Investigating Implemented Process Design: A Case Study on the Impact of Process-aware Information Systems on Core Job Dimensions

Adequate process design particularly means that a process fulfills its stakeholders’ expectations. However, when designing process-aware information systems (PAIS), one stakeholder and his expectations are often neglected: the end user. Frequently, this results in end user fears, which, in turn, lead to emotional resistance and a lack of user support during process and information system design. In order to overcome this vicious circle it becomes necessary to better understand the impact of operationalized process design on the end users’ work profile. This paper presents the results of a case study at two Dutch companies.We investigate in which way employees perceive the impact of a newly introduced PAIS based on workflow management technology with respect to five job dimensions: skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and feedback from the job

Global Militarization Index 2017

Compiled by BICC, the Global Militarization Index (GMI) presents on an annual basis the relative weight and importance of a country's military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The GMI 2017 covers 151 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2016). The index project is financially supported by Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The ten countries that have the highest levels of militarization for the year 2016 are Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Russia, South Korea, Kuwait, Jordan, Cyprus, Greece and Brunei. These countries allocate particularly high levels of resources to the armed forces in comparison to other areas of society. For some countries that are included in the top 20 militarized countries in the world, the sharp decline in the price of oil has led to a reduction in military expenditures: Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia but also Azerbaijan. In South American countries too, especially in Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Mexico, the drop in oil prices caused military spending to fall more or less significantly. One regional focus of the GMI 2017 is the Americas: The two most militarized countries in the region are Cuba and the United States. US military spending increased again for the first time since 2009 and, at US Dollar11 billion, was the highest in the world. While the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba, show a relatively low level of militarization, the South American states can be found more in the upper mid-range. This year’s GMI also positions the degree of militarization relative to Transparency International’s (TI) Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The defence sector is particularly opaque and vulnerable: Corrupt elites negotiate arms deals which, even though they frequently make little sense from a military point of view, help to make them rich. The comparison of the indices shows clearly, however, that corruption does not by any means only occur in highly militarized countries but also in many countries with comparatively low levels of militarization, indicating deficits in the security sector and weak state institutions

Global Militarization Index 2016

Compiled by BICC, the Global Militarization Index (GMI) presents on an annual basis the relative weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The GMI 2016 covers 152 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2015). The index project is financially supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. With Armenia, Russia, Cyprus, Greece and Azerbaijan, five European countries are amongst the top 10 worldwide. Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in particular and the continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine, the security situation in Europe has changed. While, for 2015, eastern European states in particular have shown a marked increase in militarization, a similar trend cannot be observed for most western European countries. Against the background of protracted conflicts in the Middle East, the level of militarization of most countries remains high. Israel is still at the top and Jordan on position four. It will be interesting in the coming years to see how oil prices, which have sharply fallen since mid-2014, will affect the militarization of the Gulf States and their extensive weapons purchases. Singapore, South Korea and Brunei are also in the top 10. It remains to be seen how the tensions from the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and connected modernization and armament efforts will shape the level of militarization in Asia. This year’s GMI highlights the relationship between the level of militarization and the Global Hunger Index, which defines the causes of hunger not only in economic or climate change terms but also with regard to instability or violent conflict. The fact that most states suffering from hunger also have comparatively low levels militarization shows that a low level of militarization often does not point to a peaceful society but more often than not to a weak security sector and the absence of a safe environment. But, within the 20 states that suffer the most from hunger, there are also countries with a relatively high level of militarization. There, high investment is tied up in military resources that would otherwise be available to fight against hunger or to invest in the health system

On the road to liquid warfare? Revisiting Zygmunt Bauman's thoughts on liquid modernity in the context of the "new Western way of war"

This Working Paper examines military interventions by precision strikes from a distance as a means to avoiding ground combat with own troops. A prominent strand of the literature argues that this is a particularly Western phenomenon; a consequence of the casualty aversion of democratic states and their riskaverse political leaders. In contrast to this line of argument, this Paper argues that precision-strike warfare is not a particularly Western phenomenon, but that it follows from the proliferation of precision-strike technologies prompted by military modernization processes and the transformation of power in what Bauman calls “liquid modernity”. In liquid modernity, the major technique of power is the rejection of territorial confinement and the related responsibilities and costs of order-building. Based on these thoughts, this Paper argues that we have to understand precision-strike warfare with its hit-and-run characteristics as liquid warfare: a way of war that shuns the direct control of territory, focusing instead on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure, copying certain characteristics of guerrilla warfare

Keeping space safe: towards a long-term strategy to arms control in space

When in 2007, China shot down an old weather satellite of its own this was the first test of an anti-satellite weapon since the 1980s. Many observers saw this as a reaction to an increasing investment of the United States in advanced technology for the “control” of space and warned of an arms race in space. Such an arms race would indeed have negative consequences for space safety and for the security of all space-faring nations. An exchange of violence in space would strongly restrain the usability of space and it could escalate to war on earth. But even below the threshold of a space war, space debris resulting from space weapon testing, could severely affect space safety. Currently, there are more than 21,000 pieces of trackable space debris in orbit that endanger other space objects such as satellites. Further testing of anti-satellite weapons would increase this number significantly. Keeping in mind that a lot of money is earned with space applications – the global revenue of the space industry in 2009 amounted to $261.61 billion – an arms race in space would have negative economic consequences, too. Then how can we keep space safe? This is the central question, this report wants to answer. One recent initiative in this regard is the EU proposal to make the major spacefaring states agree on a Code of Conduct for behavior in space. While the establishment of “rules of the road” for space would be a first step into the right direction, it does not ban space weapons and hence cannot prevent an arms race in space. This report argues that the establishment of an international arms control regime for space would be a better instrument to keep space safe and that the EU should therefore combine its Code of Conduct approach with an initiative to establish such a regime. Of course, an arms control regime for space cannot be established overnight. This report outlines a long-term strategy that maps out the central problems that must be solved to reach arms control in space. In order to do so, it draws on theoretical considerations on the establishment of international regimes. The finding of this analysis is that in order to be able to agree on arms control in space, states must solve two classical problems of international cooperation, namely cheating and the unequal distribution of gains. This is possible, though, by drawing upon classical solutions to these problems, namely verification and issue-linkage. A first problem that prevents states from agreeing to arms control in space is the fear that other states would not stick to their commitment. This fear is reflected in the American concern for effective verification and, indeed, drawing up mechanisms for verification must be part of any arms control agreement for space. This is possible, though. Although not every action that could lead to the development of space weapons can be verified, testing space weapons under real conditions can. Since space weapons cannot be developed overnight, states can make use of a strategy of reciprocity, a kind of space weapons testing tit-for-tat. A second problem results from the fact that states tend to cooperate only, if the gains from this cooperation are distributed equally. This is not easy in the case of space weapons where the U.S. clearly has the technological lead. However, a general ban of space weapons provides for a compromise between the U.S. – that chiefly would benefit from a ban on ground-based anti-satellite weapons – and Russia and China who mainly seek to restrict the placement of more sophisticated weapons in orbit. However, before these problems can be tackled, the major space-faring states have to “learn” that due to the interdependent character of space, unilateral strategies, i.e. developing space weapons, do not further their security. By drawing a parallel between the case of space weapons and nuclear arms control during the Cold War, this report argues that the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of space experts from the major space-faring states that produces consensual knowledge on the dangers of warfare in space would be an important step to foster learning in space. The EU could facilitate such a process of knowledge building by initiating a series of conferences among scientists from the major space-faring nations on the dangers of war in space

Global Militarisation Index 2015

Compiled by BICC, the Global Militarisation Index (gmi) presents on an annual basis the relative weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The 2015 GMI covers 152 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2014). The index project is financially supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (bmz). There are numerous sources of conflict around the world that are driving militarisation in many regions and inducing states to modernise their armed forces or increase defence budgets. Among the ten countries with the highest level of militarisation—namely Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Jordan, South Korea, Russia, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Kuwait and Greece—three are in the Middle East, two in Asia and five in Europe. The United States and China are absent from the GMI Top 10, despite being global leaders in military spending. This is because when their military expenditures are measured as a proportion of gross domestic product (gdp), and their military headcount and heavy weapon system numbers are measured per 1,000 inhabitants, the situation looks rather different. Nevertheless, they are following the trend towards restructuring and modernisation of the armed forces. The region with the highest level of militarisation is again the Middle East. This upward trend must be seen in connection with the violent conflicts across the region—the Israel–Palestine conflict, the war in Yemen, the civil war in Syria and the regional threat posed by so-called Islamic State (is). In Europe, too, we find high levels of militarisation. Current crises, not least the war in eastern Ukraine, could become the factor that will push up defence budgets in the future. There is also a local arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan triggered by the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict. Included for the first time in the 2015 GMI report is an examination of the relationships between militarisation and human development by considering the Human Development Index (hdi). For stronger economies, we find that a high GMI ranking is often accompanied by a high HDI value (Israel, Singapore). The relationship between militarisation and human development may again differ in countries where a high GMI is combined with a low HDI, such as Chad, or Mauretania. Here, disproportionately high spending on the armed forces may be taking critical resources away from development

The Libyan civil war: shining a spotlight on a problematic arms export policy

The German government frequently stresses that it pursues a “restrictive arms export policy”. And yet, some of the biggest customers of German arms manufacturers are countries in the Middle East (MENA region) in particular. In their comments Simone Wisotzki (HSFK) and Max Mutschler (BICC) criticise in particular German arms exports to states which–as in the case of Libya–violate UN arms embargoes

Transparent reporting for a successful Arms Trade Treaty

The ATT needs a reporting mechanism that increases transparency of the international arms trade. Transparency is a precondition to monitoring the adherence of signatory states to the criteria of the ATT and pro vides the basis for the further development of international norms for arms transfers. At a minimum, states parties to the ATT should aim to report on authorised and actual exports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) of the ATT. information provided should include the numbers and description of transferred weapons, the financial value of the licence, transit countries and the recipient country. A standardised reporting template should provide the opportunity to offer additional information, such as more details on the end­users and on the condition of the weapons. Such a voluntary segment should further include the exports of ammunition/munitions, parts and components, production licences, technologies and equipment for the manufacturing of conventional arms. Creating incentives is vital for such an approach. A commitment to voluntary reporting should have a positive effect on the level of assistance that states receive in the framework of the ATT. furthermore, participation in the reporting system should be taken as an indicator for the trustworthiness of states as partners on the international arms market. States parties to the ATT should discuss how a system of denial reporting could look like. States could start to pro vide information on denials of arms export licences confidentially and on a voluntary, rather informal, basis, possibly leading to a more standardised process in the future. later on stage, this might be complemented by an aggregated report on denials that would be made public

German arms in the Yemen war: for a comprehensive arms embargo against the war coalition

In view of the flagrant violation of international humanitarian law by the countries involved in the Yemen war, export moratoria of limited duration, such as the current German ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia until 30 March, are not sufficient. Because of the active participation of other countries in the air raids, the naval blockade in the Red Sea and the transfer of arms toYemeni militias, the German government must decide on a comprehensive arms embargo that is not limited in time against all countries of the Saudi-led coalition. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan and Senegal are militarily directly involved in the Yemen war either through their participation in the air raids, the naval blockade or through the deployment of land forces. All of them therefore must not receive any military equipment from Germany until further notice. The German government has to revoke all export licences that have been granted for arms exports to these countries. The German government must adopt the European Parliament's demand that no more military equipment be supplied to Saudi Arabia, expand it to include the United Arab Emirates and actively support it within the European Union. The German government must exert pressure on Rheinmetall to stop further deliveries of ammunition by its foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures to the countries of the war coalition. The federal government must use diplomatic channels to demand information from Saudi Arabia and the UAE about the whereabouts of small arms supplied from Germany or produced under a German licence. It must address the apparent equipment of local militias in Yemen with German weapons and forcefully demand an explanation for this