Were banks special intermediaries in late nineteenth century America? commentary

Banks and banking - History

Contractual Tradeoffs and SMEs Choice of Organizational Form, A View from U.S. and French History, 1830-2000

Today the vast majority of multi-owner firms in the United States are corporations, but that was not the case in the past. Before the advent of the income tax, tort litigation, and significant federal regulation, entrepreneurs more often than not chose to organize as partnerships, a form that economists consider seriously flawed. Why would they make such a terrible mistake? We begin by noting that corporations created new types of contracting problems for businesses at the same time as they solved problems afflicting partnerships. We then model the tradeoffs involved in the choice of corporations versus partnerships and confirm that the model’s assumptions are consistent with U.S. legal rules up through the 1940s. The model implies that partnerships and corporations are complementary organizational forms, and we show that data from the U.S. Census of Manufactures strongly supports that implication. We also verify that the model’s assumptions hold for the broader set of organizational choices available under the French Code de Commerce and use data on multi-owner firms registered in Paris in the 1830s and 1840s to demonstrate the complementary character of the basic forms. Despite much literature emphasizing the fundamentally different environments for business associated with the French and U.S. legal regimes, the basic calculus underpinning the choice of organizational form was the same in both countries.

Inventive Activity and the Market for Technology in the United States, 1840-1920

The growth of the U.S. economy over the nineteenth century was characterized by a sharp acceleration in the rate of inventive activity and a dramatic rise in the relative importance of highly specialized inventors as generators of new technological knowledge. Relying on evidence compiled from patent records, we argue that the evolution of a market for technology played a central role in these developments. Across both individuals and geographic areas, the expansion of opportunities to trade in patent rights was closely associated with increases in specialization at invention, as well as advances in rates of invention more generally. The patent system is often celebrated for the stimulus to invention provided by granting limited monopoly rights to inventors for the use of their discoveries, but its specification of tradable assets in technology has also been important.

The Decline of the Independent Inventor: A Schumpterian Story?

Joseph Schumpeter argued in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy that the rise of large firms%u2019 investments in in-house R&D spelled the doom of the entrepreneurial innovator. We explore this idea by analyzing the career patterns of successive cohorts of highly productive inventors from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We find that over time highly productive inventors were increasingly likely to form long-term attachments with firms. In the Northeast, these attachments seem to have taken the form of employment positions within large firms, but in the Midwest inventors were more likely to become principals in firms bearing their names. Entrepreneurship, therefore, was by no means dead, but the increasing capital requirements%u2014both financial and human%u2014for effective invention and the need for inventors to establish a reputation before they could attract support made it more difficult for creative people to pursue careers as inventors. The relative numbers of highly productive inventors in the population correspondingly decreased, as did rates of patenting per capita.

Financing Invention During the Second Industrial Revolution: Cleveland, Ohio, 1870-1920

For those who think of Cleveland as a decaying rustbelt city, it may seem difficult to believe that this northern Ohio port was once a hotbed of high-tech startups, much like Silicon Valley today. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Cleveland played a leading role in the development of a number of second-industrial-revolution industries, including electric light and power, steel, petroleum, chemicals, and automobiles. In an era when production and inventive activity were both increasingly capital-intensive, technologically creative individuals and firms required greater and greater amounts of funds to succeed. This paper explores how the city's leading inventors and technologically innovative firms obtained financing, and finds that formal institutions, such as banks and securities markets, played only a very limited role. Instead, most funding came from local investors who took long-term stakes in start-ups formed to exploit promising technological discoveries, often assuming managerial positions in these enterprises as well. Business people who were interested in investing in cutting-edge ventures needed help in deciding which inventors and ideas were most likely to yield economic returns, and we show how enterprises such as the Brush Electric Company served multiple functions for the inventors who flocked to work there. Not only did they provide forums for the exchange of ideas, but by assessing each other's discoveries, the members of these technological communities conveyed information to local businessmen about which inventions were most worthy of support.