23 research outputs found

    „Piedmont”, „Banderstadt”, and the „Cradle of nationalism”. Ethnopolitical study of a city

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    The West Ukrainian city of Lviv is often described as a „cradle”, or „hotbed”, of Ukrainian nationalism, within a broader media-spread narrative that counter-opposes Ukraine’s allegedly „nationalistic West” and so-called „pro-Russian East”. The article questions this quasi-binary opposition at the both formal-logical and substantive level, and examines the factors that informed and still tend to support the „nationalistic” image of the region. It finds out no data-based evidence of a higher level of xenophobia or intolerance in Western Ukraine if compared with other Ukrainian regions or some neighboring states, and concludes that the primary reason for the „nationalistic” othering of the city of Lviv and the Western Ukraine was their defiance of the Soviet rule, Soviet norms and values in the post-WWII period. That defiance had many forms but the most manifestly observable was a brazen free use of Ukrainian in the urban environment, deemed „nationalistic” and stigmatized elsewhere in Ukraine. The article draws on the earlier observations of close connection between Ukrainian identity (nationalism) and pro-Western orientation (set of values), determined by a peculiar development of the Ukrainian national project since its very inception in the first half of the 19th century. The higher patriotic mobilization in Lviv (and in Western Ukraine in general) is seen as the main reason for a higher level of social optimism and apparently exaggerated assessments of personal well-being in Lviv vis-à-vis Ukraine’s average. Nowadays, West Ukrainians and the denizens of Lviv face a difficult dual task: to tackle their burdensome „nationalistic” image and to play the self-assigned role of Ukrainian „Piedmont” that leads both the national revival and social modernization. The emphasis on the latter, the essay implies, might be a good key to the successful managing of the former

    Whose crisis? Russian Intelligentsia and the Ukrainian Question - Coming to Terms

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    The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war euphemistically defined as the “Ukrainian crisis”, brought to the fore, once again, a striking inability of the Russian cultured and educated stratum to come to terms with Ukraine’s cultural distinctness and political sovereignty, and to withstand soberly the unscrupulous propaganda of the Kremlin regime. The paper examines reaction of Russian intelligentsia to what they perceive as the “Ukrainian crisis” and searches for historicaland cultural roots of what is in fact a profound crisis of Russian identity and nationhood.Trwająca rosyjsko-ukraińska wojna, określana eufemistycznie jako „ukraiński kryzys”, uwyraźniłapo raz kolejny fatalną niezdolność rosyjskiej warstwy ludzi wykształconych do pogodzenia się z ukraińską odrębnością kulturalną i polityczną. Jak pokazuje przedstawiona tutaj analiza, zdecydowana większość wykształconych Rosjan bezwładnie ulega pozbawionej skrupułów propagandzie Kremla, wspierając entuzjastycznie jego agresywną politykę wobec sąsiadów. Esej wyjaśnia historyczne i kulturalne źródła tego zjawiska, sugerując, że tak zwany „ukraiński kryzys” jest w istocie przejawem i dramatycznym skutkiem coraz ostrzejszego kryzysu rosyjskiej tożsamości

    Calling a spade a spade. Russian propaganda rhetoric as probable evidence of genocidal intentions

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    The number and scale of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian military in Ukraine since the start of the all-out invasion in February 2022 have prompted many experts and politicians to define this brutality as genocide and seek prosecution of the perpetrators under international law.Ukrainian investigators and prosecutors, in cooperation with foreign colleagues, are carefully documenting relevant facts, while lawyers and diplomats are looking for optimal ways to administer justice within existing or newly created international judicial institutions. At the same time, many express a warning that among the four types of crimes recognized by the UN as the most serious and those that do not have a statute of limitations, the crime of genocide is the most difficult to prove in judicial practice, because the number of war crimes in itself, however brutal and large-scale, does not make them genocide from a legal point of view, if the most important and necessary for such a formal and legal qualification is not proven: genocidal intent on the part of the military and/or political leadership of the aggressor country. Politicians usually do not give such orders in writing, and even make them orally, as a rule, in a veiled form. Therefore, it is necessary to prove genocidal intentions in court on the basis of indirect evidence — an analysis of the entire sum of the statements of high-ranking officials of the aggressor country, who ideologically justify and encourage genocide, using various euphemisms at the same time (calling, for example, for the extermination of the fictional "Nazis" in Ukraine, under which they have meaning all self-conscious Ukrainians), as well as — on the basis of a comparison of veiled genocidal statements with the corresponding systematic actions of the occupying forces and the administration, which clearly translate the ideological instructions of the leadership into the practical plane.The author of the article shows that the genocidal intentions of the Kremlin, despite all their rhetorical veiling, can be proven if the corresponding anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Russian government officials, experts and propagandists is systematically analyzed, deconstructed and contextualized as a certain integrity, in close connection with the specific actions of the occupying army and administration

    Calling a Spade a Spade: How to Unwrap a Genocidal Essence from the Kremlin Anti-Ukrainian Rhetoric

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    The sheer number and scale of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian military in Ukraine since the beginning of their all-out invasion, has prompted many experts and politicians to define this brutality as a genocide and seek for the prosecution of perpetrators under international law. The lawyers are cautious in this regard, however, maintaining that crucial element of the criminal case – the clear-cut proof of a genocidal intent on the side of the Russian leadership – might be missing or largely unprovable in the court. This article provides an overview of the ongoing debate on the alleged Russian genocide in Ukraine and argues that the Kremlin’s genocidal intent can be proved if the anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Russian officials, pundits, and propagandists is systemically scrutinized, deconstructed, and contextualized
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