Determinants of R&D and Its Productivity: Identifying Demand and Supply Channels (First revision)

Identifying whether an exogenous factor affects R&D from a demand side or from a supply side is an important issue. This paper, first, theoretically shows that a favorable change in either side can reduce the R&D productivity in equilibrium, so that the reduced form estimation cannot provide a clear identification. Secondly, it estimates both structural and reduced form patent production functions, based on instrumental variables approach, using a large database on Japanese firms. According to the estimation, while the initial firm size, market concentration or export orientation increases R&D, none of them significantly shifts the structural patent production function.R&D productivity, patent, firm size, competition

Determinants of high-royalty contracts and the impact of stronger protection of intellectual property rights in Japan

This paper first reviews how Japan has strengthened the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), focusing on the expansion of the patentable subject matter, the restriction of the possibility of compulsory licensing, stronger deterrence against infringement and the introduction of the doctrine of equivalents. Second, based on the statistical analysis of sector-level panel data, it shows that (1)R&D intensity of domestic industry, trademark licensing, cross-licensing and, to a smaller degree, monopoly provisions are the significant determinants of the incidence of high-royalty contracts, and (2)Stronger protection of intellectual property rights looks to have increased the incidence of high-royalty contracts in the latter part of 1990s in the Japanese industries for which patent is important for appropriability.Intellectual property rights, Licensing contract, Appropriability, Patent

R&D and Market Value: Appropriability vs. Preemption

The recent empirical studies on innovation and market value suggest that R&D has a strong complementarity with market share in the market valuation of firms. Blundell, Griffith and Reenen (1999) argue that it represents the strategic preemptive effect, while Hall and Vopel (1997) suggest a Schumpeterian reason (the cost of financing R&D is lower for large firms). The theoretical framework of these studies is the classical work by Griliches (1981), which postulates that the market value of firm is given by the sum of the values of physical capital and R&D capital with respective multipliers. However, non-rivalry in using new knowledge within a firm makes this framework highly questionable. This paper examines the nexus between R&D and market value, based on a simple but new structural model. Major findings are the following. First, the new model shows that the market evaluation of R&D may well be high for a firm with a large market share, simply due to its appropriability advantage. Second, our estimation based on the data of the Japanese firms shows that the new specification performs better. Third, it shows that there is no statistical support for the prevalence of preemption effect.R&D, market value, appropriability, preemption

Patent quality, cumulative innovation and market value: Evidence from Japanese firm level panel data

We examine empirically how patent quality in terms of forward citation and science linkage affect the market value of a firm. We find that both indicators affect the market value of a firm significantly even if we extensively control the effects of the other major determinants of the market value, including R&D investment and current return on asset. In addition, the forward citation affects the market value more in cumulative innovation area such as in IT, consistent with a theoretical proposition that the value of having a dependent patent is larger in the industry where innovation is cumulative among firms.patent quality, market value, forward citation, science linkage, cumulative innovation

The Utility Standard and the Patentability of Intermediate Technology

We explore the consequences of the utility requirement on speed of innovation, welfare and public policy. A weak utility requirement means that an intermediate technology with no immediate application or commercial value is patentable. Using a model of two stage innovation with free entry and trade secrecy, we identify cases when patentability is beneficial to society. Although a firm may undertake basic research protected by trade secrecy, patentability is still desirable when spillover is high and innovation costs are high. However, patentability becomes less desirable as basic research costs decrease. We also show that high value of final technology by itself does not favor non-patentability and identify condition when it does.

Coalition Formation for a Consortium Standard Through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G

We examine why cooperation among essential patent holders for a standard may not occur, despite significant gains for patent holders and users of the standard. Utilizing Maskin's (2003) framework, we show that a grand coalition can be implemented only if the number of patent holders (n) is small. When n is large, emergence of an outsider is inevitable, so that voluntary sequential negotiation cannot secure the socially efficient outcome. We also show that a firm specialized in research is more likely to become an outsider. We discuss the MPEG2, DVD and 3G patent pools in light of these results.

Acquisitions and use of patents: A theory and new evidence ｆrom the Japanese firm level data

A significant part of the patents held by a firm are not used. We show that, given the uncertainty of invention quality at the patent application stage and the sunk cost incurred for obtaining and developing a patent, the patent (internal) utilization rate declines with the (anticipated) size of complementary assets, licensing opportunity, and invention quality uncertainty while it increases with the average quality of an invention. We find empirical evidence supportive of these theoretical predictions. Moreover, a firm with larger price cost margin does not have a lower rate of patent utilization, which does not support the view of preemptive R&D and patenting as a primary explanation of unused patents. Finally, a firm with more diversified patent portfolio tends to have more patents but its utilization rate tends to be lower, suggesting that such diversification facilitates appropriation.patent, unused patents, uncertainty, complementary assets

The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools

We examine patent pools in the context of a consortium standard. Although such pools of complementary technologies are approved by antitrust authorities, the actual implementation has proved to be problematic. We identify two possible obstacles: free riding and bargaining failure. We also examine the traditional RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing condition. We suggest formation, licensing and rent distribution methods more conducive to a successful patent pool operation.

The Utility Standard and the Patentability of Intermediate Technology

We explore the consequences of the utility requirement on speed of innovation and welfare. A weak utility requirement means that an intermediate technology with no immediate application or commercial value is patentable. Using a model of two stage innovation with free entry and trade secrecy, we identify cases when patentability is beneficial to society. Although a firm may undertake basic research protected by trade secrecy, patentability is still desirable when spillover is high and innovation costs are high. However, patentability becomes less desirable as basic research costs decrease. We also show that high value of final technology by itself does not favor non-patentability and identify condition when it does.utility requirement, basic research, patentability, innovation

"The Utility Standard and the Patentability of Basic Research"

We explore the consequences of the utility requirement for patents on speed of innovation. Basic research output, that has no immediate appli-cation except for as a step to further research, may not be patentable be-cause it does not fulfill the utility requirement of patentability. Patentabil-ity of basic research differs from the questions analyzed in the past sequen-tial innovation framework, in that basic research has no market value in itself and patentability of the first-stage invention, rather than that of the second-stage invention, is an issue. There is never immediate gain for the innovator (or static loss to society) of obtaining a patent and the gain is purely from appropriating future success of the application technology. We extend Denicolo (2000) model to identify conditions in which allowing basic research to be patented is socially desirable.