A Role for Theory in Eyewitness Identification Research

For 20 to 30 years eyewitness identification research has been expanding, and, increasingly, it is providing a focus for researchers in cognitive, developmental, and social psychology. By relying on carefully controlled experimentation, often guided by observations from actual criminal cases (e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 1972; People v. McDonald, 1984; United States v. Ash, 1973; United States v. Wade, 1967), this research has advanced our understanding of eyewitness fallibility and provided many useful practical guidelines for the conduct of eyewitness identification tests (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). Many of the advances in the field have resulted from the fact that research has directly targeted specific practical issues (e.g., the nature of instructions given to witnesses prior to the identification test, the mode of presentation of lineup members at the identification test). Much less prominent, however, has been research that has been motivated primarily by the desire to refine our theories of identification decision processes. Here we endeavor to make the case that continued and meaningful practical developments will be most likely to occur if we can provide significant theoretical insights into key aspects of the identification decision process, and that this should be a major motivating factor in future research. A problem with the purely practically motivated approach is that research studies run the risk of being haphazard or uncoordinated, leading to one-off forays into the particular field of inquiry. In contrast, a theoretically based approach, which asks fundamental questions about the nature of the processes underlying eyewitness identification behavior, can provide a structure or integrative framework that should guide research toward a more satisfying conclusion. Although the latter approach sometimes conveys the impression that researchers are merely treading water when it comes to the development of practical applications, it is our belief that, ultimately, the most useful and powerful practical claims will derive from such an approach

Eyewitness identification

Neil Brewer, Nathan weber, and Carolyn Semmle

Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Response Latency: The Unruly 10-12-Second Rule

Copyright © 2004 American Psychological Association This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.Data are reported from 3,213 research eyewitnesses confirming that accurate eyewitness identifications from lineups are made faster than are inaccurate identifications. However, consistent with predictions from the recognition and search literatures, the authors did not find support for the "10-12-s rule" in which lineup identifications faster than 10-12 s maximally discriminate between accurate and inaccurate identifications (D. Dunning & S. Perretta, 2002). Instead, the time frame that proved most discriminating was highly variable across experiments, ranging from 5 s to 29 s, and the maximally discriminating time was often unimpressive in its ability to sort accurate from inaccurate identifications. The authors suggest several factors that are likely to moderate the 10-12-s rule.Nathan Weber, Neil Brewer, Gary L. Wells, Carolyn Semmler and Amber Keas

How variations in distance affect eyewitness reports and identification accuracy

© Springer. Part of Springer Science+Business MediaWitnesses observe crimes at various distances and the courts have to interpret their testimony given the likely quality of witnesses’ views of events. We examined how accurately witnesses judged the distance between themselves and a target person, and how distance affected description accuracy, choosing behavior, and identification test accuracy. Over 1,300 participants were approached during normal daily activities, and asked to observe a target person at one of a number of possible distances. Under a Perception, Immediate Memory, or Delayed Memory condition, witnesses provided a brief description of the target, estimated the distance to the target, and then examined a 6-person target-present or target-absent lineup to see if they could identify the target. Errors in distance judgments were often substantial. Description accuracy was mediocre and did not vary systematically with distance. Identification choosing rates were not affected by distance, but decision accuracy declined with distance. Contrary to previous research, a 15-m viewing distance was not critical for discriminating accurate from inaccurate decisions.R. C. L. Lindsay, Carolyn Semmler, Nathan Weber, Neil Brewer and Marilyn R. Lindsa