Predicting {0, 1}-Functions on Randomly Drawn Points

AbstractWe consider the problem of predicting {0, 1}-valued functions on Rn and smaller domains, based on their values on randomly drawn points. Our model is related to Valiant′s PAC learning model, but does not require the hypotheses used for prediction to be represented in any specified form. In our main result we show how to construct prediction strategies that are optimal to within a constant factor for any reasonable class F of target functions. This result is based on new combinatorial results about classes of functions of finite VC dimension. We also discuss more computationally efficient algorithms for predicting indicator functions of axis-parallel rectangles, more general intersection closed concept classes, and halfspaces in Rn. These are also optimal to within a constant factor. Finally, we compare the general performance of prediction strategies derived by our method to that of those derived from methods in PAC learning theory

Braess's Paradox in Wireless Networks: The Danger of Improved Technology

When comparing new wireless technologies, it is common to consider the effect that they have on the capacity of the network (defined as the maximum number of simultaneously satisfiable links). For example, it has been shown that giving receivers the ability to do interference cancellation, or allowing transmitters to use power control, never decreases the capacity and can in certain cases increase it by $\Omega(\log (\Delta \cdot P_{\max}))$, where $\Delta$ is the ratio of the longest link length to the smallest transmitter-receiver distance and $P_{\max}$ is the maximum transmission power. But there is no reason to expect the optimal capacity to be realized in practice, particularly since maximizing the capacity is known to be NP-hard. In reality, we would expect links to behave as self-interested agents, and thus when introducing a new technology it makes more sense to compare the values reached at game-theoretic equilibria than the optimum values. In this paper we initiate this line of work by comparing various notions of equilibria (particularly Nash equilibria and no-regret behavior) when using a supposedly "better" technology. We show a version of Braess's Paradox for all of them: in certain networks, upgrading technology can actually make the equilibria \emph{worse}, despite an increase in the capacity. We construct instances where this decrease is a constant factor for power control, interference cancellation, and improvements in the SINR threshold ($\beta$), and is $\Omega(\log \Delta)$ when power control is combined with interference cancellation. However, we show that these examples are basically tight: the decrease is at most O(1) for power control, interference cancellation, and improved $\beta$, and is at most $O(\log \Delta)$ when power control is combined with interference cancellation

Competing with stationary prediction strategies

In this paper we introduce the class of stationary prediction strategies and construct a prediction algorithm that asymptotically performs as well as the best continuous stationary strategy. We make mild compactness assumptions but no stochastic assumptions about the environment. In particular, no assumption of stationarity is made about the environment, and the stationarity of the considered strategies only means that they do not depend explicitly on time; we argue that it is natural to consider only stationary strategies even for highly non-stationary environments.Comment: 20 page

Do Prices Coordinate Markets?

Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats. First, the prices alone are not sufficient to coordinate the market, and buyers may need to select among their most preferred bundles in a coordinated way to find a feasible allocation. Second, we don't in practice expect to encounter exact equilibrium prices tailored to the market, but instead only approximate prices, somehow encoding "distributional" information about the market. How well do prices work to coordinate markets when tie-breaking is not coordinated, and they encode only distributional information? We answer this question. First, we provide a genericity condition such that for buyers with Matroid Based Valuations, overdemand with respect to equilibrium prices is at most 1, independent of the supply of goods, even when tie-breaking is done in an uncoordinated fashion. Second, we provide learning-theoretic results that show that such prices are robust to changing the buyers in the market, so long as all buyers are sampled from the same (unknown) distribution