Masculinity—Femininity

Six areas of research in developmental and personality psychology concerning sex-typed traits, attitudes, and interests are identified as elements of a common “masculinity-femininity” paradigm needing reexamination. The masculinity-femininity paradigm is defined in relationship to Money and Ehrhardt's model for gender identity differentiation and dimorphism. The six lines of research in the masculinity-femininity paradigm are then briefly critically examined: (1) the measurability of masculinity-femininity as a trait, (2) the identification model of masculinity-femininity development, (3) the effects of father absence on boys, (4) correlates of masculinity-femininity in life adjustment, (5) cross-sex identity in males, and (6) sex role identity problems in black males. The empirical and conceptual problems in each line of research are explored, and are substantial enough to suggest the need for alternate paradigms. Two alternate models for masculinity-femininity development are briefly sketched. First, masculinity-femininity development is analogized to moral development, as a phasic process ideally leading to sex role transcendence and androgyny. Second, the acquisition of masculinity-femininity is analogized to language acquisition, as a highly symbol-dependent learning process contingent upon the interaction between an innate acquisition apparatus and a corpus of observed sex role behavior.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45567/1/11199_2004_Article_BF00288009.pd

Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based decision making for health policy makers

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Current healthcare systems have extended the evidence-based medicine (EBM) approach to health policy and delivery decisions, such as access-to-care, healthcare funding and health program continuance, through attempts to integrate valid and reliable evidence into the decision making process. These policy decisions have major impacts on society and have high personal and financial costs associated with those decisions. Decision models such as these function under a shared assumption of rational choice and utility maximization in the decision-making process.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>We contend that health policy decision makers are generally unable to attain the basic goals of evidence-based decision making (EBDM) and evidence-based policy making (EBPM) because humans make decisions with their naturally limited, faulty, and biased decision-making processes. A cognitive information processing framework is presented to support this argument, and subtle cognitive processing mechanisms are introduced to support the focal thesis: health policy makers' decisions are influenced by the subjective manner in which they individually process decision-relevant information rather than on the objective merits of the evidence alone. As such, subsequent health policy decisions do not necessarily achieve the goals of evidence-based policy making, such as maximizing health outcomes for society based on valid and reliable research evidence.</p> <p>Summary</p> <p>In this era of increasing adoption of evidence-based healthcare models, the rational choice, utility maximizing assumptions in EBDM and EBPM, must be critically evaluated to ensure effective and high-quality health policy decisions. The cognitive information processing framework presented here will aid health policy decision makers by identifying how their decisions might be subtly influenced by non-rational factors. In this paper, we identify some of the biases and potential intervention points and provide some initial suggestions about how the EBDM/EBPM process can be improved.</p