48 research outputs found
Inverse Association between Educational Status and Coronary CT Calcium Scores: Should We Reflect This in Our ASCVD Risk Assumptions?
Education is not a factor included in most cardiovascular risk models, including SCORE2. However, higher education has been associated with lower cardiovascular morbidity and mortality. Using CACS as a proxy for ASCVD, we studied the association between CACS and educational status. Subjects, aged 40–69, from the Paracelsus 10,000 cohort, who underwent calcium scoring as part of screening for subclinical ASCVD, were classified into low, medium, and high educational status using the Generalized International Standard Classification of Education. CACS was dichotomised as either 0 or >0 for logistic regression modelling. Our analysis showed that higher educational status was associated with higher odds for 0 CACS (aOR 0.42; 95%CI 0.26–0.70; p = 0.001). However, there was no statistically significant association between the levels of total, HDL or LDL cholesterol and educational status, nor any statistical differences in HbA1c. SCORE2 did not differ between the three educational categories (4 ± 2% vs. 4 ± 3% vs. 4 ± 2%; p = 0.29). While our observations confirmed the relationship between increased educational status and lower ASCVD risk, the effect of educational status was not mediated via its impact on classical risk factors in our cohort. Thus, perhaps educational status should be taken into account to more accurately reflect individual risk in cardiovascular risk models
Der Einsatz neuer Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien in der Marketingausbildung — ein Erfahrungsbericht
System- vs. consumer-generated recommendations: affective and social-psychological effects on purchase intention
The Impact of Information Diffusion on Bidding Behavior in Secret Reserve Price Auctions
What Does a Construction Manager Look Like? Perceptions of Hispanic High School Students and Parents
Public Sector Science And The Strategy Of The Commons
We model the conditions under which incumbent firms may purposefully create an intellectual property (IP) commons such that no firm has the incentive to invest in new product development, despite the potential profitability of a public sector invention. The strategy of spoiling incentives to innovate by eliminating exclusive IP rights—the strategy of the commons—is motivated by a fear of cannibalization and supported by a credible threat. We show how the degree of potential cannibalization is related to this market failure and characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in which the strategy of the commons is played.Entry deterrence, Intellectual property, University research, Welfare loss, Cannibalization,
