates in the competitive, cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%, respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of contributions in the compet- itive treatment first order stochastically dominates that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the cooperative treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in IPG settings.George P. Shultz Fund and the B.F. Haley and E.S. Shaw Fellowshi
Competition and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game: A Field Experiment
Working paperWe explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on contributions
in a field experiment. 10,000 potential political donors received
solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the competing
party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment),
or no past contribution information (control). Contribution rates in the competitive,
cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%,
respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of
contributions in the competitive treatment first order stochastically dominates
that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the cooperative
treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary
reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at
twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than
cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in intergroup public
good settings