Preparatory Signal Detection for the EU Member States under EU Burden Sharing - Advanced Monitoring Including Uncertainty (1990-2002)

This study follows up the authors' collaborative IIASA Interim Report IR-04-024 (Jonas et al., 2004) which addresses the preparatory detection of uncertain greenhouse gas (GHG) emission changes (also termed emission signals) under the Kyoto Protocol. The question was "how well do we need to know net emissions if we want to detect a specified emission signal after a given time?" The authors use the Protocol's Annex I countries as net emitters and excluded the emission/removals due to land-use change and forestry (LUCF). They motivated the application of preparatory signal detection in the context of the Kyoto Protocol as a necessary measure that should have been taken prior to/in negotiating the Protocol. The authors argued that uncertainties are already monitored and are increasingly made available but that monitored emissions and uncertainties are still dealt with in isolation. A connection between emissions and uncertainty estimates for the purpose of an advanced country evaluation has not yet been established. The authors develop four preparatory signal detection techniques and applied these to the Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The frame of reference for preparatory signal detection is that Annex I countries comply with their committed emission targets in 2008-2012. In our study we apply one of these techniques, the combined undershooting and verification time (Und&VT) concept to advance the monitoring of the GHG emissions reported by the Member States of the European Union (EU). In contrast to the earlier study, we focus on the Member States' committed emission targets under the EU burden sharing in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. We apply the Und&VT concept in the standard mode, i.e., with reference to the Member States committed emission targets in 2008-2012, and in a new mode, i.e., with reference to linear path emission targets between the base year and the commitment year (here for 2001). To advance the reporting of the EU we take uncertainty and its consequences into consideration, i.e., (i) the risk that a Member State's true emissions in the commitment year/period are above its true emission limitation or reduction commitment; and (ii) the detectability of its target. Undershooting the committed EU target or EU-compatible, but detectable, target can decrease this risk. We contrast the Member States' linear path undershooting targets for the year 2001 with their actual emission situation in that year, for which we use the distance-to-target indicator (DTI) introduced by the European Environment Agency. In 2001 only four countries exhibit a negative DTI and thus appear as potential sellers: Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, expecting that the EU Member States exhibit relative uncertainties in the range of 5-10% and above rather than below, excluding emissions/removals due to LUCF, the member states require considerable undershooting of their EU-compatible, but detectable, targets if one wants to keep the associated risk low. These conditions can only be met by the three Member States Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom - or Luxembourg, Germany and the United Kingdom if ranked in terms of creditability. Within the 5-10% relative uncertainty class, Sweden can only act as potential high-risk seller. In contrast, with relative uncertainty increasing from 5 to 10%, the emission signal of the EU as a whole switches from "detectable" to "non-detectable", indicating that the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol were imprudent because they did not take uncertainty and its consequences into account. We anticipate that the evaluation of emission signals in terms of risk and detectability will become standard practice and that these two qualifiers will be accounted for in pricing GHG emission permits

Preparatory Signal Detection for Annex I Countries under the Kyoto Protocol - A Lesson for the Post-Kyoto Policy Process

In our study we address the detection of uncertain GHG emission changes (also termed emission signals) under the Kyoto Protocol. The question to be probed is "how well do we need to know net emissions if we want to detect a specified emission signal after a given time?" No restrictions exist as to what concerns the net emitter. However, for data availability reasons and because of the excellent possibilityof inter-country comparisons, the Protocols Annex I countries are used as net emitters. Another restriction concerns the exclusion of emissions/removals due to land-use change and forestry (LUCF) as the reporting of their uncertainties is only soon becoming standard practice. Our study centers on the preparatory detection of emission signals, which should have been applied prior to/in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. Rigorous preparatory signal detection has not yet been carried out, neither prior to the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol nor afterwards. The starting point for preparatory signal detection is that the Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol comply with with their emission limitation or reduction commitments. Uncertainties are already monitored. However, monitored emissions and uncertainties are still dealt with in isolation. A connection between emission and uncertainty estimates for the purpose of an advanced country evaluation has not yet been established. We apply four preparatory signal detection techniques. These are the Critical Relative Uncertainty (CRU) concept, the Verification Time (VT) concept, the Undershooting (Und) concept, and the Undershooting and Verification Time (Und&VT) concepts combined. All of the techniques identify an emission signal and consider the total uncertainty that underlies the countries emissions, either in the commitment year/period or in both the base year and the commitment year/period. The techniques follow a hierarchical order in terms of complexity permitting to explore their robustness. The most complex technique, the Und&VT concept, considers in addition to uncertainty (1) the dynamics of the signal itself permitting to ask for the verification time, the time when the signal is outstripping total uncertainty; (2) the risk (probability) that the countries true emissions in the commitment year/period are above (below) their true emission limitation or reduction commitments; (3) the undershooting that is needed to reduce this risk to a prescribed level; and (4) a corrected undershooting/risk that accounts for detectability, i.e., that fulfills a given commitment period or, equivalently, its maximal allowable verification time. Our preparatory signal detection exercise exemplifies that the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol were imprudent because they did not consider the consequences of uncertainty, i.e., (1) the risk that the countries true emissions in the commitment year/period are above their true emission limitation or reduction commitments; and (2) detectable targets. Expecting that Annex I countries exhibit relative uncertainties in the range of 5-10 % and above rather than below, excluding emissions/removals due to LUCF, both the CRU concept and VT concept show that it is virtually impossible for most of the Annex I countries to meet the condition that their overall relative uncertainties are smaller than their CRUs or, equivalently, that their VTs are smaller than their maximal allowable verification times. Moreover, the Und and the Und&VT concepts show that the countries committed emission limitation or reduction targets - or their Kyoto-compatible but detectable targets, respectively - require considerable undershooting if one wants to keep the risk low that the countries true emissios in the commitment year/period are above the true equivalents of these targets. The amount by which a country undershoots its Kyoto target or its Kyoto-compatible but detectable target can be traded. Towards installing a successful trading regime, countries may want to also price the risk associated with this amount We anticipate that the evaluation of the countries emission signals in terms of risk and detectability will become reality. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also suggests assessing total uncertainties. However, a connection between monitored emission and uncertainty estimates for the purpose of an advanced country evaluation, which considers the aforementioned risk as well as detectable targets, has not yet been established. The IPCC has to take up this challenge

Desensitization of Gonadotropin-releasing Hormone Action in αT3-1 Cells Due to Uncoupling of Inositol 1,4,5-Trisphosphate Generation and Ca 2+ Mobilization

Gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) acts via a G-protein coupled receptor on gonadotropes to increase cytosolic Ca2+ and stimulate gonadotropin secretion. Sustained exposure causes desensitization of these effects, but the GnRH receptor has no C-terminal tail and does not undergo rapid (<5 min) desensitization. Nevertheless, pretreatment of alphaT3-1 cells with GnRH reduced the spike Ca2+ response to GnRH and decreased the GnRH effect on inositol 1,4,5-trisphosphate (Ins(1,4,5)P3) by 30-50%. Ca2+-free medium with or without thapsigargin also decreased GnRH-stimulated Ins(1,4,5)P3 generation, implying that attenuation of the Ca2+ response underlies the Ins(1,4,5)P3 reduction rather than vice versa. Intracellular Ca2+ pool depletion cannot explain desensitization of the Ca2+ response because pool depletion and repletion were faster (half-times, <1 min) than the onset of and recovery from desensitization (half-times 10-20 min and 4-6 h). Moreover, 1-h GnRH pre-treatment attenuated the spike Ca2+ response to GnRH but not that to ionomycin, and brief GnRH exposure in Ca2+-free medium reduced the response to ionomycin more effectively in controls than in desensitized cells. GnRH pretreatment also attenuated the Ca2+ response to PACAP38. This novel form of desensitization does not reflect uncoupling of GnRH receptors from their immediate effector system but rather a reduced efficiency of mobilization by Ins(1,4,5)P3 of Ca2+ from an intact intracellular pool