Effect of Reluctant Players in Demographic Prisoner\u27s Dilemma Game

We consider the effect of reluctant player on emergence of cooperation in Demographic Prisoner\u27s Dilemma game. Players are initially randomly distributed in square lattice of cells. In each period, players move to random cell in von Neumann neighbors if unoccupied and play PD game against neighboring player. If wealth (accumulated payoff) of player becomes negative or his age becomes greater than his lifetime, he dies. If his wealth becomes greater than some amount and there is an unoccupied cell in neighbors, he has an offspring. We introduce global move, global play, and reluctant players who use extended forms of Tit for Tat. TFT uses Cooperate (C) at the first period and thereafter immediately replies with the same move to the opponent\u27s. Unlike TFT, a reluctant player may start with Defect (D) at the first period and delay replying with the opponent\u27s move in the last play to an opponent in the current play. Some types of reluctant players are considered by extent of delay. We investigate, by Agent-Based Simulation, the emergence of cooperation where there are reluctant players as well as AllC\u27s and AllD\u27s, and show some cases where cooperation is emerged more frequently with reluctant players than without them.14th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making under UncertaintyHejnice, Czech RepublicSeptember 18-21, 201

高い磁気活動を示す恒星の観測的研究: 巨大黒点・スーパーフレア・質量噴出

京都大学新制・課程博士博士(理学)甲第23012号理博第4689号新制||理||1672(附属図書館)京都大学大学院理学研究科物理学・宇宙物理学専攻(主査)准教授 野上 大作, 教授 太田 耕司, 教授 一本 潔学位規則第4条第1項該当Doctor of ScienceKyoto UniversityDFA

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